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Overview
The last four decades have seen a rise in economic inequality throughout the world.
This has sparked interest into distributional issues both in the public as well as
in the economic profession. Several causes have been proposed for this increase in
economic inequality.
One cause which frequently discussed in public debates are the recent advances
in automation technology: Industrial robots as well as computerization have taken
over tasks that have in the past been performed by humans. This technological
change has greatly affected the workplace, and there are growing concerns that
automation technologies displace workers, lead to higher unemployment, decrease
wages, and eventually lead to higher inequality.
A second central issue underlying the question of inequality is about equal op-
portunity. Whereas inequality in incomes across individuals may be tolerated to
some extent, many consider inequality in opportunities to be unfair. We have re-
cently witnessed a significant concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. In the
form of inheritances and investment into the human capital of children by their par-
ents such inequality is transmitted from one generation to the next. This may lead
children of rich parents to have better opportunities than children of poor families.
It is clear that questions of social mobility and opportunity lie at the heart of the
conerns about high economic inequality. This disseration studies these two topics
of inequality in three chapters, which are briefly outlined below.
The first Chapter, entitled Automating Labor: Evidence from Firm-level Patent
Data, studies to what extent increases in low-skilled wages lead firms to invent new
automation technologies. Answering this question is essential to understand the
long-term effects of policy inverventions such as higher minimum wages. Previous
1
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research has mostly focused either on automation adoption rather than innovation
or on the reverse effects of automation innovation on wages. We are the first to
study the effect of wages on automation innovation. In this chapter, we make two
contributions. First, we develop a novel patent-based measure of automation in-
novation. To do that we classify patents as automation by using a combination of
full-text keyword search and technological classification codes which are assigned to
patents. We show that our measure is highly correlated with decreases in routine
tasks in U.S. industries. Our second contribution is to use this patent classification
to identify the causal effect of low-skilled wages on automation innovation. We iden-
tify the causal effect of wages on automation by building on the method by Aghion
et al. (2016), which exploits firm-level variation in firms’ exposure to countries as an
identification strategy. We find substantial effects of wages on automation innova-
tion: higher low-skill wages lead to more automation innovations with an elasticity
which we estimate between 1 and 2.2 depending on our specification. Finally, we
conduct an event study on the German Harzt reform 2002–2004 which was designed
to increase labor flexibility and thereby decrease costs of labor. We find that foreign
firms exposed to Germany sharply decreased innovation in automation technologies
after the reform.
In the second Chapter, entitled Automation and the Labor Share: Evidence from
Patents, we contribute to the understanding of the global decline in the labor share
and relate it to automation. The labor share — that is the share of aggregate income
paid out to labor in the form of wages, salaries, and benefits — has been decreas-
ing steadily over the majority of countries in the last three decades.(Karabarbounis
and Neiman, 2014) Given that most people make a living by selling their labor,
this decline has vast implications for inequality. In our study, we employ the patent
classification developed in Chapter 1 and document a robust negative relationship
between automation and the labor share. We find that the negative association is
mostly driven by the middle-skilled labor share. Moreover, automation innovation
is negatively associated with the share of hours worked of low-skilled labor, not sig-
nificantly related to the share of hours worked of middle-skilled labor, and positively
related to the share of hours worked of high-skilled labor.
Chapter 1 and 2 both address the progress in automation technologies raised
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in the beginning of this section. While Chapter 2 shows how the development of
automation is related to important global processes affecting inequality, Chapter
1 sheds light on the micro-level mechanisms that determine the innovation of au-
tomation technologies. I believe that Chapter 1 makes clear that automation is
not an exogenous process and its relationship with inequality is two-sided: The
attempt to mitigate inequality, for example, by increasing minimum wages will lead
to more automation innovation, which may displace labor and eventually lead to
more inequality.
Finally, in the third Chapter, entitled Opportunity and Inequality Across Gen-
erations, we address the second topic of this thesis: How important is parental
background for the transmission of inequality? We study this question in an OLG
model calibrated to the U.S. economy. Our quantitative results suggest that the
transmission of inequality is determined mostly by nature (ability) rather than nur-
ture (bequests and schooling). We then solve for the socially optimal allocation in
this economy. In the social optimum, the importance of nurture increases relative
to nature compared with the steady state of the calibrated economy. The planner
provides more intergenerational insurance against ability risk at the cost of less
mobility. However, this decrease in mobility is modest compared to the increase in
insurance the planner is able to provide. The socially optimal allocation is highly
non-linear and history-dependent in a manner that cannot easily be captured by cur-
rent observables such as income, bequests, or schooling expenditures. We therefore
assess the extent to which the welfare gains of the social optimum can be achieved
using simple, history-independent tax schedules. We show that a linear tax system
can capture almost half of the welfare gains of the socially optimal allocation.

Chapter 1
Automating Labor: Evidence from
Firm-level Patent Data
This chapter is joint work with Antoine Dechelezprêtre, David Hémous, and Morten
Olsen.*
1.1 Introduction
Do higher wages lead to more labor-saving innovations? And if so, by how much?
At a time of fast technological progress in automation technologies such as robotics
and AI and of political campaigns pushing for higher minimum wages, answering
these questions is of central importance. Even more so because the endogeneity
of automation innovations matters for the long-term effects of policy interventions
(Hémous and Olsen, 2018). Yet, the literature on the effect of wages on labor-saving
*Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Grantham Research Institute and Centre for Economic Performance,
LSE and OECD, antoine.dechezlepretre@oecd.org. David Hémous, University of Zurich and
CEPR, david.hemous@econ.uzh.ch, Morten Olsen, University of Copenhagen, mgo@econ.ku.dk.
Carlo Zanella, University of Zurich, carlo.zanella@econ.uzh.ch. David Hémous gratefully acknowl-
edges the financial support of the European Commission under the ERC Starting Grant 805007
AUTOMATION. We thank Lorenzo Casaburi, Nir Jaimovich, Elias Papaioannou, Pascual Re-
strepo, Joachim Voth, and Fabrizio Zilliboti among others for helpful comments and suggestions.
We also thank seminar and conference participants at the University of Zurich, Swiss Macro
workshop, the University of Copenhagen, the TRISTAN workshop in Bayreuth, the University of
Bath, London Business School, the NBER Macroeconomics Across Time and Space Conference,
the NBER Summer Institute, the AlpMacro Conference, LMU, Oxford University and Helsinki
Graduate School of Economics. We thank Amedeo Andriollo, Selina Schön, and Shi Suo for
fantastic research assistance.
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technological change remains limited. In fact, the few existing papers focus on the
effect of labor costs on the adoption of automation technologies (e.g. Lewis, 2011,
Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014, or Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018a). Our paper is the
first to establish a causal effect of an increase in wages on automation innovations.
Answering this question requires overcoming two challenges: identifying au-
tomation innovations and finding a source of exogenous variation in wages from the
perspective of innovating firms. To overcome the first challenge, we build a new
method of classifying automation patents using the existing assignment of patents
to technological categories (IPC and CPC codes). We use the text of patents from
the European Patent Office (EPO) and compute the frequency of certain keywords
(such as “robot”, “automation” or “computer numerical control”) for each techno-
logical category. Our identification strategy is ideally suited for innovations in
equipment and we restrict attention to those innovations. We define “automation
technological categories” as technological categories where the frequency of the key-
words is above a certain threshold. Finally, we identify as automation patents those
which belong to automation technological categories (including non-EPO patents).
Our method presents at least two advantages: it is transparent and covers a wide
range of innovations across several sectors compared with more narrow measures
such as the use of robots. According to our laxer measure, the share of automation
innovations among innovations in machinery has increased from 12.8% in 1999 to
20.5% in 2014. We conduct a validation exercise based on Autor, Levy and Murnane
(2003). We find that in the United States, sectors where the share of automation
patents filed in machinery was high, saw a decrease in routine tasks and an increase
in the skill ratio. Automation is uncorrelated with computerization and captures a
different form of technological change but has similar effects.
At the country level, technology and wages are co-determined. To isolate ex-
ogenous variation in wages, we therefore exploit firm-level variations in the wages
faced by the potential customers of innovating firms by exploiting variations in
innovating firms’ exposure to international markets. We expand on the methodol-
ogy of Aghion, Dechezleprêtre, Hémous, Martin and Van Reenen (2016, henceforth
ADHMV) and use the PATSTAT database, which contains close to the universe
of patents. For each firm which undertakes automation innovations, we compute
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how much it has patented pre-sample in machinery in each country. We take this
information as a proxy for the distribution of the firm’s international exposure and
build firm-specific weighted averages of low- and high-skill wages using country-level
data. These firm-specific wages proxy for the average wage paid by the downstream
firms of the innovating firms. As a result, for, say, two German firms, we iden-
tify the effect of an increase in wages on automation innovations, by comparing
how much more automation innovations increase for the firm which has the higher
market exposure to the US when US low-skill wages increase.
We conduct our main analysis over the sample period 1997-2011 and use wage
data for 41 countries with automation patents for 3,341 firms. We find a substantial
effect of wages on automation innovations: higher low-skill wages lead to more au-
tomation innovations with an elasticity between 2 and 4 depending on specification.
Higher high-skill wages tend to reduce automation, but with a smaller elasticity, a
finding in line with the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis (Krusell, Ohanian,
Rios-Rull and Violante, 2000). Our results are robust to the inclusion of domestic
country-year fixed effects and continues to hold when we decompose firm-specific
wages into a domestic and a foreign part. Moreover, we use the geographical local-
ization of firms’ inventors to compute the local knowledge stocks which firms are
exposed to. We find strong evidence of local knowledge spillovers which suggest
that the long-term effects of an increase in wages on automation innovations are
larger than the short-term effects. Yet, more automation innovations in a firm are
associated with fewer future automation innovations. We run placebo regressions
with low-automation patents in machinery and find no effect of low-skill wages on
automation innovation.
Finally, we look at the effect of the Hartz reform in Germany in 2002-2004,
which aimed at increasing labor market flexibility making the use of labor more
attractive and consequently lowering the incentive for automation innovation. We
focus on patents from the countries with the highest exposure to Germany, excluding
Germany itself. While foreign firms most exposed to Germany were increasingly
doing automation innovations relative to other innovations in machinery until the
Hartz reform, the trend sharply reversed thereafter.
The theoretical argument that higher wages should lead to more labor-saving
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technology adoption or innovation dates back to Habakkuk (1962) and is at the core
of several theoretical papers (e.g. Zeira, 1998, Acemoglu, 2010). More recently, a
small growth literature has emerged where endogenous innovation can take the form
of either automation or the creation of new tasks, in which case wages affect the
direction of innovation (Hémous and Olsen, 2018, Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018b).
There is an extensive literature on the effects of technological change on wages
and employment,1 yet the empirical literature on the reverse question is much more
limited. A few papers show that labor market conditions affect labor-saving technol-
ogy adoption in health care (Acemoglu and Finkelstein, 2008), agriculture (Manuelli
and Seshardi, 2014, Hornbeck and Naidu, 2014, and Clemens, Lewis and Postel,
2018), and manufacturing (Lewis, 2011). Lordan and Neumark (2018) find that
minimum wage hikes displace workers in automatable jobs and Acemoglu and Re-
strepo (2018a) relate demographic trends to robot adoption. Our paper differs in at
least two ways. First, our analysis is broader since it covers a range of automation
technologies and 40 countries. Second, we focus on innovation instead of adoption,2
which matters because the economic drivers of innovation may differ from those
of adoption: it may be less responsive to macroeconomic variables such as wages
and knowledge spillovers are likely to play a greater role. There is essentially no
empirical literature on automation innovations: Alesina, Battisti and Zeira (2018)
find in cross-country regressions that labor market regulations are positively corre-
lated with innovation in low-skill intensive sectors, which is consistent with a model
where innovation is low-skill labor-saving; and a recent working paper by Bena
and Simintzi (2019) shows that firms with a better access to the Chinese labor
market decrease their share of process innovations after the 1999 U.S.-China trade
agreement.3
1See for instance Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Autor et. al. (2003), Bartel, Ichniowski and
Shaw (2007) or Autor and Dorn (2013), Gaggl and Wright (2017) for IT, Doms, Dunne and Totske
(1997) for factory automation, Graetz and Michaels (2017) or Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) for
robots, Blanas, Gancia and Lee (2018) for different forms of capital, Mann and Püttmann (2018)
or Bessen, Goos, Salomons and van den Berge (2019) for broader measures of automation and
Aghion, Jones and Jones (2017), Martinez (2018) or Gaggl and Eden (2018) for the effect on factor
shares (see also Aghion, Bergeaud, Boppart, Klenow and Li, 2019, and Akcigit and Ates, 2019,
for other factors behind the drop of the labor share).
2To be more precise, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a) also show some cross-country correlations
between demographic trends and patents in robotics.
3Process innovations and automation innovations are not the same: certain process innovations
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This is perhaps surprising because a large literature shows that the direction
of innovation is endogenous in other contexts: Acemoglu and Linn (2004) in the
pharmaceutical industry; Hanlon (2015) in the 19th century cotton industry and
several papers in the context of energy-saving or green innovations (Newell, Jaffe
and Stavins, 1999, Popp, 2002 and Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016). Here, we build
more specifically on the methodology of ADHMV, who build firm-level variations in
gas prices to show that higher gas prices lead firms in the auto industry to engage
more in clean and less in dirty innovations.4
The use of text analysis using keywords has developed rapidly in economics since
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). More closely related, Mann and Püttman (2018)
use machine-learning techniques to classify automation patents. We compare our
approaches below.
Section 1.2 contains our first contribution: a classification of automation tech-
nologies and compares it with existing measures. Section 1.3 introduces a simple
model to motivate the analysis. Section 1.4 describes our empirical strategy and the
data we use. Section 1.5 contains the results of the main analysis on the effect of
wages on automation innovations. Section 1.6 discusses the event study of the Hartz
reform. Section 1.7 concludes. Appendix 1.8 provides details on our automation
classification and additional robustness checks.
1.2 Classifying automation patents
In the following we describe the patent data as well as our method for classifying
automation patents. We then show how our measure of automation compares to
previous measures of automation, notably the use of computers in the framework
of Autor et. al. (2003). Our approach proceeds in three steps: i) We use the
may involve reducing other costs than labor costs (for instance materials costs) and certain au-
tomation innovations can be product innovations (for instance a new industrial robot is a product
innovation for its maker).
4Three other papers have used ADHMV’s methodology: Noailly and Smeets (2015) use it to
look at innovation in electricity generation, Coelli, Moxnes and Ulltveit-Moe (2018) use it to look
at the effect of trade policy on innovation and Aghion, Bénabou, Martin and Roulet (2019) to look
at the role of environmental preferences and competition in innovation in the auto industry—as
explained later in the text, we methodologically extend this work by looking separately at the
effect of the domestic and foreign variables.
10 CHAPTER 1. AUTOMATING LABOR
existing literature to identify keywords related to automation. ii) We use those
keywords and the text of EPO patents to classify technological categories (based on
the existing IPC and CPC codes) in machinery as automation or not. iii) We then
classify worldwide patents as automation or not depending on whether they belong
to an automation technology category.
1.2.1 Patent data
We use two patent databases maintained by the European Patent Office (EPO).
For most of our empirical analysis, we use the World Patent Statistical Database
(PATSTAT) from Autumn 2018 which contains the bibliographical information of
patents from 90 patent-issuing authorities (covering nearly all patents in the world)
but not the text of individual patents. Since text analysis is essential to our ap-
proach, we supplement with the EP full-text database from 2018, which contains
the full text of EPO patent applications (a subset of the patents from PATSTAT).
PATSTAT allows us to identify “patent families”, a set of patent applications
across different patent offices which represent the same innovation. For each patent
family, we know the date of first application (which we use as the year of an inno-
vation), the patent offices where the patent is applied for (which indicates its geo-
graphical breadth), the identity of the applicants and the inventors and the number
of citations received by the patent family. In addition, to identify the technological
characteristics of patents we use their IPC and their CPC codes (henceforth C/IPC
codes).5 Importantly each patent usually has several C/IPC codes. The C/IPC
codes form a hierarchical classification systems. Certain types of technologies (for
instance fossil fuel engines) can readily be identified to existing groupings of C/IPC
codes. Such a grouping does not exist for automation and it is our goal in the
following to create it.
Our strategy to identify automation innovations relies on first identifying au-
tomation C/IPC codes (and combinations thereof) by computing the frequency of
certain keywords in the text of patents belonging to those C/IPC codes. We then use
5The IPC is the International Patent Classification and the CPC the Cooperative Patent Clas-
sification used by the USPTO and the EPO. The CPC is an extension of the IPC and contains
around 250,000 codes in its most disaggregated form.
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this information to identify automation patents as those with automation C/IPC
codes. This strategy has two advantages over classifying patents directly. First, it
allows us to include non-EPO patents in our analysis, for which PATSTAT does not
contain the text.6 Second, technological codes by themselves are informative and
one should think of the particular wording of a patent as a signal of its underlying
characteristics. Patents are written in different styles, and often do not expand on
the purpose of the invention, so that the same innovation can often be described
with or without using our keywords. In other words, if a patent does not contain
one of our keywords but belongs to a C/IPC code where patents most of the time
do, there is a high likelihood that it is actually an automation patent (see examples
in Figures 1.2a and 1.2b below). Conversely, if a patent uses one of our keywords
but does not belong to any C/IPC codes where this is common, the inclusion of
this keyword is frequently uninformative about the nature of the innovation.7
1.2.2 Choosing automation keywords
In the following we explain how we choose our automation keywords. Most of our
keywords come from the automation technologies identified in Doms, Dunne and
Troske (DDT, 1997) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (AR, 2018).8 We complemented
this list as described below. Naturally, we seek to capture as many patents truly
associated with automation as possible without too many false positives. Table 1.1
describes the list of keywords together with their origin (Appendix 1.8.2 provides
additional details).
We have eight categories of keywords. Five of these, Robot*, numerical con-
trol, computer-aided design and manufacturing, flexible manufacturing and pro-
6To give an idea of the increase in sample, over the period 1997-2011 there are 3.19 million
patent families with patent applications in at least two offices (a condition we will impose in our
main analysis). Among those only around 740 thousand have an EPO patent with a description
in English.
7As a matter of fact, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) offers on its website
a simple tool based on a similar principle. A search engine allows to identify up to 5 IPC codes
most likely to correspond to a set of keywords using the text of the patents in its database.
8Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997) measure automation using the Survey of Manufacturing
Technology (SMT) from 1988 and 1993 conducted by the US Census. The survey asked firms about
their use of certain automation and information technologies. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018)
include imports of automation technology and associate specific HS-categories from Comtrade
with automation technology.
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Table 1.1: Choice of automation keywords
Key words Comments Source
Automat* Automation, automatization Own / 
or automat* at least 5 times
Robot* Not surgical or medical DDT and AR
Numerical Control CNC or numeric* control* or DDT and AR
(NC in the same sentence as secondary words)
Computer-aided design DDT
and manufacturing In the same patent as secondary words
CAD or CAM in same sentence as secondary words
Flexible manufacturing DDT
Programmable logic Programmable logic control or DDT
 control PLC and not (powerline or "power line")
3D printer Including additive layer manufacturing Own
Labor Including laborious Own
Secondary words Machine or manufacturing or equipment or apparatus or machining
or (automat* or autonomous) with (secondary words or warehouse 
or operator  or arm or convey* or handling or inspect or knitting or 
manipulat*  or regulat* or sensor or storage or store or vehicle 







Notes: "In the same sentence as control words" refers to at least one control word. Keywords include i) 
natural adjacent words (i.e. numerical control includes NC, numerically controlled and numeric control), ii) 
British/American spelling (i.e. labour/labor) and iii) hyphenated adjectives (i.e. computer aided  / computer-
aided design). We added words in italics, the others come from AR or DDT. See Appendix for details.
Computer-aided/-assisted/-supported
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grammable logic control are automation technologies in DDT or AR. Simply ap-
plying these keywords may result in false positives. For instance “NC” can refer
to either “numeric control” or “North Carolina”. To address this issue, we require
that those keywords are either in the same patent or the same sentence as a list
of secondary words which indicate that the text describes a machine. We add 3D
printing, which was in its infancy when DDT was written. We also add “labor”
which indicates that an innovation reduces labor costs.
We similarly add “automation” and “automatization”. The stem “automat*”
gather too many false positives such as“automatic transmission”. We resolve this in
two ways: either by restricting attention to patents where the frequency is 5 or more
or by combining automat* with other words which largely come from technologies
described in DDT or AR (we count patents where automat* and one of these words
appear in the same sentence at least twice).
An alternative procedure would have been to read and classify a subset of patents
and use machine-learning techniques to classify patents (or technological categories)
as automation or not. This is the procedure in Mann and Püttmann (2018). We
believe our approach has several advantages. First, we found that classifying patents
as automation is a difficult task: often looking at a single patent in isolation is not
enough, and one needs to look at several patents within the same technological
group to find patterns suggesting that a patent is likely an automation patent.
Therefore, the task of manually classifying patents cannot be easily systematized
and therefore outsourced. Second, patents are written in a technical language and do
not primarily discuss the goal of an innovation, so that only a few words within the
text are informative. Consequently, a machine-learning algorithm would require a
large set of classified data to classify patents correctly. Third, once the classification
is done it can easily be applied to patents without text and future patents. Fourth,
our method is more transparent and can easily be replicated or modified.
1.2.3 Defining automation technological codes and automation patents
As discussed above we use the keywords to associate technological categories, and
not patents directly, to automation. These technological categories are defined as:
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6-digit C/IPC codes, all pairs of 4-digit C/IPC codes and pairs combining the union
of the 3 digit codes G05 and G06 with any 4-digit C/IPC codes (outside codes in
G05, G06).9 The code G05 corresponds to “controlling; regulating” and G06 to
“computing; calculating; counting”. Using combinations of G05 and G06 code with
4-digit C/IPC codes is inspired by Aschhoff et al. (2010) who use these codes to
identify advanced manufacturing technologies. We restrict attention to categories
which contain at least 100 patents to ensure that the prevalence of keywords measure
is based on a sufficiently large number of patents.10
We then measure the prevalence of our keywords within technological categories
for those patent applications from 1978 onward which contain a description in En-
glish (a total of 1,538,370 patent applications). In Appendix 1.8.2, we verify that
the choice of the starting year does not affect our classification much. To select au-
tomation C/IPC codes, we further restrict attention to C/IPC codes which belong
to technological fields which are associated with equipment. There are 34 techno-
logical fields (see Figure 1.8.7) and we focus on “machine tools”, “handling”, “textile
and paper machines” and “other special machines”, which we refer to as “machin-
ery” patents (we use machinery and equipment interchangeably). Our classification
scheme captures a broader set of automation technologies than what is relevant for
our empirical analysis including Roombas and military drones. We adjust the set
of technological codes accordingly.11 For pairs of 4 digit IPC codes, we assume that
they belong to the relevant technological field when at least one of the 4 digit codes
9Technically, the structure of the C/IPC classification is as follows: C/IPC “classes” have 3
digit codes (for instance B25: “hand tools; portable power-driven tools; handles for hand im-
plements; workshop equipment and manipulators”), “subclasses” have 4 digit codes (for instance
B25J: “manipulators; chambers provided with manipulation devices”) and main groups have 5 to
7 digit codes (for instance B25J 9: “programme-controlled manipulators”). In the following, we
will slightly abuse language and refer to classes, subclasses and main groups as 3 digit, 4 digit and
6 digit codes respectively.
10We group 6-digit codes with less than 100 patents into codes at the 4-digit level.
11Roombas are already excluded since they are not in the four technological fields. We further
exclude F41 and F42 which correspond to weapons and ammunition and are in “other special
machines”. In addition, we include B42C which corresponds to machines for book production
and B07C which corresponds to machines for postal sorting as both correspond to equipment
technologies and contain 6-digit codes with a high prevalence of automation keywords; the 6-digit
code G05B19 which corresponds to “programme-control systems” and contains a large number
of NC and CNC (computer numerically controlled) machine tools which are not attributed IPC
codes in the machine tools technological field; and the 6-digit code B62D65 which concerns engine
manufacturing even though the rest of the B62D code is about the vehicle parts themselves.
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belongs to the relevant technological field. Similarly, the combinations of 4 digit
IPC code and G05 or G06 belong to the relevant technological fields if the 4 digit
code belongs to that group.
We extensively checked the C/IPC codes and sampled patents from each cate-
gory to ensure that the procedure delivered reasonable results. However, the vali-
dation exercises and the main empirical exercise where carried out after the classi-
fication was set.
Table 1.2 gives some examples of 6-digit C/IPC codes in machinery with the
prevalence of automation keywords including their rank within machinery 6 digit
codes with at least 100 patents. It also shows the prevalence of some of the most
important subcategories (automat*, robots and CNC) in the patents linked to each
C/IPC code. C/IPC codes associated with robotics (B25J) have the highest preva-
lence numbers with up to 91% patents in B25J5 which contain at least one of the
keywords. Yet, there are also codes associated with machine tools other than robots
at the top of the distribution such as B23Q15 and codes associated with devices
used in the agricultural sector such as A01J7. B24B49 is a code close to the thresh-
old we use to delimit automation patents. The last four C/IPC codes are examples
with a low prevalence of automation keywords. The table also shows that the dif-
ferent sub-measures do not capture the same technologies: the robotic codes are
ranked highly thanks to their share of patents with the word “robot”, B23Q15 is
high because a lot of patents contain words related to CNC, and B65G1, because a
lot of patents contain words associated with automation directly.
Figure 1.1 gives the histograms of the prevalence of automation keywords for
all C/IPC 6 digit codes (panel a) and C/IPC 6 digit codes in the “machinery”
technological field (panel b). The histograms show that most C/IPC codes have a
low prevalence of automation keywords and that the distribution is shifted to the
right for the relevant technological fields. Yet, a few codes have a high prevalence
measure. Appendix 1.8.2 gives additional statistics on the prevalence measures.
Consequently, we define automation technological categories as those with a
prevalence measure above some threshold. As our baseline, we choose thresholds at
the 90th and 95th percentiles of the 6 digit code distribution within the machinery
technological field, which are given by 0.386 and 0.477 respectively. We then define a
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Code Description Number of All share Rank Robot Automat* CNC
patents (over 1009) share share share
– High prevalence –
B25J5 Manipulators mounted on wheels or on car-
riages.
504 0.91 1 0.87 0.27 0.01
B25J19 Accessories fitted to manipulators, e.g. for
monitoring or for viewing; safety devices
combined with or specially adapted for use
in connection with manipulators.
1001 0.89 2 0.85 0.22 0.04
B25J13 Controls for manipulators. 857 0.88 3 0.81 0.27 0.03
B25J9 Programme-controlled manipulators. 2809 0.86 4 0.79 0.29 0.07
B23Q15 Automatic control or regulation of feed
movement, cutting velocity or position of
tool or work.
591 0.79 7 0.09 0.36 0.65
A01J7 Accessories for milking machines or devices. 395 0.77 9 0.62 0.52 0
G05B19 Programme-control systems. 7133 0.70 16 0.22 0.39 0.25
B65G1 Storing articles, individually or in orderly ar-
rangement, in warehouses or magazines.
1064 0.58 29 0.18 0.46 0.01
B24B49 Measuring or gauging equipment for control-
ling the feed movement of the grinding tool
or work; Arrangements of indicating or mea-
suring equipment, e.g. for indicating the
start of the grinding operation.
608 0.42 75 0.12 0.18 0.19
– Low prevalence –
B65H7 Controlling article feeding, separating, pile-
advancing, or associated apparatus, to take
account of incorrect feeding, absence of arti-
cles, or presence of faulty articles.
736 0.28 228 0.01 0.25 0.00
B23P6 Restoring or reconditioning objects. 613 0.26 266 0.07 0.06 0.05
A01B63 Lifting or adjusting devices or arrangements
for agricultural machines or implements.
264 0.24 306 0.01 0.20 0
B66D3 Portable or mobile lifting or hauling appli-
ances.
215 0.13 677 0.02 0.07 0.00
Table 1.2: Examples of 6-digit C/IPC codes in relevant technological fields
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(a) For all C/IPC 6 digit codes (b) For C/IPC 6 digit codes in machinery
with at least 100 patents
Figure 1.1: Histogram of the prevalence of automation keywords for C/IPC 6 digit codes
patent as an automation patent if it belongs to at least one automation technological
group (that is a 6 digit code, a pair of 4 digit codes, or a combination of 4 digit code
and G05/G06).12 We refer to the two classifications as auto90 and auto95 depending
on the threshold used. We can similarly define subcategories of automation patents
such as robot90 which correspond to patents which contain at least one technological
group for which the frequency of the keywords related to robots (uniquely) is above
the threshold defining auto90. By definition all robot90 patents are also auto90
patents.
Figure 1.2 shows two automation patents. Both are automated storage cabinets
and are counted as automation patents because they contain the IPC 6 digit code
B65G 1. As described in Table 1.2, B65G 1 corresponds to devices for storing
articles and has a high prevalence of automation keywords (0.58, which is above
the 95th percentile threshold). The patent of Figure 1.2a contains our keywords: a
sentence with the words “automatic” and “storing,” and another sentence with the
word “robot.” The description strongly suggests that this is indeed an automation
patent. The patent of Figure 1.2b does not contain any of the keywords, but the
description of the text still describes a labor-saving innovation.
12In practice, most automation patents in our dataset are automation patents because they
belong to at least one 6 digit automation code—see Appendix 1.8.2 for more details.
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(a) Example with keywords
(b) Example without keywords
Figure 1.2: Examples of automation patents from technological code B65G1, which are
both automated storage cabinets.
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1.2.4 Trends in automation innovations
To ensure that we only capture innovations of a sufficiently high quality, we restrict
attention to patent families with patent applications in at least two countries in our
main empirical analysis and for the trends depicted here. We refer to these as biadic
patents.13 Several studies have documented that biadic patents are of higher quality
and fundamentally different from patents applied for in only one office (e.g. Harhoff,
Scherer and Vopel, 2003, van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and van Zeebroeck, 2008,
De Rassenfosse, Dernis, Guellec, Picci and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2013,
and Dechezleprêtre, Ménière and Mohnen, 2017). In addition, patents can be more
or less broad across countries: for instance the same invention may be covered by
two patents in Japan but only one in the US. By focusing on biadic patents, we
only count such a case as one innovation.14
Figure 1.3 below shows the evolution of automation patents in the set of biadic
patents. Panel (a) shows that worldwide, the share of automation patents declines
in the 1990s from 17.4% to 12.8% for the laxer auto90 measure and from 8.8%
to 6.4% for the stricter auto95 measure before increasing quickly to reach 20.5%
for auto90 and 9.5% for auto95 in 2014—Figure 1.8.8 in the Appendix shows that
automation patents in machinery represent between 1.9 and 3.5% of all patents with
the auto90 definition and it also reports the raw numbers of auto90 and auto95
patents. One interpretation is that globalization made cheap low-skill labor abroad
available in the 1990s and contributed to a temporary decline in automation, which
has since reversed. Panel (b) computes the share of automation patents for the
auto95 measure for biadic patents conditional on the patent being protected in
certain countries. The graphs show that for UK, French, German and US patents,
the decline of the 1990s is less pronounced and the rise of the 2000s is very stark.
In Japan, the decline of the 1990s is more pronounced and the recent growth more
timid there. As a result while the share of automation patents was the highest in
13The original definition of biadic patents correspond to patents in at least 2 of the 3 main
offices (EPO, USPTO and JPO). Our definition is a generalization counting all patent offices. We
check that our results are robust to the original definition of biadic in section 1.5.6.
14We count patent applications and not granted patents because in certain patent offices, notably
in Japan, a patent is only formally granted if the rights of the applicant are challenged. To restrict
attention to patent families of even higher quality, we carry out robustness checks where we use
patent citations, or patents applied to more than two offices.
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Figure 1.3: Share of automation patents in machinery. Shares are computed for biadic
patents.
Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s, it is now the lowest among these countries. In
the Appendix, Figure 1.8.9 reports the share of automation patents in machinery
according to the nationality of applicants, the trends are roughly similar but the
share of Japanese patents remains higher (suggesting that the relative decline in
the share of automation patents at the JPO is due to foreign firms). These country
trends are similar with the auto90 measure.
1.2.5 Automation patents and robots
Recent papers (Graetz and Michaels, 2018, or Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017) have
used data on industrial robots from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR)
to measure automation. The IFR reports stocks of robots by country and sectors
based on yearly surveys of robot suppliers.
We first compare our automation measure with robotization at the country
level. To measure robotization in a given country, we follow Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017) and use the stock of industrial robots in 2011 minus the stock of robot in 1997
divided by total employment in manufacturing in 1997 (employment data come from
the OECD database). Table 1.3 reports the correlation across 27 countries between
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this measure of robotization and our measures of automation, namely the shares of
auto95 and auto90 patents within machinery among biadic patents applied for in
each country and computed over the years 1997-2011. The correlation is quite high
with a coefficient of 0.38 for the auto95 measure. When we correlate robotization
with the shares of robotic patents in machinery (robot90 and robot80) we find a
somewhat larger coefficient (0.46) for robot80.
We then compare our two measures of automation at the sector level for the US
and Germany. The IFR data contain consistent stocks of industrial robots for 17
sectors according to the ISIC Rev 4 classification between 1997 and 2011 for Ger-
many and between 2004 and 2011 for the US (technically the IFR data aggregate the
robot stocks at the level of US, Canada and Mexico). We compute robotization in
each sector by taking the difference between the stocks in the two years and dividing
by employment in the first period (still using OECD data). We allocate patents to
these sectors according to their (family-level) 4-digit C/IPC codes using a concor-
dance table provided by Lybbert and Zolas (2014), and similarly measure the share
of auto95, auto90, robot90 and robot80 patents in machinery for each sector over
the same time periods.15 Appendix Table 1.8.15 reports shares of auto95 patents in
machinery for patents granted at the USPTO, patents protected in Germany (i.e.
granted German patents or granted EPO patents protected in Germany) in 1997-
2011 and for all biadic patents across sectors. The shares of automation patents
are very similar in the US, Germany and for the world. The three sectors with the
highest shares for auto95 are always the automotive, “computer, electronic, optical
and electrical products” and “other transport equipment” industries. In addition,
Table 1.3 reports correlations across sectors for these measures in the US and in
Germany. We find higher levels of correlations with coefficients of 0.60 and 0.56
for both US and German industries with the auto95 measure. When we use our
method to focus specifically on robotic patents, we find correlation coefficients up
to 0.74 and 0.78 for the robot80 measure.
15Lybbert and Zolas (2014) present several probabilistic concordance tables, which are based on
matching industry descriptions with the title and the abstract of patents within an IPC code. This
methodology cannot a priori distinguish between the sector of use of a patent and the industry of
manufacture, we verify however on a few simple examples that within machinery, the classification
seemed to assign patents to the sector of use (for instance textile machines are assigned to the
textile industry not the equipment industry).
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Table 1.3: Correlations between our automation measures and robot intensity
(1) (2) (3)
Share of automation
patents in machinery (auto95)
Share of automation
patents in machinery (auto90)
Share of robot patents in 
machinery (robot90)
Share of robot patents in 
machinery (robot80)
Number of observations 27 17 17
0.377
0.365 0.682 0.546
Note: This table reports correlations across countries or industries between shares of automation
patents in machinery, robots patents in machinery and robot intensity. Robot intensity is measured
as the difference between the stock of robots in 2011 and 1997 (columns 1 and 3) or 2004 (column
2) over employment in each country (column 1) or each sector (columns 2 and 3) in 1997 (columns
1 and 3) or 2004 (column 2). Shares of automation and robot patents are computed over the time
period 1997-2011 for columns (1) and (3) and over 2004-2011 for column (2).
0.4260.483
0.461 0.740 0.780





1.2.6 Validating our automation measure
To validate our automation measure, we use it in the framework of Autor et. al.
(2003) (henceforth ALM), who show how computerization has been associated with
a decrease in routine tasks at the industry level in a cross-sectional analysis on U.S.
data from 1960 to 1998. Here, we provide a brief description of what we do, and we
refer the reader to Appendix 1.8.3 for details. To measure automation innovations
at the sectoral level, we use USPTO granted patents which belong to the machinery
technological field. As before, we allocate patents to sectors according to their 4-
digit C/IPC codes using a concordance table provided by Lybbert and Zolas (2014).
For each sector j and each period τ , we compute the share of automation patents
among machinery patents applied for during this period. We denote this variable
autjτ . We then run regressions of the type:
∆Tjkτ = β0 + βC∆Cj + βautautjτ , (1.1)
where ∆Tjkτ represents the change in tasks of type k in industry j during period
τ and ∆Cj is the measure of the change of computerization in sector j (it is com-
puted over the years 1984-1997 and used for all time periods θ). We do not first
difference our measure of automation because patenting is already a measure of the
flow of knowledge. We take our tasks measures directly from ALM, and therefore
consider 5 types of tasks: nonroutine analytic, nonroutine interactive, routine cog-
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(b) Change in routine manual tasks and au-
tomation intensity
Figure 1.4: Scatter plots of routine tasks changes and automation intensity (auto 95) in
1980-1998 in the United States. The list of sectors is given in Table 1.8.37
nitive, routine manual and nonroutine manual. ∆Tjkτ is measured as 10 times the
annual within-industry change in task input measured in percentile of the 1960 task
distribution (as in ALM). We consider 3 time periods for which we can compute
our automation intensity measure: 1970-1980, 1980-1990 and 1990-1998 (ALM also
considers 1960-1970), and the joint time period 1980-1998. The initial concordance
table mostly assigns our machinery patents to manufacturing sectors (see full list
in Table 1.8.37, we restrict attention to sectors with at least 50 machinery patents
per decade). As a result, we can measure automation intensity for between 67
and 69 sectors most of them in manufacturing. Our automation measures auto90
and auto95 are strongly correlated with each other (the coefficient is 0.86) but not
correlated with computerization (the coefficient is 0.016 for auto95 and 0.05 for
auto90).
Figure 1.4 first provides simple scatter plots of the changes in routine tasks and
the share of automation patents in machinery (according to the auto95 definition)
over the years 1980-1998. The list of sectors plotted (which are also the sectors in
the regressions) is given in Appendix Table 1.8.37.16 Sectors with a high share of
16At this level of disaggregation, the five sectors with the highest share of automation patents are:
scientific and controlling instruments, optical and health services (246), dairy products (101), elec-
tronic computing equipment, office and accounting machines (186), household appliances, radio,
24 CHAPTER 1. AUTOMATING LABOR
automation patents experience a decline in routine cognitive and routine manual
tasks. Given our focus on automation in machinery a decline in routine cognitive
tasks might seem surprising at first sight, but several machines replace workers for
tasks such as inspection and control (such as in the example given in Figure 1.2b).
Table 1.4, columns (1) to (5) report the results of regression (1.1) for the auto95
measure. The means of the share of automation in machinery are 0.06, 0.08 and
0.07 in the 70s, 80s and 90s. Columns (3) and (4) show that sectors with a high
share of automation patents in machinery experienced a large reduction in both
cognitive and manual routine tasks in each decade. The coefficients of column (3)
and (4) in panel B indicate that a 10 pp increase in the share of automation patents
is associated with a 3 centiles and 2.2 centiles decrease in labor input of routine
cognitive and manual tasks in the 1980s. To interpret a 10 pp increase, note that the
standard deviation in the share of automation patents in the 1980s is 0.09, so that a
1 standard deviation increase in the automation share is associated with a decrease
in routine cognitive and routine manual tasks of 2.7 and 1.9 centiles respectively.
The corresponding effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in computerization is
associated with a decrease in routine cognitive tasks of 0.8 centiles and essentially no
change in routine manual tasks (the computerization variable has a larger effect in
the 90s). We obtain similar results when we restrict attention to biadic patents (as
in our main regression exercise of section 1.5) or when we exclude the equipment
sector, which could be contaminated if patents are assigned to the industry of
manufacture instead of the sector of use (176 in the Census classification).
Since we are interested in the effect of low- and high- skill wages on automation
but do not measure the price of tasks directly, we also use the ratio of high-skill to
low-skill workers (defined as college graduates over high-school dropouts and high-
school graduates) as our dependent variable in cross-section regressions similar to
1.1.17 Column (6) of Table 1.4 shows that sectors with a higher automation share
also experienced a large increase in the ratio of high-skill to low-skill workers. Panel
B, for instance suggests that a 10 pp increase in the share of automation patents is
TV & communications equipment, electric machinery, equipment & supplies, n.e.c., not specified
electrical machinery, equipment & supplies (206) and transport equipment (351).
17The results are similar for the ratio of college graduates over high-school dropouts or college
graduates and some college over high school graduates and dropouts.
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Table 1.4: Correlation between changes in task intensity or skill ratio across sectors and
automation (auto95)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 1970 - 80, n=67
Share of automation -1.29 5.42 ***-17.27*** **-11.43** -1.15 ***0.27***
patents in machinery (5.10) (6.27) (6.59) (5.59) (7.46) (0.07)
D Computer use -6.86 -3.13 ***-19.51*** -3.46 *14.87* 0.07
1984 - 1997 (5.72) (7.04) (7.41) (6.28) (8.38) (0.08)
Intercept 1.06 **2.31** **3.07** ***2.69*** -1.75 ***0.05***
(0.95) (1.17) (1.23) (1.04) (1.39) (0.01)
R
2 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.21
Weighted mean D -0.05 2.17 -0.90 1.49 0.42 0.07
Panel B: 1980 - 90, n=67
Share of automation 10.09 **19.05** ***-30.00*** ***-21.61*** ***16.78*** ***1.33***
patents in machinery (7.14) (8.12) (6.76) (5.42) (6.04) (0.23)
D Computer use **24.80** *22.21* -13.24 -0.42 -6.49 0.29
1984 - 1997 (10.43) (11.85) (9.87) (7.91) (8.82) (0.33)
Intercept -2.62 -0.65 2.15 1.20 -2.13 -0.04
(1.70) (1.93) (1.61) (1.29) (1.44) (0.05)
R
2 0.12 0.14 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.37
Weighted mean D 1.86 4.17 -2.22 -0.59 -1.74 0.11
Panel C: 1990 - 98, n=67
Share of automation *11.06* *16.02* ***-22.81*** **-12.53** 6.66 ***0.77***
patents in machinery (6.08) (8.18) (6.54) (5.42) (6.28) (0.15)
D Computer use ***26.77*** **27.00** **-23.15** ***-24.87*** 7.48 ***0.66***
1984 - 1997 (8.35) (11.23) (8.98) (7.44) (8.62) (0.20)
Intercept *-2.36* -1.43 1.72 *2.27* *-2.40* *-0.06*
(1.37) (1.84) (1.47) (1.22) (1.41) (0.03)
R
2 0.19 0.15 0.25 0.23 0.03 0.41
Weighted mean D 2.45 3.79 -3.44 -2.36 -0.79 0.09
D H/L
Standard errors are in parentheses. Colums (1) to (5) of Panels A to C each presents a separate OLS regression of ten times the
annual change in industry-level task input between the endpoints of the indicated time interval (measured in centiles of the 1960 task
distribution) on the share of automation patents in machinery (defined with the 95th percentile threshold) and the annual percentage
point change in industry computer use during 1984 - 1997 as well as a constant. In Column (6), the dependent variable is the ratio of
high-skill (college graduates) to low-skill (high-school graduates and dropouts) workers. Estimates are weighted by mean industry share
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associated with an increase of 1.33 in the ratio of high-skill to low-skill workers in
the 1980s.
In the Appendix, Table 1.8.38 reproduces the same exercise for our laxer measure
(auto90) and obtains similar results. Finally, Table 1.8.39 reproduces the same anal-
ysis separately for each education category (as ALM) and shows that automation
leads to a reduction of routine tasks and an increase in non-routine manual tasks
for high-school graduates (but in line with column (6) of Table 1.4, a large share
of the task changes at the industry level are explained by changes in educational
composition - see Panel F).
Overall, these results suggest that our automation measure captures a form of
skill-biased technical change, distinct from computerization and associated with a
decrease in routine tasks by low-skill workers. We can therefore use it to analyze
the effect of wages on automation innovation incentives.
1.3 A simple model
Before carrying out our main empirical analysis, we present a simple one-period
model to clarify our argument. The model is motivated by the business structure
of the largest automation innovator. In 2018, Siemens, the biggest innovator in
our sample, had 31% of its work force in Germany, but only 14% of total revenue
from customers based in Germany. During this year the strongest growing divi-
sion of Siemens was the Digital Factory Division which provides a broad range of
automation technology to manufacturers across the globe. The annual report de-
scribes how “The Digital Factory Division offers a comprehensive product portfolio
and system solutions for automation technologies used in manufacturing industries,
such as automation systems and software for factory automation, industrial con-
trols and numerical control systems, motors, drives and inverters and integrated
automation systems for machine tools and production machines...”. The report is
centrally interested in how “Changes in customer demand [for automation technol-
ogy by downstream manufacturers] are strongly driven by macroeconomic cycles”
and discusses a number of such drivers including changes in cost of capital and polit-
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ical development towards trade protectionism.18 Siemens further directly discusses
how such macroeconomic trends affect its R&D decisions.
We incorporate these business features into a model built on the task frame-
work of Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and more precisely on the growth model of
Hémous and Olsen (2018). A manufacturing good is produced with a continuum of
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where y(i) denotes the quantity of intermediate input i. The manufacturing good
is the numeraire. Each intermediate input is produced competitively with high-
skill labor (h1,i and potentially h2,i), low-skill labor li and potentially machines xi,











where γ(i) is the productivity of low-skill workers and α(i) is an index which takes
the value 0 for non-automated intermediates and 1 for automated intermediates. ν
and β are fixed share parameters in (0, 1). Machines are specific to the intermediate
input i. If a machine is invented, it is produced monopolistically, 1 for 1 with the
final good so that the monopolist charges a price px(i) ≥ 1.
At the beginning of the period, for each non-automated intermediate i, there
is an innovator (Siemens). The innovator manages to create a machine specific to
intermediate i with probability λ if it spends θλ2Y/2 units of manufacturing good,
where θ is a productivity parameter.
We solve the model in two steps, first we derive the profits realized by machine
producers, second we solve for the innovation decision. Consider an automated
intermediate input (that is α(i) = 1), then the downstream intermediate input
producer is indifferent between using low-skill workers or machines together with
high-skill workers in production whenever:
18Interestingly, the report never mentions “cost of labor”as a reason for automation, but instead
used a number of euphemisms such as “increase competitiveness”, “enhance efficiency”, “improve
cost position” and “stream line production”.




As a result, the machine producer is in “Bertrand competition”with low-skill work-










, and the intermediate input producer will use
low-skill workers whenever wL/γ(i) < w
ν
H and machines otherwise. Therefore, the
machine producer can charge a higher price when low-skill wages are lower it has
to charge a lower price when high-skill wages are higher since high-skill workers
and machines are complement. Using that the manufacturing good is produced
according to a Cobb-Douglas production function, we have that p(i)y(i) = Y for




























































This expression is increasing in the low-skill wage wL and decreasing in the high-
skill wage wH , with a smaller elasticity in absolute value. Intuitively, the incentive
to replace low-skill workers with machines (and high-skill workers) increases with
low-skill wages and make manufacturing firms better customers of machines and the
reverse for high-skill wages. An upward shift in the low-skill workers productivity
function γ(i) also reduces the number of automation innovations.
More generally, the defining characteristic of automation is that it allows for
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the replacement of workers by machines in certain tasks. When intermediates have
a unit-elasticity of substitution as in (1.2), the aggregate production function is
Cobb-Douglas and automation corresponds to a change in factor shares. When in-
termediates have an elasticity of substitution lower than 1, the aggregate production
function is CES and automation corresponds to a combination of labor-augmenting
and capital-depleting technical changes (see Aghion et al., 2017).
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
1.4.1 Empirical strategy
We now take the predictions of our model to the data. As mentioned above, inno-
vators in automation technologies are often large companies (e.g. Siemens) which
sell their automation equipment internationally. Following the logic of our model,
the incentives of the downstream producers to adopt automation technology is de-
termined by wages in their local market. As a result, the decision of innovators such
as Siemens to pursue automation research in the first place depends on the wages
that their potential customers face in different countries.19
In our baseline regression, we assume that a firm’s innovation in automation is





βwL lnwL,i,t−2 + βwH lnwH,i,t−2 + βXXi,t−2
+βKa lnKAut,i,t−2 + βKo lnKother,i,t−2 + βSa lnSPILLAut,i,t−2
+βSo lnSPILLother,i,t−2 + δi + δt

+ ǫi,t.
PATAut,i,t denotes the number of automation patents applied for by firm i in year
t. wL,i,t−2 and wH,i,t−2 denote the average low-skill and high-skill wages faced by
the customers of firm i at time t − 2 (we explain below how we proxy for them).
Section 1.3 predicts that βwL > 0: an increase in the average low-skill wage faced by
19If the automation innovation is internal to the firm, then the argument follows if one interprets
the innovator’s customers as the different downstream production sites of the same firm.
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the customers of firm i leads firm i to undertake more automation innovations. It
also predicts that βwH < 0 since high-skill workers are complementary to machines.
Xi,t represents a vector of additional controls (average GDP per capita, GDP gap
and labor productivity). Controlling for GDP per capita or labor productivity
allows us to control for changes in productivity in the country where machines are
potentially sold20 and controlling for the GDP gap allows us to capture business
cycle fluctuations and changes in demand. We include this control because the
literature finds that innovation in general is affected by the business cycle (see for
instance Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, and Kalina, 2010).
KAut,i,t−2 and Kother,i,t−2 denote the stocks of knowledge in automation and in
other technologies of firm i at time t − 2. These knowledge stocks are computed
using the perpetual inventory method.21 SPILLAut,i,t−2 and SPILLother,i,t−2 simi-
larly denote the stocks of external knowledge (spillovers) in automation and in other
technologies which firm i has access to at time t−2 (we explain below how these are
constructed). δi is a firm fixed effect and δt is a time fixed effect. Finally, ǫi,t is an er-
ror term, which, we assume, is uncorrelated with the other right-hand side variables.
The right-hand side variables are lagged by 2 years in the baseline regressions to
reflect the delay between changes in R&D investments and patent applications—we
investigate the role of our timing assumption in Section 1.5.4 below.
To control for firm-level fixed effects, we use several econometric techniques.
Our baseline specification uses the Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) method,
denoted HHG, which is the count data equivalent to the within-group estimator.
Technically, this method is inconsistent with equation (1.3) because it requires strict
exogeneity and therefore prevents the lagged dependent variable from appearing on
the right-hand side (which it does through the knowledge stock KAut,i,t−2). Yet, the
bias is small with large T , which is the case in our baseline regression (15 years).
Second, we use the Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) method, which proxies
for the fixed effect by using the pre-sample average of the dependent variable.
20GDP per capita could also captures non-homotheticity in preferences, for instance if higher
quality goods or services are less automated.
21To be more specific we use ln(1 +K), a depreciation rate of 15% and add a dummy indicator
variable for when each of knowledge stocks—automation and others—equals zero.
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1.4.2 Macroeconomic data
Our macroeconomic variables come primarily from the 2013 release of the World
Input Output Tables, henceforth, WIOD (Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los,
B., Stehrer, R. and de Vries, G. J., 2015). The database contains information on
hourly labor costs across groups of educational attainment – low-skill, middle-skill
and high-skill workers – for the manufacturing sector from 1995 to 2009 as well as
value added and producer price indices. The dataset contains information on 40
countries, including all 27 EU countries of 2009. We obtained similar data from the
Swiss Federal Statistical Office to add Switzerland, a large source of patents, to our
analysis. For our baseline regressions, we focus on labor costs in manufacturing since
our analysis in section 1.2 showed that most of our patents (89% of biadic auto95
patents in 1997-2011) are associated with manufacturing, but we check that our
results are robust to using labor costs in the entire economy. Although our measures
cover all labor costs, we refer to those as wages from here on for simplicity. From
the same dataset, we obtain measures of labor productivity (as value added divided
by hours) and producer price indices (for the whole economy and manufacturing).
We obtain exchange rate and GDP data from UNSTAT and compute the GDP gap
to control for business cycles.22 Appendix 1.8.5 provides additional details. All
macroeconomic variables are deflated in the same way: In the baseline regression,
we first deflate nominal values by the local producer price index for manufacturing
(indexed to 1995), and then we convert everything into dollars using the average
exchange rate for 1995 the starting year of our regressions.
In the data low-skill workers are defined as those without a high-school diploma
or equivalent and high-skill workers as those with at least a college degree. Middle-
skill wages and low-skill wages are very highly correlated so in practice one should
interpret our low-skill wage variable as reflecting both low-skill and middle-skill (we
look at middle-skill wages in section 1.5.6).23
The countries with the highest low-skill wages in 1995 are Belgium, Sweden and
22We use a HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 on ln(GDP ) to get the trend, and the
GDP gap is measured as the difference between ln(GDP ) and its trend.
23For our baseline sample of firms, included in Table 1.7 below, the correlation between low-skill
and middle-skill wages is 0.94 controlling for firm and year fixed effects. It is only 0.6 for low-skill
and high-skill wages. See Appendix Table 1.8.26.
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Table 1.5: Low-skill wages and the skill-premium in manufacturing sector for selected
countries
Country Low-skill wages Skill-premium
(1995$) (HS wages/LS wages)
1995 2009 1995 2009
India 0.19 0.28 4.79 4.98
Mexico 0.89 0.61 3.90 4.21
Bulgaria 1.29 0.71 3.32 2.25
USA 11.57 13.67 2.46 3.02
Belgium 29.50 41.89 1.56 1.46
Sweden 19.92 42.16 1.73 1.33
Finland 23.41 43.63 1.20 1.46
Note: Wages data, taken from the World Input Output
Database. The table shows manufacturing low-skill wages
(technically labor costs) deflated by (manufacturing) pro-
ducer price index and converted to US dollars using average
1995 exchange rates. Skill-premium is the ratio of high-skill
to low-skill wages (labor costs). The table shows the three
countries with the lowest low-skill wages in 2009, the three
with the highest and the United States.
Finland with $41.9, $42.2 and $43.6 respectively (in 1995 dollars). The countries
with the lowest high-skill wages in 2009 are India, Mexico and Bulgaria with $0.28,
$0.61 and $0.71, respectively. The corresponding number for the US is $13.7. Table
1.5 summarizes these values for these seven countries. It further shows that the ratio
of high-skill to low-skill wages varies considerably across countries, even among those
that have relatively similar low-skill wages. The skill-premium in the United States
rose from 2.46 to 3.02 during this period while it slightly declined in Belgium from
1.56 to 1.46.
1.4.3 Computing firm’s market-specific wages and spillovers
Ideally, we would like to measure the wages paid by the (actual and potential)
customers of automation innovators. We do not directly observe these, and we
build a proxy which is a weighted average of country-level wages where the weights
reflect the market exposure of innovators. We define the average low-skill wage
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where wL,c,t is the low-skill wage in country c at time t and ωi,c is the fixed weight
of country c for firm i. Firms have different exposure to different markets because
of trade barriers, heterogeneous tastes of customers, or various historical accidents
if exporting involves sunk cost. This measure is a shift-share instrument (Bartik,
1991). Since the weights are fixed, our identification relies on how country-level
shocks affect firms differently. In fact, had we observed the wages of the customers
of automation innovators, those would have suffered from reverse causality, and we
would have used our measure as an instrument. We discuss the recent literature on
shift-share regressions in detail in Section 1.5.5.24
To measure the weights, and in the absence of sales data for most firms involved
in automation innovations, we follow and expand on the methodology of Aghion et
al. (2016, ADHMV). We use the firm’s pre-sample history of patent filing as a proxy
for the market exposure of firms. When a firm applies for a patent, it applies for
protection in a specific jurisdiction, and it has to pay a fixed cost whenever it wants
to expand the geographic coverage of a patent. Therefore, whether a firm protects
its innovations in a country or not reflects its intent to sell or license its technology
in that country (see e.g. Eaton and Kortum, 1996). Taking this into account,
we compute for each firm, the fraction of its patents in the relevant technological
field of machinery (not only automation) protected in each country c, ω̃i,c during a
pre-sample period.25 We only count patents in the machinery because some of the
biggest innovators in automation technologies are large firms (Sony, Siemens, etc.)
which produce a wide array of products with different specialization patterns across
industries. We restrict attention to patent families with at least one citation (not
counting self-citations) to exclude the lowest quality patents.26
24As we keep the weights fixed we look at how wage changes in the countries where a firm
already sells affect the firm’s automation innovation. A different question would have been to
analyze how wage changes affect a firm’s decision to enter a new market, this is beyond the scope
of this paper.
25In Europe, firms can apply both at national patent offices and at the European Patent Office
(EPO). In the latter case, firms still need to pay a fee for each country in which they want their
patent to be protected. We count a patent as being protected in a given European country if it is
applied for either directly in the national office or through the EPO.
26Including all patents generally increases the weight of the country with the most patents, in line
with the finding that poor quality patents tend to be protected in fewer countries. However, further
increasing the threshold from 1 to more citations does not significantly change the distribution of
weights.
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Patenting indicates whether the firm intends to sell in that market. However,
a larger market is likely to host more firms so that the market size per firm will
generally not grow 1 for 1 with size of total market. To account for this we weigh
each market c by GDP 0.350,c , where GDP0,c is the 5 year average GDP of country c
at the end of the pre-sample period.27 As a result, the weight of country c for firm








We compute weights for the 41 countries for which we have wage data. The weights
are computed over the pre-sample period 1970-1994 to ensure that they are weakly
exogenous as patent location could be influenced by shocks to innovation. We use
the same weights to compute firm customers’ average high-skill wage, productivity
or GDP per capita.
ADHMV verify that a similar method accounts well for the sales distribution of
major auto manufacturers. Coelli, Moxnes and Ulltveit-Moe (2016) carry out a more
systematic exercise and verify that a similar method accounts well for aggregate
bilateral trade flows and firm exports across 8 country groups in a representative
panel of 15,000 firms from 7 European countries (regressing patent weights on sales
weights gives a coefficient of 0.89 with a s.e. of 0.008). In Appendix 1.8.4, we
similarly show that our patent weights correlate well with trade flows. 28
Patent data also reports where firms’ innovators are located. Given that knowl-
edge spillovers have a geographical component (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1993),
we can use this information to build a measure of the stock of knowledge to which a
firm is exposed. More specifically and similarly to ADHMV, we compute the stocks
of automation patents and of other patents in each country. Then, for each firm,
we build a weighted average of country-level knowledge stocks, where the weights
correspond to the location of their innovators pre-sample in 1970-1994.29
27Here we use Eaton et al. (2011) who estimate that the elasticity of French exports to the
GDP of the destination country is 1 while the elasticity of the number of French exporters is 0.65,
which gives an elasticity of the average export by firm of 0.35. ADHMV use a power of 1 on GDP
instead of 0.35. We use different values in robustness checks in section 1.5.6
28There are three differences between our weights and those of these previous papers: we use
the empirically founded exponent of 0.35 on GDP, we restrict attention to cited patent families
and to patents in certain technological fields.
29The country stocks are built using the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate
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To link patents with their owners, we use Orbis Intellectual Property which
links 40 million patents to companies available in the Orbis financial database.
For companies in the same business group, R&D decisions could happen at the
group, though treating a group as one agent is often too aggressive (for instance
because subsidiaries may be in different sectors). Therefore, for firms within the
same business group, we normalize company names by removing non-firm specific
words such as country names or legal entity types from the name and then merge
firms with the same normalized name. All other firms are treated as separate
entities.30
1.4.4 Descriptive statistics
Our basic dataset consists of applicants who have applied to at least one biadic
automation patent between 1997 and 2011 (included), who have at least one patent
prior to 1995 which can be used to compute weights, and who are not fully domestic
(i.e. we exclude firms which have only patented in one country pre-sample). For the
auto95 measure this corresponds to 3, 341 firms, which are responsible for 35, 803,
or 58% of the total number of innovations (patent families). For auto90, 4, 905 firms
are responsible for 61, 931, also 58% of the total. Table 1.6 gives some descriptive
statistics on the number of automation patents per year and the country weights
for the firms in our sample. Over the period 1997-2011, the median firm in the
sample has filed 2 auto95 and 3 auto90 patent applications. The distribution is
very skewed and the 99th percentile firm in the sample has filed 194 automation
patents for auto90 and 173 for auto95. The largest country for a given firm has
on average a weight of 0.47 (for auto95). To ensure that our results are not driven
solely by the largest country, which we refer to as the “domestic country” of a firm,
we will include in some regressions, domestic country-year fixed effects. The second
largest country has on average a weight of 0.17. The three countries with the largest
weights on average are the United States, Germany and Japan. Appendix Table
of 15%. We add dummy variables for when the spillover stocks are zero.
30For instance, Siemens S.A., Siemens Ltd. or Belgian Siemens S.A. are merged, but Primetals
Technologies Germany Gmbh which belongs to the same group remains a separate entity in our
regressions.
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Table 1.6: Descriptive statistics for firms in our baseline regression
Variable Auto95 Auto90 Auto95 Auto90
Automation pantents per year 1997-2011 per year 1997-2011 weights
Mean 0.7 11.22 0.84 13.24 Largest country 0.47 0.46
Standard deviation 3.46 48.71 4.04 56.76 Second largest 0.17 0.18
p50 0 2 0 3 US 0.21 0.21
p75 0.27 6 0.33 7 Japan 0.17 0.15
p90 1.4 19 1.6 22 Germany 0.2 0.21
p95 3 41 3.27 50 France 0.09 0.09
p99 12 173 13.73 194 UK 0.09 0.09
Number of firms 3341 4903
1.8.16 gives the list of the ten biggest automation patenters in our sample.31
1.5 Main Empirical Results
We present our main results in three steps: First, our baseline regressions use the
full variation of firm low-skill wages to estimate the effect of an increase in low-
skill wages on automation innovations. Second, we use country-year fixed effects
to isolate the contribution of foreign wages. Third, we contrast the results on
automation innovations with those on other types of machinery innovations. The
rest of the section contains additional results and robustness checks.
1.5.1 Baseline results
Our baseline results are contained in Table 1.7. The dependent variable is the
number of biadic patents that qualify as automation when we use a threshold of
the 95th percentile for 6 digit C/IPC codes (auto95). The regression is carried over
the years 1997-2011 for the dependent variable and 1995-2009 for the independent
variables, a constraint imposed by the availability of wage data for a large number
of countries. Skill-dependent wages are measured in the manufacturing sector and
we deflate by the producer price index in the same sector.
Column (1) shows that without any controls except fixed effects, a higher low-
skill manufacturing wage for the customers of an innovating firm predicts more au-
tomation innovation. The estimated coefficient is an elasticity so that an increase of
31For instance, for Siemens the countries with the largest weights are Germany (0.37), the USA
(0.12), France (0.10), Japan (0.09) and the UK (0.07).
1.5. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS 37
Table 1.7: Baseline regressions: effect of wage on automation innovations (auto95)
Dependent variable Auto95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.2000*** 2.8254*** 1.8160** 1.9058** 1.9992** 2.2954*** 2.4627*** 2.4266*** 3.7365***
(0.5123) (0.7332) (0.7421) (0.7729) (0.8223) (0.8198) (0.8351) (0.8658) (0.9116)
High-skill wage -0.9210 -0.9009 -0.9695 -0.8698 -0.2971 -1.6180** -1.6700* -0.4838
(0.7082) (0.6715) (0.6913) (0.7511) (0.6802) (0.8033) (0.8634) (0.7650)
Stock automation -0.1275*** -0.1269** -0.1270** -0.1239** -0.1441*** -0.1443*** -0.1504***
(0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0510)
Stock other 0.6311*** 0.6296*** 0.6309*** 0.6260*** 0.6408*** 0.6407*** 0.6489***
(0.0579) (0.0581) (0.0581) (0.0574) (0.0600) (0.0600) (0.0595)
GDP gap 0.0210 0.0214 0.0179 0.0279* 0.0278* 0.0265*
(0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0156)
Labor productivity -0.2551 0.1285
(0.8644) (0.9199)
GDP per capita -1.5635* -3.3618***
(0.8765) (0.8917)
Spillovers automation 0.5442* 0.5478* 0.8587***
(0.3135) (0.3151) (0.3213)
Spillovers other -0.3014 -0.3089 -0.5853**
(0.2248) (0.2315) (0.2303)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. All regressions with stock variables (resp.
spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock (resp. no spillover). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01
10% in the low-skill wage is associated with 22% more automation patents. Column
(2) introduces high-skill wages as a control. As predicted by the model, high-skill
wages enter with a negative coefficient which is smaller in magnitude than the low-
skill wage (though not statistically significant). Column (3) adds control for the
firm’s stock of knowledge: a higher stock of automation knowledge within the firm
reduces the amount of automation innovation, suggesting that firms do not become
more specialized in automation technologies over time. Column (4) controls for the
GDP gap, automation innovations appear to be mildly pro-cyclical with a small elas-
ticity which is only significant at the 10% level in some specifications. Columns (5)
and (6) add controls for labor productivity in manufacturing and GDP per capita.
Labor productivity does not have a significant effect and GDP per capita has a
negative effect, though its significance is not robust to the specifications to follows.
Columns (7) to (9) repeat columns (4) to (6) but include knowledge spillovers and
find that firms which are exposed to more knowledge in automation technologies
innovate more in automation (with an elasticity between 0.54 and 0.86 depending
on specifications). In all specifications, the coefficient on low-skill wages is highly
significant with elasticities between 1.8 and 2.8 for columns (1) to (8) and a larger
38 CHAPTER 1. AUTOMATING LABOR
elasticity of 3.7 in column (9).
Firms in the same country could be affected by common shocks, and we therefore
we cluster standard errors at the domestic country (i.e. the country of largest
weight) level in Appendix Table 1.8.17. If anything clustering at the country level
tends to reduce the standard error on low-skill wages.32
Appendix Table 1.8.18 repeats Table 1.7 for the auto90 measure of automation.
The results are very similar but the coefficients on low-skill wages tend to be of a
smaller magnitude, which is in line with auto95 measure being a stricter measure of
automation. This also helps explain the magnitude of our elasticities in Table 1.7:
our analysis focuses on innovations with a high automation content (and therefore
most likely to respond to an increase in wages) for firms which introduce at least
one of those innovations.
1.5.2 Focusing on foreign wages
Country-level shocks which we have not controlled for may affect both innovation
and wages. Insofar as firms are mainly affected by the shock of their domestic coun-
try, we can capture those through domestic country-year fixed effects. Country-year
fixed effects would for instance control for a tax reform in Germany that would af-
fect both the innovation incentives of Siemens and low-skill wages. It would also
control for a technology shock that leads German firms to introduce more automa-
tion innovations and affect wages. Our identification assumption then becomes that
foreign wages are exogenous to automation innovations given our set of controls.
One remaining concern would arise from shocks to the cost of innovation if firms
innovate outside of their domestic country. We address this issue directly in section
1.5.6 by including wages weighted by the location of the firm’s inventors.33 Further-
more, in section 1.5.3 we look at the effect of wages on low-automation machinery
innovations and therefore any remaining bias would have to affect both types of
32A potential explanation for the negatively correlated error terms, is that a successful automa-
tion innovation by one firm will reduce the incentive for its competitors since the market has
already been captured.
33A related concern arises from offshoring: the cost of machine production would then be
correlated with foreign wages. Note, however, that higher foreign low-skill wages in production
would increase the price of machines and therefore bias our coefficient on low-skill wages toward
0.
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Table 1.8: Country-year fixed effects
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 1.8852* 2.1429* 3.0411** 3.4891*** 4.3023*** 3.7989** 3.6420*** 4.3362*** 3.8663**
(1.0367) (1.1505) (1.2232) (1.2958) (1.4482) (1.6370) (1.3146) (1.4473) (1.6288)
High-skill wage -2.4820** -1.9117* -1.7526 -3.5161*** -2.4740* -3.3526** -3.7549*** -2.8325** -3.6398***
(1.0115) (1.0157) (1.1046) (1.2515) (1.4209) (1.3633) (1.2805) (1.4364) (1.3692)
GDP gap 0.0623* 0.0620* 0.0646* 0.0044 0.0016 0.0044 0.0031 0.0001 0.0031
(0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0492) (0.0492) (0.0492) (0.0494) (0.0494) (0.0494)
Labor productivity -1.2851 -1.7494 -1.5475
(1.6381) (1.4131) (1.3896)
GDP per capita -2.8260 -0.5289 -0.3829
(2.0242) (1.9347) (1.8713)
Stock automation -0.1511*** -0.1506*** -0.1541*** -0.1522*** -0.1523*** -0.1526*** -0.1530*** -0.1532*** -0.1533***
(0.0528) (0.0527) (0.0523) (0.0525) (0.0523) (0.0525) (0.0524) (0.0521) (0.0524)
Stock other 0.6549*** 0.6556*** 0.6555*** 0.6494*** 0.6471*** 0.6490*** 0.6496*** 0.6475*** 0.6493***
(0.0602) (0.0602) (0.0598) (0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0600) (0.0601) (0.0601) (0.0599)
Spillovers automation 1.4782*** 1.4762*** 1.4715*** 1.4396*** 1.4128*** 1.4355*** 1.4380*** 1.4161*** 1.4357***
(0.4992) (0.5000) (0.4998) (0.4872) (0.4895) (0.4899) (0.4866) (0.4896) (0.4887)
Spillovers other -1.2259*** -1.2020*** -1.2436*** -1.2377*** -1.2268*** -1.2436*** -1.2252*** -1.2141*** -1.2300***
(0.3805) (0.3820) (0.3789) (0.3748) (0.3730) (0.3716) (0.3731) (0.3725) (0.3697)
Fixed effects F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070
Firms 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson
regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm and country-year fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables include a dummy
for no stock and no spillover. In columns (4)-(6) domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign)
low-skill wages in total low-skill wages computed at the beginning of the sample, and similarly for high-skill wages, GDP per capita and VA per em-
ployee. In columns (7)-(9), they are interacted with the average shares over the sample period instead. In columns (4)-(9), domestic (resp. foreign)
GDP gap is interacted with the domestic (resp. foreign) weight. In columns (1)-(3), there is no such interactions. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
machinery innovations differently.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 1.8 reproduce the columns (7), (8) and (9)
of Table 1.7 but adding country-year fixed effects, where the country of a firm is
still defined as the country with the largest weight. We still obtain a positive effect
of low-skill wages on automation innovations with similar elasticities (between 1.8
and 3.0). Columns (4) to (9) go further and only consider the foreign component of
wages (and of the other macroeconomic variables). In columns (4) to (9), the foreign
low-skill wage variable is defined as the log of the weighted average of country-level
wages excluding the domestic country multiplied by the share of foreign low-skill
wages in total wages. This share is computed at the beginning of the sample for
columns (4) to (6) and as the average value over the whole sample for columns
(7) to (9). We pre-multiply the (log) foreign wage by this share to take into allow
for some firms being more affected by foreign wages than others, and to ensure
that the reported coefficient corresponds to an elasticity on total low-skill wages.
The foreign macroeconomic control variables are defined similarly.34 Once again we
34Denote ωi,D the domestic weight and ωi,F = 1−ωi,D the total foreign weight with wL,D,t the
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find a positive effect of low-skill wages on automation innovations, with if anything
slightly larger elasticities. Our coefficient captures the average effect of an increase
in foreign low-skill wages given our controls whatever the shock behind it. Relative
to Table 1.7, the main difference is that high-skill wages are now the macroeconomic
control variable with the most explanatory power (neither labor productivity nor
GDP per capita have a significant effect once high-skill wages are introduced).
Clustering at the country-level (to account for correlation of errors across firms
within a country over time) tends to reduce standard errors (Appendix Table 1.8.19).
We also reproduced the regression for the auto90 measure, we obtain similar results
with slightly smaller coefficients (Appendix Table 1.8.20). Finally, we also replaced
the country-year fixed effects with the interaction of country-year dummies with the
domestic weight of each firm to account that firms are more or less exposed to the
domestic country. Here as well, we obtain similar results although the magnitude
of the coefficient on low-skill wages is a bit smaller (Appendix Table 1.8.21).
1.5.3 Non-automation innovations
Is the effect of wages on automation innovations specific to automation or does
it affect machinery patents in general? To answer this question, we now look at
“placebo regressions” of the effect of wages on innovations with a low score on our
automation metric. Specifically, we consider the set of machinery patents and ex-
clude any patent which has a technological category with an automation score above
a certain threshold. We fix that threshold at the 60th percentile of the distribution
of C/IPC 6 digit codes in the machinery technological fields (0.2091). We refer to
these innovations as “placebo machinery” innovations and we recompute knowledge
wage in the domestic country and wL,F,t the average wage in the foreign country. Then we can
decompose a small change in logwL,i,t as:







where ωi,DwL,D,0/wL,i,0 denotes the values around which the change is computed—which we take
as the the value at the beginning of the period or the average value over the sample period.
This shows that if
ωi,FwL,F,0
wL,i,0
d logwL,F,t increases by 0.01 then wL,i,t increases by 1%. The same
reasoning applies to high-skill wages or GDP per capita. In (1.3), GDP gap enters directly in
levels as an average of logs so we directly interact the domestic and foreign variables with ωi,D
and ωi,F .
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stocks and spillover variables for those innovations (“own”) and for all innovations
except those (“other”). Table 1.9 reports the results. Columns (1) to (3) corre-
spond to the baseline regressions with firm and year fixed effects. Low-skill wages
only have a positive and significant effect in column (3) when GDP per capita is
included as a control variable, but even in that case the coefficient is statistically
significantly smaller than with automation (1.66 versus 3.74 in column 9 of Table
1.7).35 Columns (4) to (6) repeat the same regressions but add country-year fixed
effects and columns (7) to (9) focus on foreign wages (here defined as in columns
(4) to (6) of Table 1.8). Neither low-skill wages nor any other macroeconomic con-
trol variables have an effect on placebo machinery innovations. The sign of low-skill
wages even flip in columns (7) to (9).36 We therefore view this exercise as validating
both our empirical approach and our measure of automation. In particular, if our
result on the effect of low-skill wages on automation innovations came from a bias,
than that bias would have to be absent for other types of machinery innovations.
1.5.4 Additional results
Innovation types. Building on the previous results contrasting automation inno-
vations and low-automation machinery innovations, we now look at subcategories
of automation innovations and a laxer measure in Table 1.10, which reproduces
column (8) of Table 1.7 for various types of innovations. Column (1) is essentially
a robustness check which removes the codes that we added to the definition of the
machinery technological field listed in footnote 11 (though, we continue to exclude
the weapons categories). The results are similar to the baseline (with a lower but
not statistically so coefficient). Column (2) presents a laxer definition of automa-
tion using the 80th percentile of the distribution of the C/IPC 6 digit codes. We
still get a positive effect of low-skill wages though with a coefficient smaller than for
either auto90 or auto95. Columns (3) to (8) look at subcategories of automation
35Further, this positive coefficient in the placebo regression is sensitive to specifications, and
unlike for the regressions with automation, it loses significance with different deflators for wages
(not shown).
36Conditioning on the 60th percentile is not important and we obtain similar results with machin-
ery innovations excluding auto95 or auto90. In fact, since automation innovations are a relatively
small share of all machinery innovations, a regression on all machinery innovation gives similar
results. See Appendix Table 1.8.22.
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Table 1.9: Non-automation innovations
Dependent Variable Placebo Machinery
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 0.2962 0.5837 1.6587** -0.0486 0.0964 0.6381 -0.7470 -1.0568 -0.9430
(0.6209) (0.7013) (0.6573) (0.8089) (0.9245) (0.9903) (1.2590) (1.4477) (1.3045)
High-skill wage -0.1907 0.3251 0.8911 -0.3499 -0.0648 0.0238 0.4969 0.1238 0.4016
(0.6953) (0.6428) (0.7506) (0.9539) (0.9122) (1.0053) (1.3193) (1.3073) (1.4470)
GDP gap -0.0307*** -0.0292*** -0.0292*** -0.0072 -0.0071 -0.0062 0.0117 0.0120 0.0114
(0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0319)
Labor productivity -1.1140 -0.6087 0.6174
(0.7467) (1.1021) (1.1452)
GDP per capita -3.4367*** -1.5038 0.3079
(0.8242) (1.3776) (1.3051)
Stock own 0.0866** 0.0879** 0.0892** 0.0952** 0.0956** 0.0957** 0.0958** 0.0954** 0.0956**
(0.0408) (0.0411) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0406) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0406) (0.0406)
Stock other 0.4797*** 0.4811*** 0.4758*** 0.4854*** 0.4861*** 0.4847*** 0.4862*** 0.4871*** 0.4866***
(0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0463) (0.0460) (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0449)
Spillovers own 2.6849*** 2.7419*** 1.9983*** 1.1394*** 1.1505*** 1.0777** 1.1398*** 1.1215** 1.1469***
(0.4153) (0.4163) (0.4423) (0.4410) (0.4435) (0.4411) (0.4393) (0.4428) (0.4418)
Spillovers other -2.4198*** -2.4342*** -1.8132*** -1.2443** -1.2469** -1.1918** -1.2694** -1.2450** -1.2706**
(0.5298) (0.5348) (0.5386) (0.5052) (0.5056) (0.5047) (0.4965) (0.5008) (0.4965)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 115575 115575 115575 115515 115515 115515 115515 115515 115515
Firms 7705 7705 7705 7701 7701 7701 7701 7701 7701
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). Columns (1)-(3) include firm and year fixed effects, while (4)-(9) include firm and country-year fixed
effects. Stock variables are calculated with respect to the dependent variable. In columns (7)-(9) domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages are
interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages in total low-skill wages computed at the beginning of the sample, and
similarly for high-skill wages, GDP per capita and VA per employee. Domestic (resp. foreign) GDP gap is interacted with the domestic (resp.
foreign) weight. In columns (1)-(6), there is no such interactions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01
innovations. Robot90 and Robot80 were already defined in Section 1.2.5. The other
types of innovations are similarly defined: for instance, automat*90 covers patents
which belong to technological categories with a frequency of the “automat*” key-
words above the threshold used to define auto90. Columns (3) and (4) show that the
results are similar for automat* patents (note that by definition automat*80 patents
are all auto80 but 91.5% of them are auto90). Column (6) shows that our results
extend to robot80 patents (which are also all auto95) but not to robot90 maybe
because the sample size is reduced. The sample size drops even more substantially
for the CNC categories in columns (7) and (8), and consequently the coefficient on
low-skill wages is very imprecisely estimated.
Timing. We look at alternative lags for the macroeconomic and the spillover
variables in Table 1.11—we keep a lag of 2 between patent applications and the
stocks of patents from the firm because otherwise the dependent variable would be
included in the stock of automation when we consider contemporaneous regressions
or leads. Column (4) reproduces our baseline results with a 2 year lag. Panel A
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Table 1.10: Innovation categories
Dependent Variable AutoX95 Auto80 Automat* 90 Automat* 80 Robot 90 Robot 80 CNC 90 CNC 80
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low-skill wage 1.9759** 1.3013** 2.6151** 1.7535* 0.4046 2.3998* -2.6476 -1.5273
(0.9046) (0.6373) (1.1768) (0.9657) (1.6931) (1.2440) (2.0151) (1.5877)
High-skill wage -1.2113 -1.2776** -0.9885 -0.9874 -0.8384 -2.0705* 2.0374 0.8833
(0.9265) (0.5754) (1.0579) (0.8395) (1.6053) (1.2334) (1.8923) (1.5580)
GDP gap 0.0370** 0.0047 0.0078 -0.0052 0.0345 0.0409 0.0317 0.0214
(0.0186) (0.0121) (0.0214) (0.0173) (0.0365) (0.0264) (0.0411) (0.0305)
Labor productivity 0.2216 0.8058 -0.9351 -0.2196 0.8059 0.7937 2.7221 1.9101
(0.9431) (0.6648) (1.1098) (0.9161) (1.9404) (1.3971) (2.3494) (2.1381)
Stock own -0.1400** 0.0263 -0.1149* -0.0861 -0.3029*** -0.1319* -0.3043** -0.2888***
(0.0567) (0.0374) (0.0601) (0.0525) (0.0993) (0.0790) (0.1511) (0.0999)
Stock other 0.6443*** 0.5225*** 0.6684*** 0.6312*** 0.8200*** 0.6329*** 0.5642*** 0.6140***
(0.0645) (0.0460) (0.0872) (0.0737) (0.1334) (0.0994) (0.1303) (0.0961)
Spillovers own 0.7068* 0.9236* 0.3869 0.4415 0.2346 0.1891 0.7408** 0.4634*
(0.4072) (0.5235) (0.4365) (0.4719) (0.5380) (0.3489) (0.3657) (0.2727)
Spillovers other -0.5863* -0.6139 -0.3800 -0.3305 -0.0665 -0.2028 -1.5340*** -0.7109
(0.3036) (0.4435) (0.2736) (0.3469) (0.3529) (0.2887) (0.5522) (0.4478)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 48600 97635 34170 50220 17670 24645 8970 15000
Firms 3240 6509 2278 3348 1178 1643 598 1000
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson
regressions fixed-effects (HHG). Stocks and spillovers are calculated with respect to the dependent variable. All regressions include firm fixed effects and
year dummies. All regressions include a dummy for no stock and no spillover. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01
shows that the largest coefficient on low-skill wages is obtained for a 2 year lag,
but remains relatively stable between a 4 year lag and a 1 year lead. Both panels
find an effect of low-skill wages more clearly centered around lag 2 (ADHMV also
found that the largest coefficient for the effect of gas prices on innovations in the car
industry was at a 2 year lag). Our baseline regressions assume a 2 year lag between
wages and patent applications.
Of course, innovators would not be interested about wages 2 years in the past
per se, but only inasmuch as they are indicative of future wages. This is our in-
terpretation throughout our regressions, with the 2 year lag corresponding roughly
to the time spent between an effect on R&D and the first results materialized by a
patent application.37 We push this logic further in Appendix Table 1.8.23, where
we compute predicted future wages at time t − 2 based on an AR(1) process with
country-specific trends. We find similar results.
Minimum wage. Given its policy relevance, we also look at the effect of minimum
wages using data on 22 countries.38 Importantly, we cannot use the minimum wage
37In that context, the difference between the significant lead coefficients in Panel A and the
insignificant ones in Panel B and C, could reflect that domestic wages may be easier to predict
than foreign wages.
38We use data from the OECD. Importantly, not all countries have government-mandated min-
imum wages, most notably Italy and, until 2015, Germany. For Germany, we follow Dolado,
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Table 1.11: Lags and leads
Dependent variable Auto95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lags (Leads) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Panel A: baseline
Low-skill wage 1.4268* 2.0578** 1.9681** 2.4266*** 2.0882** 2.0767** 2.2411*** 1.4514*
(0.8599) (0.8328) (0.8229) (0.8658) (0.8417) (0.8331) (0.8518) (0.8251)
High-skill wage -0.0640 -0.9379 -1.6808* -1.6700* -2.0273** -2.5752*** -2.5365*** -2.7223***
(0.9033) (0.8937) (0.9223) (0.8634) (0.7977) (0.8281) (0.7687) (0.7828)
Labor productivity 0.1931 0.4055 1.1283 0.1285 0.0857 -0.0118 -0.2255 0.4201
(1.1023) (1.0789) (1.0884) (0.9199) (0.7871) (0.8022) (0.8265) (0.8912)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 47565 48240 49395 50115 50670 51315 52470 53940
Firms 3171 3216 3293 3341 3378 3421 3498 3596
Panel B: country-year fixed effects
Low-skill wage 0.9671 1.3572 1.5405 2.1429* 1.6930 1.2360 1.2538 0.1282
(1.1012) (1.1353) (1.1175) (1.1505) (1.1222) (1.1088) (1.1409) (1.0962)
High-skill wage 0.4539 -0.9749 -1.7245 -1.9117* -2.0866** -2.7165** -2.1045** -1.6862
(1.3522) (1.1490) (1.0931) (1.0157) (1.0346) (1.0935) (1.0333) (1.0682)
Labor productivity -1.5193 -0.8311 -0.2556 -1.2851 -0.5775 0.3167 -0.1957 0.0676
(1.8190) (1.6338) (1.5444) (1.6381) (1.6431) (1.5761) (1.6158) (1.5974)
Panel C: country-year fixed effects and foreign variables
Low-skill wage 1.5679 2.5117* 3.1804** 4.3023*** 3.0459** 1.6943 1.6996 0.4034
(1.6579) (1.4908) (1.4684) (1.4482) (1.4516) (1.5642) (1.7055) (1.7377)
High-skill wage 2.1192 -1.0194 -2.5135 -2.4740* -3.2862** -3.8818*** -3.3215** -2.5666*
(1.8327) (1.6302) (1.6445) (1.4209) (1.4238) (1.4272) (1.3771) (1.4844)
Labor productivity -2.3858 -0.9029 -0.7200 -1.7494 0.4010 1.8684 1.6417 1.6644
(1.5235) (1.5420) (1.5937) (1.4131) (1.3247) (1.4493) (1.5255) (1.6175)
Fixed effects F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 47565 48240 49365 50070 50595 51255 52410 53895
Firms 3171 3216 3291 3338 3373 3417 3494 3593
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. Each panel represents a different regression. All regressions con-
tain controls for GDP gap, stocks and spillovers, for which we do not report the coefficient. The independent variables
(wages, VAemp and GDP gap) are lagged by the number of periods indicated in lag, except for the stock variables which
are always lagged by 2 periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). Panel A regressions
contain firm and year fixed effects. Panel B and C regressions contain firm and country-year fixed effects. In Panel C
regressions, wages are replaced with foreign wages interacted with the share of foreign wages in total wages at the begin-
ning of the sample, and similarly for the other macro variables. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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as an instrument for low-skill wages: our regressions show that the high-skill wage
has a significant effect and therefore should be included in the regression. If low-
skill wages were to be instrumented so should high-skill wages, and we would need
a second instrument. We report the results of reduced form regressions where we
replace low-skill wages with the minimum wage in Appendix Table 1.8.24. We find
a positive effect of the minimum wage on automation innovations which in specifica-
tions with country-year fixed effects has p-values just above or below 0.1. Clustering
standard-errors at the country-level gives significant coefficients (see Appendix Ta-
ble 1.8.25). Minimum wages are unlikely to be a strong predictor of automation in
our analysis: first because it only captures part of the labor costs (contrary to our
baseline measure), second because we focus on automation innovations that largely
happen in manufacturing where wages for low-skill workers are often substantially
higher than the minimum wage. An analysis on automation in service industries
might show a stronger relationship.
1.5.5 Shift-share set-up
A recent literature addresses the identifying assumptions behind the shift-share set-
up in linear regressions. In the language of our setting, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin
and Swift (2019) show that the shift-share instrument is equivalent to a combination
of weights time country-year dummies. Our shift-share setting would then capture
the effect of low-skill wages on automation innovations if weights time country-year
dummies only affect automation through the controls that we have included. In this
interpretation of the shift-share set-up the exogeneity of the weights is important
and we show below that our results are robust to using weights from an earlier
period.
Borusyak, Hull and Jaravel (2018) show that country-time shocks can also be
a source of identification in the shift-share setting. The inference is valid if either
there is a large number of countries (such that the Herfindahl index tends toward
0) affected by independent shocks (controlling for a year and firm fixed effects); or
the correlation of shocks within a country decays sufficiently rapidly that a large
Kramarz, Machin, Manning, Margolis, Teulings, Saint-Paul and Keen (1996) and use the the
collectively bargained minimum wages which in effect constitute law.
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number of country x years is sufficient (see Appendix A2 in their paper). They
advise practitioners to use appropriate controls to capture omitted variables. We
follow this approach partly by including a large set of controls in our regressions and
partly by including country-year fixed effects. They further encourage practitioners
to apply the standard error correction of Adão, Kolesár and Morales (2019).
Adão et. al. (2019) show that standard applications with the shift-share design
often lead to an over-rejection of the null of no effect. In the language of our
application, the problem arises if the standard errors of firms with similar country-
distributions have correlated residual errors. Though this problem is related to
the correlation of standard errors in clustered designs it is not solved by standard
clustering. Adão et. al. (2019) use Monte Carlo simulations in a standard Bartik
setting and show that in a setting where the true coefficient is zero by construction
the commonly used approach rejects the null of no effect up to 55% of the cases.
They derive a formulae for standard errors in an OLS setting that corrects for
this problem. This formulae is not directly applicable in the current setting since
we employ a Poisson estimator and deriving the corresponding correction for the
Poisson estimator is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we implement a Monte
Carlo simulation like the one used in Adão et. al. (2019) and show that we do not
have a similar problem of over-rejection.
Specifically, we replicate the regression in Column (9) in Table 1.7. For each firm
we keep the automation activity, the stocks of innovations, the spillover variables, as
well as the distribution of country-weights based on actual patents. For each country
we sample without replacement the entire path of wages and GDP from the existing
set of wages and GDP. Figure 1.5 shows a histogram of the t-statistic of the low-
skill wages, the main coefficient of interest, where the red line at 4.1 corresponds
to the t-statistic of column (9). The empirical distribution has a heavier left tail
than the expected standard normal distribution but only in 0.33% of the cases did
the absolute value of the t-statistic exceed the realized t-statistic from our main
regressions. In the language of Adão et al. (2019) the set of controls soaks up
most country-specific shocks affecting the outcome variable and, consequently, no
shift-share structure is left in the regression residuals.














-4 -2 0 2 4
t-value
T-statistics for Monte Carlo on country wages
Figure 1.5: The t-value on the low-skill wages from a Monte Carlo simulation sampling
country wages and GDP (see text for details)
1.5.6 Robustness checks
This section presents several robustness checks.
Controlling for the cost of innovation. Our measure of wages could still re-
flect the cost of innovation if innovation does not solely take place in the domestic
country. To address this issue we re-build our firm-specific macroeconomic variable
using the inventor weights of the firm instead of the patent weights. Table 1.12
reports the result. The coefficient on low-skill wages remains positive and signifi-
cant but the coefficient on low-skill wages weighted by inventor weights is small and
insignificant. These regressions constitute a placebo test in that they are essentially
treating the firms by the same macroeconomic shocks but distributed according to
where the firm innovates not where it sells.
Multicollinearity and skill premium. Low-skill wages, high-skill wages and labor
productivity are correlated, which could affect our regressions—although control-
ling for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, the correlation coefficient is only
0.6 (see Appendix Table 1.8.26). To deal with this issue, Appendix Table 1.8.27
regresses automation innovation on the log of the ratio of low-skill to high-skill
wages (the inverse of the skill premium) for firm fixed effects, country-year fixed
effects and foreign wages with country-year fixed effects. The coefficient on the
inverse skill premium is always of the same magnitude as that on low-skill wages
and highly significant. On the other hand, replacing low-skill and high-skill wages
with their ratio in the regressions with placebo machinery innovations of Table 1.9
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Table 1.12: Wages weighted by inventor weights
Dependent Variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.6194*** 2.4897*** 3.7088*** 1.9136* 2.0761* 2.9547** 4.7342*** 5.6526*** 5.0494**
(0.9119) (0.9549) (1.0503) (1.0705) (1.1954) (1.3173) (1.5977) (1.7376) (1.9638)
Low-skill wage (iw) -0.2924 -0.1985 -0.0762 -0.1439 0.0552 0.0944 -0.1005 0.6363 0.4886
(0.4461) (0.4668) (0.4805) (0.4747) (0.4794) (0.4754) (0.5772) (0.6011) (0.5562)
High-skill wage -1.9307** -2.1087** -0.8557 -2.5728** -2.2029** -1.9204* -4.0721*** -3.4857** -4.2454**
(0.9171) (1.0032) (0.8490) (1.0770) (1.0546) (1.1427) (1.5497) (1.6359) (1.6521)
High-skill wage (iw) 0.3960 0.5295 0.4991 0.1804 0.4874 0.2735 -0.2895 0.7720* 0.0817
(0.3397) (0.3869) (0.3370) (0.3249) (0.3727) (0.3451) (0.4384) (0.4655) (0.4573)
GDP gap 0.0364 0.0366 0.0314 0.0616* 0.0616* 0.0630* -0.0077 -0.0166 -0.0080
(0.0229) (0.0227) (0.0231) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0361) (0.0567) (0.0565) (0.0565)
GDP gap (iw) -0.0076 -0.0083 -0.0050 0.0003 -0.0017 0.0022 0.0186 0.0126 0.0208
(0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0153)
Labor productivity 0.4313 -0.8383 -1.5747
(1.1116) (1.6547) (1.5093)
Labor productivity (iw) -0.3065 -0.7076 -1.8365***
(0.5374) (0.5066) (0.6146)
GDP per capita -3.0004*** -2.4889 -0.1854
(0.9236) (1.9888) (2.1553)
GDP per capita (iw) -0.4388 -0.4514 -1.1406**
(0.5746) (0.6508) (0.5649)
Control variables stock + spill stock + spill stock + spill stock + spill stock + spill stock + spill stock + spill stock + spill stock + spill
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 49305 49305 49305 49245 49245 49245 37395 37395 37395
Firms 3287 3287 3287 3283 3283 3283 2493 2493 2493
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects
(HHG). Columns (1)-(3) include firm and year fixed effects, while (4)-(9) include firm and country-year fixed effects. Stock variables are calculated with respect to the de-
pendent variable. In columns (7)-(9) domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages in total low-skill wages
computed at the beginning of the sample, and similarly for high-skill wages, GDP per capita and labor productivity. Domestic (resp. foreign) GDP gap is interacted with
the domestic (resp. foreign) weight. In columns (1)-(6), there is no such interactions. All regressions with patent-weighted low-skill wage variable include a corresponding
inventor-weighted low-skill wage variable, similarly for high-skill wage, GDP gap, GDP per capita and labor productivity. All inventor-weighted variables are denoted by (iw)
after their names. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
gives insignificant coefficients.
Including middle-skill wages. Previous work has often found that IT dis-
proportionately affects middle-skill workers (e.g. Autor and Dorn, 2013). In this
spirit, Appendix Table 1.8.28 adds middle-skill wages to our regressions. Low-skill
wages continue to have a large positive impact on automation, whereas middle-skill
wages have a negative (though not consistently significant effect). Low-skill and
middle-skill wages are highly correlated (with a coefficient of 0.94, see Appendix
Table 1.8.26), and consequently, middle-skill wages have a positive coefficient when
low-skill wages are not included.
Wages and deflators. Appendix Table 1.8.29 shows that our results are robust
to deflating our macroeconomic variables differently: by converting to USD in a
different year (columns 1 and 2), every year (columns 3 and 4) or using the local
GDP deflator instead of the local PPI in manufacturing (columns 5 and 6). Further,
we look at total wages instead of manufacturing wages either with our baseline
deflator (columns 7 and 8) or converting every year (columns 9 and 10). Our
results remain largely robust but with smaller coefficients when converting in USD
every year. Converting in USD every year makes our macroeconomic variables more
1.5. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS 49
correlated and increases the importance of short-term fluctuations.
Weights. Table 1.13 reproduces the regressions of columns (7) and (8) of Table
1.7 but with alternative firm-specific weights ωi,c. In columns (1) and (2), we com-
pute the patent weights over a more recent period (1985-1994 instead of 1970-1994)
and obtain the same results. Columns (3) and (4) on the other hand drop the 5
most recent years in computing the weights. We lose a large number of firms, but
still obtain a positive effect of low-skill wages on automation innovations, though
with slightly smaller coefficients. This regression addresses the potential concern
that our weights could be endogenous because firms which already intend to do au-
tomation innovations may decide to locate in places where they forecast an increase
in low-skill wages: it is hard to see how firms’ location decisions before 1989 could
reflect increases in wages from 1995 onward.39 Columns (5) to (10) keep the patent
weights as in our baseline analysis but instead of multiplying them by GDP 0.35c ,
they do not multiply them (columns 5 and 6), multiply them by GDP (7 and 8) or
by the total value of low-skill employment to the power 0.35 ((wLL)
0.35: one could
argue that this represents a better measure than GDP 0.35 of the potential market
for technology designed to automate low-skill work). We obtain similar results.
Quality. Appendix Table 1.8.30 investigates whether our results are robust
when focusing on patents of higher quality. We look at patents which have been
applied for at 2 of the 3 main patent offices (EU, Japan and US), or at triadic
patents which have been applied for at the 3 offices. Triadic patents are generally
considered to be patents of very high quality. All of these give similar results. We
also restrict attention to biadic patents with at least one citation within 5 years and
weigh patents by citations.40 This weakens the results somewhat perhaps because
whereas the decision to innovate is a choice variable of the firm the eventual quality
of the innovation is largely random.
39The same concern can be addressed by keeping our baseline weight but dropping the first few
years. See Appendix Table 1.8.30 which reproduces Table 1.7 but only from 2000. Though the
standard errors are bigger, the results are essentially the same.
40We add to each patent the number of citations received within 5 years normalized by tech-
nological field and year of application, in a similar fashion to, for instance, Kogan, Papanikolaou,
Seru and Stoffman (2017), who find a positive correlation between patent value and citations.
Abrams, Akcigit and Grennan (2018) on the other hand find an inverted U relationship between
patent value and citations.
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Table 1.13: Alternative weights
Dependent Variable Auto95
1985− 1994 1970− 1989 GDP 0 GDP 1 (wL ∗ L)
0.35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low-skill wage 2.4739*** 2.3626*** 1.8155* 1.7192* 1.8685** 1.7962** 2.8690*** 2.8825*** 2.2007*** 2.1429**
(0.8691) (0.8876) (0.9480) (0.9544) (0.7776) (0.8176) (0.8855) (0.8953) (0.8125) (0.8516)
High-skill wage -1.7055** -1.9002** -0.8990 -1.0259 -1.3791* -1.4820* -1.6609** -1.6405** -1.4445* -1.5237*
(0.8288) (0.8899) (0.8354) (0.9524) (0.8226) (0.8851) (0.7114) (0.7547) (0.7847) (0.8444)
GDP gap 0.0226 0.0224 0.0140 0.0138 0.0276* 0.0273* 0.0265* 0.0264* 0.0283* 0.0280*
(0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0154)
Labor productivity 0.4484 0.3240 0.2559 -0.0482 0.1983
(0.9649) (1.0211) (0.8994) (0.8293) (0.9221)
Stock automation -0.1337** -0.1343** -0.1194** -0.1201** -0.1436*** -0.1441*** -0.1429*** -0.1429*** -0.1428*** -0.1432***
(0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0602) (0.0603) (0.0509) (0.0511) (0.0511) (0.0511) (0.0509) (0.0509)
Stock other 0.6539*** 0.6540*** 0.6900*** 0.6895*** 0.6414*** 0.6410*** 0.6385*** 0.6384*** 0.6404*** 0.6403***
(0.0639) (0.0639) (0.0769) (0.0769) (0.0600) (0.0600) (0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0600) (0.0600)
Spillovers automation 0.5655* 0.5815* 0.2618 0.2719 0.4091 0.4178 0.8056** 0.8051** 0.4679 0.4744
(0.3154) (0.3182) (0.3206) (0.3229) (0.3093) (0.3106) (0.3340) (0.3354) (0.3103) (0.3114)
Spillovers other -0.3401 -0.3693 -0.3772 -0.3951 -0.1913 -0.2090 -0.4680** -0.4664** -0.2577 -0.2702
(0.2303) (0.2401) (0.2435) (0.2518) (0.2311) (0.2366) (0.2265) (0.2305) (0.2284) (0.2353)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 45735 45735 35955 35955 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115
Firms 3049 3049 2397 2397 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-
effects (HHG). All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. All regressions with stock variables (resp. spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock
(resp. no spillover). In columns (1) and (2) firms’ country weights for the macroeconomic variables are computed over the period 1985-1994; and over the period 1970-
1989 for columns (3) and (4). Columns (5) to (19) use the baseline pre-sample period of 1970-1994. Columns (5) and (6) do not adjust for GDP in the computation
of the weights and columns (7) and (8) use GDP instead of GDP 0.35 to adjust for countries’ size in the computation of the weights. Columns (9) and (10) adjust for
total low-skilled payment instead of using GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Nickell’s bias. Our regressions include the stock of automation innovations and
therefore may suffer from Nickell’s bias. To address this issue, in Appendix Table
1.8.31, we remove the stock of automation innovations with very little effect on the
variable of interest. In addition, we use Blundell, Griffith and van Rennen (1999)’s
method, which proxies for the fixed effect by using the firm’s pre-sample average of
the dependent variable. We obtain very similar results.
Industry-year fixed effects. Appendix Table 1.8.33 introduces industry-year
fixed effects where the industry of a firm correspond to its 2 digit industry in Orbis.
The results are very similar.
1.6 Event study: the Hartz reforms in Germany
In this section, we use the Hartz reform as an event study to complement our main
analysis. The Hartz reforms were a series of labor-market reforms in Germany
designed from 2002 onward and implemented between January 1st 2003 and January
1st 2005. The reforms aimed at reducing unemployment and increasing labor-
market flexibility by reforming employment agencies to provide better job-search
assistance, deregulating temporary work, offering wage subsidies for hard-to-place
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workers, reducing or removing social contributions on low-paid jobs and reducing
long-term unemployment benefits (see Jacobi and Kluve, 2007). The reforms have
been widely credited with playing a major role in the remarkable performance of the
German labor market since, in particular, for increasing labor supply and improving
matching efficiency (see Krause and Uhlig, 2012, Krebs and Scheffel, 2013 and 2017,
or Burda and Seele, 2016). Such reforms should reduce the incentive to automate
low-skill labor by reducing labor costs (directly through social contribution and
indirectly through an increase in labor supply) but also by allowing for more flexible
contracts and reducing the expected cost of vacancies.
We start from the same database linking firms and patents as in our main
empirical analysis of Section 1.5, using the same weights to measure firms’ exposure
to different countries and focusing on biadic patent applications as a measure of
innovation. We still define the country of a firm as the country of largest weight,
and restrict attention to firms from the countries with the highest average exposure
to Germany (Austria, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States).
We first run the following Poisson regression, over the years 1995-2012, main-
taining a 2-year lag:
PATAut,i,t+2 = exp (βDE · δtωi,DE + βKa lnKAut,i,t + βKo lnKother,i,t + δi + δc,t)+ ǫi,t.
PATAut,i,t+2 is still a count of automation patents, KAut,i,t and Kother,i,t continue
represent firm knowledge stocks, δi is a firm fixed effect, δc,t is a country-year fixed
effect, ωi,DE is the (fixed) firm weight on Germany, δt is a set of year dummies (with
2003 as the excluded year) and βDE is the full vector of coefficients of interest. The
vector of coefficients βDE determines by how much a firm more exposed to Germany
tends to do more automation patents in a given year relative to 2005 (with the 2
year lag). Figure 1.6.a reports the results. The coefficients can be interpreted as
follows: a value of −2 in 2008 indicates that on average a firm with a German
weight of 0.1 (the mean value is 0.106) did 20% less automation innovations in 2010
than in 2005 (recall the 2 year lag) compared to a firm with no German exposure.























































































(b) Effect of German exposure on au-
tomation innovations relative to other
machinery innovations.
Figure 1.6: Effect of German exposure on automation innovations. Panel (a) reports coef-
ficients on the interaction between the German weight and a set of year fixed effects in
a Poisson regression of auto95 innovations controlling for a full set of fixed effects and
firm innovation stocks. Panel (b) reports coefficients on the triple interaction between
the German weight, a dummy for auto95 innovations and a set of year fixed effects in a
Poisson regression of auto95 and other machinery innovations controlling for a full set of
fixed effects, firm innovation stocks and the interaction between the German weight and a
set of year fixed effects.
The figure suggests that from 2000 until 2004 firms highly exposed to Germany in-
creased their propensity to introduce automation innovations. This trend reversed
between 2006 and 2009 and resumed from 2010. This is consistent with the Hartz
reform increasing labor supply from 2002-2004, and therefore decreasing the incen-
tive to introduce automation innovations 2 years later. 2008 marks the beginning
of the Great Recession which had a lower impact on German labor markets than in
other countries, so that German labor markets remained relatively tight, potentially
increasing the incentive to undertake automation innovations.
The previous figure clearly shows that the behavior of firms highly exposed to
Germany differs over time from that of other firms. To show that the trends above
are specific to automation innovations, we then run the following Poisson regression:
PATk,i,t+2 = exp

 βDE · δtωi,DE + β
aut
DE · δtωi,DE1k=aut




1.6. EVENT STUDY: THE HARTZ REFORMS IN GERMANY 53
k denotes the type of an innovation which is either auto95 or another machinery
innovation, δk,i represents a full set of innovation type firm fixed effects and δk,c,t
innovation type country year fixed effects and 1k=aut is a dummy for an auto95
innovation. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. βautDE is the vector of
coefficients of interests, for each year, they measure how much exposure to Germany
increases the relative propensity to introduce automation innovations instead of
other forms of machinery innovations compared to 2005 (as 2003 is still the excluded
year). Figure 1.6.b reports the results: the pattern is similar to Figure 1.6.a but
more striking.
To formally test that the Hartz reform created a trend break in the relative
propensity of firms highly exposed to Germany to introduce automation innova-
tions relative to other types of machinery innovation, we replace the full set of year
fixed-effects δt in β
aut
DE · δtωi,DE1k=aut in (1.5) with a time trend t− 2003 and a time
trend interacted with a post 2003 dummy (t− 2003)1t>2003. We focus on the years
1998-2008 (i.e. 2000-2010 for the innovation variable) to have a panel centered on
2003 and avoid the Great Recession. Table 1.14 reports the result. Column (2) cor-
responds exactly to the specification we discussed: it shows a significant time trend
in the effect of German exposure on the relative propensity to carry automation
innovation two years later between 1998 and 2003, this time trend sharply reversed
in the following 5 years. Column (1) carries out the same regression but omits the
controls for the stock variables. Column (3) adds a control for the triple interac-
tion of the German weight, a dummy for automation innovations and a dummy for
post-2003. This tests whether the break in time trends is associated with a shift
in levels. The coefficient is insignificant. Column (4) replaces the German weight
by a dummy indicating that the firm is in the top quartile of exposure to Germany
among innovating firms: the results are of similar magnitude since the 75th per-
centile of German weight is 0.16. Column (5) uses the low-automation innovations
of section 1.5.3 instead of all other machinery innovations. The results are similar.
Finally, column (6) considers three types of innovations by separating non-auto95
machinery innovations into the low-automation innovations of the previous columns
and the rest. There are no significant trends distinguishing low-automation innova-
tions from other non-auto95 machinery innovations. Overall, this exercise suggests
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Table 1.14: Innovation and exposure to Germany
Dependent variables Auto 95 and other + low auto Auto95 and low auto Auto95 and other and low auto
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
time trend*dummy auto95*German exposure 0.6309** 0.6245*** 0.7726* 0.0929** 0.6486*** 0.6523***
(0.2502) (0.2296) (0.3957) (0.0366) (0.2464) (0.2322)
time trend*dummy auto95*post_2003*German exposure -1.2330*** -1.2322*** -1.3229** -0.1810** -1.2500*** -1.2826***
(0.4473) (0.4291) (0.5273) (0.0766) (0.4605) (0.4300)
dummy auto95*post_2003*German exposure -0.7289
(1.0856)
time trend*dummy low auto*German exposure 0.0081
(0.1278)
time trend*dummy low auto*post_2003*German exposure -0.0386
(0.1835)
year dummy*German exposure Y Y Y Y Y Y
firm innovation stocks * innovation types N Y Y Y Y Y
firm *innovation types fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
country * year * innovation types fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects
(HHG). All regressions include firm innovation types fixed effects, country year innovation types fixed effects and controls for the year dummy times the measure of German
exposure. German exposure is measured by the German weights in all regressions except for column (4) where it is replaced by a dummy signaling that the firm is in the top
quartile of Germany exposed firms. Innovation types are auto95 and (other + low auto) in columns (1) to (4), auto 95 and low auto in column (5) and auto 95, other and low
auto in column (6). All regressions with stock variables include a dummy for no stock. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
that the Hartz reforms reduced the propensity of foreign firms highly exposed to
Germany to introduce automation innovations.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used patent text data to identify patents which correspond to
automation innovations and provide a new measure of automation. Across sectors,
our measure is uncorrelated with computerization but positively correlated with
robotization. We also find that our measure is associated with a decline in routine
tasks across US sectors. We then use our classification to analyze for the first time
the effect of wages on automation innovations in machinery. We find that automa-
tion innovations are very responsive to changes in low-skill wages with elasticities
estimated between 2 and 4. This result does not extend to other types of innova-
tions in machinery. Furthermore, we show that the Hartz reforms in Germany were
associated with a relative increase in automation innovations by foreign firms with
a high exposure to Germany.
These results suggest that policies which increase labor costs for low-skill work-
ers will lead to an increase in innovations which aim at saving on low-skill workers.
Therefore, with endogenous technological change, such policies are likely to be less
costly for the economy in terms of overall welfare, but they introduce additional neg-
ative effects for low-skill workers. By how much then would an exogenous increase
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Figure 1.8.7: Share of biadic patent applications in the different technical fields in 1997-
2011
in low-skill wages be undone in a couple of years through innovation? Answering
this question requires finding the effect of an increase in automation patents on
low-skill wages.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Further Figures and Tables
















(a) Share of automation patents in machinery
out of total patents. Automation techno-
logical categories are defined at the 90th
percentile of the distribution of 6 digit
C/IPC codes in machinery (for auto90) or














(b) Number of automation patents worldwide
according to the auto90 and auto95 defini-
tions











1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
United States Germany France
United Kindom Japan
Figure 1.8.9: Share of automation patents (auto95) in machinery by applicant’s nation-
ality.
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Table 1.8.15: Share of automation patents in machinery across sectors
ISIC Rev. 4 Title
auto95 auto90 auto95 auto90 auto95 auto90
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5.7 12.4 6.4 14.8 6.8 13.8
B Mining and quarrying 10.0 17.6 9.9 18.2 9.8 17.2
10-12 Food, beverages and tobacco products 4.6 12.9 5.6 15.2 5.0 12.6
13-15 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and 3.9 9.0 4.7 11.4 4.2 10.3
related products
16 Wood and products of wood and cork 4.3 9.3 4.7 11.9 4.9 10.9
17-18 Paper, paper products and printing 2.6 6.8 2.8 7.5 2.8 7.6
19-22 Coke, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 2.9 6.9 3.8 8.2 3.0 7.0
rubber and plastic products
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 6.1 11.7 6.7 13.9 5.9 12.0
24 Basic metals 10.8 26.0 12.4 29.4 11.1 27.0
25 Fabricated metal products 7.7 22.3 8.8 24.3 8.4 23.7
26-27 Computer, electronic, optical and 30.7 39.4 30.1 40.1 29.4 39.1
electrical products
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 17.4 30.5 18.1 30.7 18.8 31.5
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 32.6 36.8 30.0 35.7 31.9 36.8
30 Other transport equipment 24.5 29.3 22.8 29.1 26.1 31.9
91 All other manufacturing 15.7 23.2 18.7 27.9 18.9 27.7
branches
E Water supply; sewerage, waste 6.6 13.2 8.2 16.5 7.9 14.7
management and remediation activities 
F Construction 7.7 11.7 9.4 15.5 8.4 13.3
Germany United States
Share of automation patents in machinery 1997 - 2011 (in %)
All Countries
Table 1.8.16: Top 10 auto95 innovators in our sample
Company
Number of biadic auto95
patents in 1997-2011
Siemens S.A. 1738
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 810
Fanuc Co. 777
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 706
Robert Bosch AG 655
Mitsubishi Electric Europe B.V. 652
Tokyo Electron Europe, Ltd. 578
Murata Machinery, Ltd. 501
Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba 473
General Electric Canada 464
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Table 1.8.17: Baseline regressions for auto95 with country-level clustering
Dependent variable Auto95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.2000*** 2.8254*** 1.8160*** 1.9058*** 1.9992** 2.2954*** 2.4627*** 2.4266*** 3.7365***
(0.5464) (0.7421) (0.6310) (0.6863) (0.9001) (0.5383) (0.7170) (0.8727) (0.6582)
High-skill wage -0.9210 -0.9009** -0.9695*** -0.8698 -0.2971 -1.6180*** -1.6700** -0.4838*
(0.6234) (0.3519) (0.3701) (0.7025) (0.2972) (0.4701) (0.7968) (0.2831)
Stock automation -0.1275*** -0.1269*** -0.1270*** -0.1239*** -0.1441*** -0.1443*** -0.1504***
(0.0336) (0.0339) (0.0335) (0.0355) (0.0358) (0.0365) (0.0389)
Stock other 0.6311*** 0.6296*** 0.6309*** 0.6260*** 0.6408*** 0.6407*** 0.6489***
(0.0495) (0.0506) (0.0483) (0.0518) (0.0493) (0.0492) (0.0501)
GDP gap 0.0210*** 0.0214** 0.0179** 0.0279*** 0.0278*** 0.0265***
(0.0081) (0.0088) (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0076)
Labor productivity -0.2551 0.1285
(1.0309) (0.9693)
GDP per capita -1.5635* -3.3618***
(0.8207) (0.8952)
Spillovers automation 0.5442*** 0.5478*** 0.8587***
(0.1831) (0.1931) (0.1270)
Spillovers other -0.3014 -0.3089 -0.5853***
(0.2573) (0.2395) (0.1790)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. All regressions with stock variables (resp.
spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock (resp. no spillover). Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01
Table 1.8.18: Baseline regressions: effect of wage on automation innovations (auto90)
Dependent variable Auto90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 1.7307*** 2.4414*** 1.3357** 1.3715** 1.4738** 1.8797*** 1.9059*** 1.8309*** 3.1623***
(0.4953) (0.6610) (0.6363) (0.6610) (0.6778) (0.7051) (0.6883) (0.7008) (0.7486)
High-skill wage -1.0613* -0.7746 -0.8019 -0.6844 0.0911 -1.4074** -1.5340** -0.0865
(0.5844) (0.5311) (0.5480) (0.6068) (0.5491) (0.6296) (0.6850) (0.6114)
Stock automation -0.0347 -0.0345 -0.0348 -0.0328 -0.0475 -0.0479 -0.0538
(0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0406) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0403)
Stock other 0.5682*** 0.5676*** 0.5690*** 0.5611*** 0.5773*** 0.5770*** 0.5814***
(0.0496) (0.0497) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0508) (0.0508) (0.0504)
GDP gap 0.0081 0.0085 0.0038 0.0152 0.0151 0.0127
(0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0132)
Labor productivity -0.2904 0.2911
(0.7011) (0.7224)
GDP per capita -2.0568*** -3.5341***
(0.7380) (0.7721)
Spillovers automation 0.8903** 0.9102** 1.2870***
(0.4162) (0.4190) (0.4170)
Spillovers other -0.6079** -0.6342** -1.0159***
(0.3050) (0.3140) (0.3174)
Fixed Effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 73545 73545 73545 73545 73545 73545 73545 73545 73545
Firms 4903 4903 4903 4903 4903 4903 4903 4903 4903
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. All regressions with stock variables
(resp. spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock (resp. no spillover). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8.19: Country-year fixed effects and country-level clustering
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 1.8852** 2.1429*** 3.0411*** 3.4891*** 4.3023** 3.7989** 3.6420*** 4.3362** 3.8663**
(0.8028) (0.7524) (1.1398) (1.2222) (1.9288) (1.6359) (1.3319) (2.0053) (1.5920)
High-skill wage -2.4820*** -1.9117 -1.7526*** -3.5161** -2.4740** -3.3526*** -3.7549** -2.8325*** -3.6398***
(0.7416) (1.3292) (0.3511) (1.5767) (1.0274) (1.2889) (1.5240) (0.9297) (1.2942)
GDP gap 0.0623*** 0.0620** 0.0646*** 0.0044 0.0016 0.0044 0.0031 0.0001 0.0031
(0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0216) (0.0445) (0.0397) (0.0439) (0.0456) (0.0407) (0.0452)
Labor productivity -1.2851 -1.7494 -1.5475
(1.2933) (1.6920) (1.6342)
GDP per capita -2.8260 -0.5289 -0.3829
(1.7682) (1.3544) (1.2045)
Stock automation -0.1511*** -0.1506*** -0.1541*** -0.1522*** -0.1523*** -0.1526*** -0.1530*** -0.1532*** -0.1533***
(0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0401) (0.0371) (0.0370) (0.0373) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0371)
Stock other 0.6549*** 0.6556*** 0.6555*** 0.6494*** 0.6471*** 0.6490*** 0.6496*** 0.6475*** 0.6493***
(0.0532) (0.0530) (0.0543) (0.0559) (0.0570) (0.0563) (0.0555) (0.0567) (0.0559)
Spillovers automation 1.4782*** 1.4762*** 1.4715*** 1.4396*** 1.4128*** 1.4355*** 1.4380*** 1.4161*** 1.4357***
(0.1276) (0.1317) (0.1188) (0.1230) (0.1585) (0.1243) (0.1243) (0.1574) (0.1254)
Spillovers other -1.2259*** -1.2020*** -1.2436*** -1.2377*** -1.2268*** -1.2436*** -1.2252*** -1.2141*** -1.2300***
(0.1690) (0.1690) (0.1633) (0.1997) (0.2111) (0.1934) (0.2002) (0.2126) (0.1941)
Fixed effects F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070 50070
Firms 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338 3338
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson
regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm and country-year fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables include a dummy
for no stock and no spillover. In columns (4)-(6) domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign)
low-skill wages in total low-skill wages computed at the beginning of the sample, and similarly for high-skill wages, GDP per capita and VA per em-
ployee. In columns (7)-(9), they are interacted with the average shares over the sample period instead. In columns (4)-(9), domestic (resp. foreign)
GDP gap is interacted with the domestic (resp. foreign) weight. In columns (1)-(3), there is no such interactions. Standard errors are clustered at
the country-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 1.8.20: Country-year fixed effects and auto90
Dependent variable Auto90
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 1.3896* 1.4107 2.2798** 2.6344** 3.1221** 3.2536** 2.7215** 3.1094** 3.2428**
(0.8386) (0.8937) (1.0390) (1.1574) (1.3170) (1.3955) (1.1927) (1.3384) (1.4122)
High-skill wage -1.5576* -1.5109 -1.0014 -3.0164** -2.3531* -2.6864** -3.1666** -2.6147* -2.8915**
(0.8304) (0.9212) (0.8793) (1.2101) (1.3149) (1.2787) (1.2485) (1.3342) (1.2984)
GDP gap 0.0387 0.0387 0.0405 -0.0044 -0.0060 -0.0042 -0.0053 -0.0070 -0.0053
(0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0269) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0360) (0.0361) (0.0362) (0.0361)
Labor productivity -0.1045 -1.0847 -0.8988
(1.1919) (1.2059) (1.1768)
GDP per capita -2.1599 -1.0595 -0.8978
(1.4800) (1.4139) (1.3541)
Stock automation -0.0537 -0.0536 -0.0556 -0.0572 -0.0576 -0.0577 -0.0577 -0.0580 -0.0581
(0.0405) (0.0406) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0405)
Stock other 0.5846*** 0.5847*** 0.5845*** 0.5802*** 0.5794*** 0.5792*** 0.5802*** 0.5796*** 0.5795***
(0.0510) (0.0509) (0.0508) (0.0508) (0.0507) (0.0506) (0.0508) (0.0507) (0.0506)
Spillovers automation 1.7794*** 1.7789*** 1.7682*** 1.7676*** 1.7438*** 1.7562*** 1.7652*** 1.7459*** 1.7563***
(0.5417) (0.5421) (0.5434) (0.5367) (0.5388) (0.5381) (0.5357) (0.5388) (0.5370)
Spillovers other -1.5492*** -1.5469*** -1.5563*** -1.5439*** -1.5316*** -1.5527*** -1.5350*** -1.5238*** -1.5431***
(0.4359) (0.4375) (0.4366) (0.4321) (0.4320) (0.4315) (0.4305) (0.4314) (0.4298)
Fixed effects F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 73485 73485 73485 73485 73485 73485 73485 73485 73485
Firms 4899 4899 4899 4899 4899 4899 4899 4899 4899
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson
regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm and country-year fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables include a dummy
for no stock and no spillover. In columns (4)-(6) domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign)
low-skill wages in total low-skill wages computed at the beginning of the sample, and similarly for high-skill wages, GDP per capita and VA per em-
ployee. In columns (7)-(9), they are interacted with the average shares over the sample period instead. In columns (4)-(9), domestic (resp. foreign)
GDP gap is interacted with the domestic (resp. foreign) weight. In columns (1)-(3), there is no such interactions. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8.21: Country-year dummies interacted with the domestic weight
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 1.8108 2.3860* 2.2889* 2.0881* 2.6237** 2.9819** 2.1664* 2.6391** 2.9695**
(1.1242) (1.2486) (1.3755) (1.1178) (1.2557) (1.3805) (1.1418) (1.2624) (1.3847)
High-skill wage -2.7802** -2.0793* -2.5647** -2.7271** -2.1941* -2.3615** -2.9054** -2.4236* -2.5943**
(1.1391) (1.2117) (1.1867) (1.1229) (1.2359) (1.1984) (1.1471) (1.2481) (1.2101)
GDP gap 0.0053 -0.0020 0.0021 0.0086 0.0037 0.0046 0.0075 0.0028 0.0039
(0.0436) (0.0444) (0.0445) (0.0440) (0.0448) (0.0445) (0.0441) (0.0449) (0.0447)
Labor productivity -1.2255 -0.9968 -0.9151
(0.9351) (0.9758) (0.9585)
GDP per capita -0.7515 -1.3618 -1.2168
(1.2918) (1.3924) (1.3560)
Stock automation -0.1531*** -0.1525*** -0.1531*** -0.1518*** -0.1514*** -0.1523*** -0.1519*** -0.1515*** -0.1525***
(0.0523) (0.0521) (0.0522) (0.0522) (0.0520) (0.0521) (0.0522) (0.0520) (0.0520)
Stock other 0.6433*** 0.6417*** 0.6429*** 0.6420*** 0.6407*** 0.6412*** 0.6422*** 0.6409*** 0.6415***
(0.0605) (0.0603) (0.0603) (0.0607) (0.0606) (0.0603) (0.0607) (0.0606) (0.0603)
Spillovers automation 1.1705*** 1.2209*** 1.2079*** 1.0883** 1.1219*** 1.1442*** 1.1121*** 1.1484*** 1.1663***
(0.4154) (0.4139) (0.4199) (0.4241) (0.4227) (0.4283) (0.4191) (0.4183) (0.4241)
Spillovers other -0.9536*** -0.9457*** -0.9736*** -0.9431*** -0.9441*** -0.9801*** -0.9379*** -0.9386*** -0.9719***
(0.3302) (0.3305) (0.3319) (0.3315) (0.3310) (0.3333) (0.3315) (0.3315) (0.3335)
Fixed effects F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 50085 50085 50085 50085 50085 50085 50085 50085 50085
Firms 3339 3339 3339 3339 3339 3339 3339 3339 3339
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Pois-
son regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm and country-year fixed effects. Country-year fixed effects are interacting with the
countries’ weights. All regressions with stock variables include a dummy for no stock and no spillover. In columns (4)-(6) domestic (resp. foreign)
low-skill wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages in total low-skill wages computed at the beginning of the
sample, and similarly for high-skill wages, GDP per capita and VA per employee. In columns (7)-(9), they are interacted with the average shares
over the sample period instead. In columns (4)-(9), domestic (resp. foreign) GDP gap is interacted with the domestic (resp. foreign) weight. In
columns (1)-(3), there is no such interactions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 1.8.22: All machinery innovations
Dependent variable Machinery
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 0.4615 0.5068 1.7568*** 0.1366 0.1813 1.1875 -0.0553 0.4116 0.9712
(0.5070) (0.5585) (0.5336) (0.6721) (0.7338) (0.8614) (1.0951) (1.2570) (1.2306)
High-skill wage -0.0290 0.0429 1.2020** -0.0638 0.0273 0.5109 -0.2290 0.3470 0.2678
(0.5224) (0.4950) (0.5625) (0.7663) (0.8065) (0.7838) (1.2089) (1.1884) (1.2571)
GDP gap -0.0211** -0.0209** -0.0219** 0.0080 0.0080 0.0100 0.0228 0.0221 0.0239
(0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0234)
Labor productivity -0.1676 -0.1986 -0.9600
(0.6030) (0.9082) (0.9293)
GDP per capita -3.5955*** -2.3745** -1.6536
(0.6309) (1.1561) (1.0728)
Stock machinery 0.3337*** 0.3339*** 0.3337*** 0.3400*** 0.3401*** 0.3386*** 0.3379*** 0.3372*** 0.3370***
(0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0341) (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0340) (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0345)
Stock other 0.2443*** 0.2444*** 0.2416*** 0.2456*** 0.2458*** 0.2454*** 0.2449*** 0.2442*** 0.2435***
(0.0441) (0.0442) (0.0426) (0.0424) (0.0423) (0.0420) (0.0413) (0.0414) (0.0413)
Spillovers machinery 2.7148*** 2.7216*** 1.9670*** 1.1095** 1.1138** 1.0117** 1.0863** 1.1211** 1.0510**
(0.4332) (0.4335) (0.4422) (0.4652) (0.4692) (0.4640) (0.4638) (0.4666) (0.4644)
Spillovers other -2.4318*** -2.4309*** -1.8095*** -1.2125** -1.2136** -1.1326** -1.1784** -1.2191** -1.1742**
(0.5096) (0.5110) (0.5022) (0.4859) (0.4867) (0.4857) (0.4802) (0.4839) (0.4801)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 160290 160290 160290 160290 160290 160290 160290 160290 160290
Firms 10686 10686 10686 10686 10686 10686 10686 10686 10686
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). In columns (1)-(3), the regressions include firm and year fixed effects. In columns (4)-(9), the re-
gressions include firm and country-year fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables include a dummy for no stock and no spillover. In
columns (7)-(9) domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages in total low-
skill wages computed at the beginning of the sample, and similarly for high-skill wages, GDP per capita and VA per employee. In columns
(7)-(9), domestic (resp. foreign) GDP gap is interacted with the domestic (resp. foreign) weight. In columns (1)-(6), there is no such interac-
tions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8.23: Predicted wages
Dependent Variable Auto95
joint ρ, average joint ρ, t+4 separate ρ, average separate ρ, t+4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low-skill wage 1.6899** 1.4813* 1.7039** 1.4899* 1.7557** 1.4318* 1.7803** 1.4313*
(0.8152) (0.8080) (0.8167) (0.8107) (0.8286) (0.8087) (0.8314) (0.8137)
High-skill wage -1.7960** -2.9855** -1.7638** -2.8597* -1.7838** -2.7068** -1.7874** -2.7378**
(0.8440) (1.5046) (0.8440) (1.4860) (0.8196) (1.2652) (0.8283) (1.2776)
GDP gap 0.0162 0.0161 0.0164 0.0163 0.0144 0.0119 0.0144 0.0117
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0139)
Labor productivity 1.7353 1.6234 1.4848 1.5467
(1.7310) (1.7208) (1.1824) (1.2247)
Stock automation -0.1433*** -0.1451*** -0.1430*** -0.1446*** -0.1433*** -0.1451*** -0.1431*** -0.1450***
(0.0509) (0.0514) (0.0509) (0.0514) (0.0509) (0.0517) (0.0510) (0.0517)
Stock other 0.6408*** 0.6380*** 0.6407*** 0.6379*** 0.6405*** 0.6371*** 0.6405*** 0.6371***
(0.0601) (0.0603) (0.0601) (0.0603) (0.0602) (0.0604) (0.0601) (0.0604)
Spillovers automation 0.4847 0.6321* 0.4848 0.6209* 0.5049* 0.7348** 0.5097* 0.7364**
(0.3045) (0.3449) (0.3049) (0.3445) (0.3036) (0.3702) (0.3044) (0.3679)
Spillovers other -0.1628 -0.3290 -0.1674 -0.3214 -0.1842 -0.4488 -0.1899 -0.4498
(0.2276) (0.2877) (0.2278) (0.2866) (0.2281) (0.3182) (0.2282) (0.3152)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). The wage
variables and labor productivity are predicted at time t-2. Columns (1) to (4) predict wages and labor productivity with an AR(1) process
with country-specific trends and with the same auto-regression coefficient across countries. Columns (5) to (8) use different auto-regression
coefficients across countries. In columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) the wages and labor productivity are the average of the predicted values be-
tween years t+2 and t+7. In columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), they are the predicted values for year t+4. All regressions with stock variables
(resp. spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock (resp. no spillover). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 1.8.24: Minimum wage
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Minimum wage 1.5230** 1.5171** 1.4636 1.5601 1.8773 1.8401 1.8331* 1.7770
(0.6865) (0.6628) (0.9127) (0.9566) (1.2125) (1.2411) (1.1117) (1.1271)
High-skill wage -1.2239* -1.2358 -3.0712*** -2.6564** -2.8017** -2.9368 -2.7456** -3.0195*
(0.7166) (0.8701) (1.0907) (1.1667) (1.4072) (1.8000) (1.3157) (1.7324)
GDP gap 0.0235 0.0235 0.0562 0.0563 -0.0232 -0.0232 -0.0238 -0.0236
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0513) (0.0514) (0.0512) (0.0513)
Labor productivity 0.0246 -0.7554 0.1730 0.3355
(0.9249) (1.4016) (1.4426) (1.3849)
Stock automation -0.1445*** -0.1446*** -0.1548*** -0.1544*** -0.1563*** -0.1564*** -0.1562*** -0.1565***
(0.0513) (0.0513) (0.0522) (0.0523) (0.0530) (0.0531) (0.0530) (0.0531)
Stock other 0.6374*** 0.6374*** 0.6569*** 0.6572*** 0.6549*** 0.6552*** 0.6540*** 0.6547***
(0.0596) (0.0596) (0.0597) (0.0597) (0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0607) (0.0606)
Spillovers automation 0.6456* 0.6462* 1.4309*** 1.4270*** 1.4198*** 1.4215*** 1.4157*** 1.4192***
(0.3363) (0.3397) (0.4958) (0.4967) (0.4939) (0.4966) (0.4929) (0.4955)
Spillovers other -0.3546 -0.3559 -1.1991*** -1.1837*** -1.2744*** -1.2764*** -1.2806*** -1.2846***
(0.2408) (0.2535) (0.3854) (0.3864) (0.3795) (0.3821) (0.3787) (0.3810)
Fixed effects F F F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 50070 50070 50040 50040 48765 48765 48795 48795
Firms 3338 3338 3336 3336 3251 3251 3254 3254
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by condi-
tional Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). Columns (1)-(2) include firm fixed effects. Columns (3)-(8) include firm and country-
year fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables include a dummy for no stock and no spillover. In columns (5)-(6) domestic
(resp. foreign) minimum wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign) minimum wages in total minimum wages com-
puted at the beginning of the sample, and similarly for high-skill wages and VA per employee. In columns (7)-(8), they are interacted
with the average shares over the sample period instead. In columns (5)-(8), domestic (resp. foreign) GDP gap is interacted with the
domestic (resp. foreign) weight. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8.25: Minimum wage with country level clustering
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Minimum wage 1.5230** 1.5171*** 1.4636** 1.5601*** 1.8773*** 1.8401*** 1.8331*** 1.7770***
(0.5926) (0.4580) (0.6148) (0.4905) (0.4685) (0.6459) (0.4272) (0.5790)
High-skill wage -1.2239** -1.2358 -3.0712*** -2.6564** -2.8017*** -2.9368*** -2.7456*** -3.0195***
(0.5538) (1.0144) (0.5048) (1.2687) (1.0073) (0.8003) (0.9635) (0.8786)
GDP gap 0.0235*** 0.0235*** 0.0562*** 0.0563*** -0.0232 -0.0232 -0.0238 -0.0236
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0246) (0.0245) (0.0238) (0.0235)
Labor productivity 0.0246 -0.7554 0.1730 0.3355
(0.9997) (1.4283) (1.3091) (1.3969)
Stock automation -0.1445*** -0.1446*** -0.1548*** -0.1544*** -0.1563*** -0.1564*** -0.1562*** -0.1565***
(0.0385) (0.0390) (0.0403) (0.0400) (0.0392) (0.0402) (0.0391) (0.0404)
Stock other 0.6374*** 0.6374*** 0.6569*** 0.6572*** 0.6549*** 0.6552*** 0.6540*** 0.6547***
(0.0514) (0.0513) (0.0563) (0.0561) (0.0572) (0.0595) (0.0569) (0.0598)
Spillovers automation 0.6456*** 0.6462*** 1.4309*** 1.4270*** 1.4198*** 1.4215*** 1.4157*** 1.4192***
(0.2076) (0.2225) (0.1139) (0.1151) (0.1192) (0.1309) (0.1182) (0.1314)
Spillovers other -0.3546 -0.3559 -1.1991*** -1.1837*** -1.2744*** -1.2764*** -1.2806*** -1.2846***
(0.2214) (0.2362) (0.1684) (0.1736) (0.1956) (0.2102) (0.1920) (0.2072)
Fixed effects F F F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 50070 50070 50040 50040 48765 48765 48795 48795
Firms 3338 3338 3336 3336 3251 3251 3254 3254
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by condi-
tional Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). Columns (1)-(2) include firm fixed effects. Columns (3)-(8) include firm and country-
year fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables include a dummy for no stock and no spillover. In columns (5)-(6) domestic
(resp. foreign) minimum wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign) minimum wages in total minimum wages com-
puted at the beginning of the sample, and similarly for high-skill wages and VA per employee. In columns (7)-(8), they are interacted
with the average shares over the sample period instead. In columns (5)-(8), domestic (resp. foreign) GDP gap is interacted with the
domestic (resp. foreign) weight. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 1.8.26: Correlation matrix
Low-skill wage Middle-skill wage High-skill wage GDP gap GDP per capita Labor productivity
Low-skill wage 1 . . . . .
Middle-skill wage 0.9401 1 . . . .
High-skill wage 0.6009 0.7469 1 . .
GDP gap -0.0660 -0.0239 0.0482 1 .
GDP per capita 0.6972 0.7974 0.7277 -0.0117 1 .
Labor productivity 0.6678 0.7340 0.7724 0.1980 0.6519 1
Note: Correlation of residuals for the auto95 sample controlling for year and firm fixed effects.
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Table 1.8.27: Skill premium
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low-skill / High-skill wage 1.9423** 2.0420*** 2.1995** 2.0520** 3.5089*** 3.4205***
(0.7552) (0.7607) (0.9170) (0.9049) (1.2083) (1.1960)
GDP gap 0.0263* 0.0268* 0.0627* 0.0620* 0.0049 -0.0017
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0526) (0.0496)
Labor productivity 0.7026 -1.0613 -0.2814
(0.7035) (1.1591) (0.7369)
Stock automation -0.1448*** -0.1456*** -0.1505*** -0.1507*** -0.1522*** -0.1524***
(0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0530) (0.0528) (0.0526) (0.0525)
Stock other 0.6407*** 0.6402*** 0.6546*** 0.6556*** 0.6495*** 0.6480***
(0.0599) (0.0601) (0.0603) (0.0602) (0.0602) (0.0602)
Spillovers automation 0.5783* 0.5783* 1.4755*** 1.4769*** 1.4397*** 1.4346***
(0.3153) (0.3114) (0.4968) (0.5004) (0.4868) (0.4892)
Spillovers other -0.2349 -0.3132 -1.2535*** -1.2021*** -1.2387*** -1.2253***
(0.2129) (0.2328) (0.3717) (0.3824) (0.3669) (0.3755)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + CY F + CY F + CY F + CY
Observations 50115 50115 50070 50070 50070 50070
Firms 3341 3341 3338 3338 3338 3338
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods.
Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). Columns (1)-(2) include firm fixed effects
and year dummies. Columns (3)-(6) include firm and country-year fixed effects. All regressions with stock vari-
ables (resp. spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock (resp. no spillover). Columns (5)-(6) use the log
difference between foreign low-skill wages interacted with the share of foreign low-skill wages in total low-skill
wages at the beginning of the sample and foreign high-skill wages similarly interacted; GDP gap and VA per em-
ployee are also their interacted foreign components. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 1.8.28: Including middle-skill wages
Dependent Variable Auto95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 4.7035*** 3.8985*** 5.1140*** 4.2760*** 5.0971*** 4.2398***
(1.4991) (1.3667) (1.5892) (1.4222) (1.5759) (1.4510)
Middle-skill wage -3.9194** 2.3617** -2.2614 -4.2997** 2.4746** -2.5516 -4.0739** 2.3236** -2.5526
(1.6096) (1.0085) (1.6773) (1.6815) (1.0411) (1.6819) (1.6090) (1.0573) (1.6825)
High-skill wage -1.7189* -0.9608 -1.8154* -1.0225 -1.9749** -1.0756
(0.9218) (0.8867) (0.9485) (0.8960) (0.9982) (0.9602)
GDP gap 0.0288* 0.0216 0.0304* 0.0292* 0.0216 0.0303*
(0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0157)
Labor productivity -0.3258 0.4545 0.1316
(0.8572) (0.8858) (0.9310)
Stock automation -0.1454*** -0.1404*** -0.1457*** -0.1460*** -0.1405*** -0.1464*** -0.1455*** -0.1415*** -0.1466***
(0.0508) (0.0508) (0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0511)
Stock other 0.6458*** 0.6394*** 0.6436*** 0.6456*** 0.6389*** 0.6433*** 0.6455*** 0.6387*** 0.6432***
(0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0600) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0601) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0601)
Spillovers automation 0.4733 0.4518 0.5330* 0.5007* 0.4692 0.5657* 0.4998* 0.4846 0.5694*
(0.2891) (0.3140) (0.3097) (0.2885) (0.3143) (0.3105) (0.2891) (0.3155) (0.3120)
Spillovers other -0.3173 -0.1874 -0.3100 -0.3478 -0.2013 -0.3416 -0.3281 -0.2315 -0.3492
(0.2254) (0.2208) (0.2265) (0.2247) (0.2197) (0.2257) (0.2315) (0.2279) (0.2325)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Pois-
son regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. All regressions with stock variables include a

























Table 1.8.29: Wages and deflators
Dependent variable Auto95
Sector Manufacturing Total
Manufacturing PPI, US manufacturing PPI GDP deflator Manufacturing PPI US Manufacturing PPI
Deflator conversion in 2005 conversion every year conversion in 1995 conversion in 1995 conversion every year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Low-skill wage 2.7140*** 2.6338*** 1.9084*** 2.1264** 2.5733*** 2.7044*** 4.1859*** 3.9769*** 1.4172** 1.1137
(0.8686) (0.8933) (0.6949) (0.8261) (0.9691) (1.0238) (1.3286) (1.2666) (0.7192) (0.8024)
High-skill wage -1.7475** -1.8694** -2.4692*** -2.2154*** -2.1163** -1.9409** -1.3163 -2.3907** -2.0329*** -2.3743**
(0.7943) (0.8603) (0.7517) (0.7790) (0.9229) (0.9578) (0.8454) (0.9545) (0.7025) (0.9521)
GDP gap 0.0285* 0.0283* 0.0153 0.0149 0.0254 0.0262 0.0431** 0.0440** 0.0158 0.0148
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0152) (0.0153)
Labor productivity 0.3056 -0.5012 -0.4125 2.6369** 0.6389
(0.9422) (0.7122) (0.7779) (1.2281) (0.9348)
Stock own -0.1439*** -0.1444*** -0.1501*** -0.1493*** -0.1454*** -0.1446*** -0.1446*** -0.1474*** -0.1457*** -0.1462***
(0.0510) (0.0511) (0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0510) (0.0511) (0.0506) (0.0509) (0.0506) (0.0508)
Stock other 0.6392*** 0.6390*** 0.6391*** 0.6396*** 0.6403*** 0.6405*** 0.6485*** 0.6455*** 0.6434*** 0.6424***
(0.0600) (0.0601) (0.0598) (0.0597) (0.0600) (0.0599) (0.0596) (0.0596) (0.0592) (0.0592)
Spillover own 0.5795* 0.5887* 0.8540** 0.8568** 0.6503* 0.6444* 0.4874* 0.5675** 0.6379** 0.6536**
(0.3073) (0.3093) (0.3471) (0.3459) (0.3451) (0.3456) (0.2862) (0.2879) (0.3217) (0.3275)
Spillover other -0.3314 -0.3499 -0.4295* -0.4312* -0.3447 -0.3310 -0.2943 -0.4228* -0.2826 -0.2962
(0.2259) (0.2344) (0.2332) (0.2332) (0.2220) (0.2219) (0.2399) (0.2510) (0.2403) (0.2414)
Fixed Effect F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115 50115
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341 3341
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-
effects (HHG). All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. All regressions include a dummy for no stock and no spillover. Columns (1) to (6) are on
manufacturing wages and columns (7) to (10) on total wages. In columns (1) and (2), macroeconomic variables are deflated with the local manufacturing PPI and
converted in USD in 2005. In columns (3), (4), (9) and (10) they are converted in USD every year and deflated with the US manufacturing PPI. In columns (5) and
(6), macroeconomic variables are deflated with the local GDP deflator and converted in USD in 1995. In columns (7) and (8), macroeconomic variables are deflated
with the local manufacturing PPI and converted in USD in 1995. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8.30: Baseline regressions in 2000-20009 only
Dependent variable Auto95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.6434*** 2.4828** 1.8409* 1.9912* 2.0772* 2.4664** 2.9215** 2.6339** 4.4721***
(0.7284) (0.9935) (1.0261) (1.0700) (1.0718) (1.2056) (1.1447) (1.1285) (1.4064)
High-skill wage 0.2690 -0.3563 -0.5113 -0.4602 -0.2960 -1.1540 -1.4516 -0.7074
(0.8835) (0.8904) (0.9219) (0.9557) (0.8762) (0.9894) (1.0716) (0.9416)
Stock automation -0.4117*** -0.4100*** -0.4105*** -0.4050*** -0.4375*** -0.4398*** -0.4335***
(0.0630) (0.0631) (0.0628) (0.0635) (0.0636) (0.0639) (0.0639)
Stock other 0.6746*** 0.6708*** 0.6725*** 0.6687*** 0.6881*** 0.6864*** 0.6937***
(0.0709) (0.0711) (0.0714) (0.0708) (0.0744) (0.0743) (0.0735)
GDP gap 0.0243 0.0246 0.0196 0.0419** 0.0437** 0.0360**
(0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0157) (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0169)
Labor productivity -0.1968 1.1082
(0.9325) (0.9940)
GDP per capita -1.5031 -3.7815**
(1.1155) (1.4968)
Spillovers automation 0.9119** 1.0198** 1.1483***
(0.4167) (0.4249) (0.4267)
Spillovers other -0.5948* -0.7380* -0.8383**
(0.3577) (0.3820) (0.3731)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y F + Y
Observations 27110 27110 27110 27110 27110 27110 27110 27110 27110
Firms 2711 2711 2711 2711 2711 2711 2711 2711 2711
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG) from 2000 to 2009. All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. All regressions with
stock variables (resp. spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock (resp. no spillover). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8.31: Nickell’s bias
Dependent Variable Auto95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low-skill wage 2.3903*** 2.3926*** 2.1515*** 2.2066*** 2.0925** 2.2884** 2.3955** 2.9126***
(0.8004) (0.8227) (0.7991) (0.8150) (0.9778) (1.0886) (0.9713) (1.0899)
High-skill wage -1.5544** -1.5510* -0.9069 -0.5857 -2.4648** -2.0312** -2.5627*** -1.2324
(0.7840) (0.8704) (0.6129) (0.7453) (0.9779) (0.9708) (0.9338) (1.0583)
GDP gap 0.0276* 0.0276* 0.0266 0.0278 0.0653* 0.0651* 0.0752** 0.0761**
(0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0191) (0.0187) (0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0353) (0.0353)
Labor productivity -0.0084 -0.7779 -0.9781 -2.6421
(0.9696) (1.0755) (1.5602) (1.6507)
Stock automation 1.1938*** 1.1818*** 1.1912*** 1.1870***
(0.0244) (0.0238) (0.0243) (0.0235)
Stock other 0.5101*** 0.5101*** 0.0895*** 0.0897*** 0.5230*** 0.5237*** 0.0869*** 0.0879***
(0.0454) (0.0453) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0439) (0.0440) (0.0120) (0.0118)
Spillovers automation 0.3519 0.3517 0.0098 -0.0315 1.3383*** 1.3373*** -0.0667 -0.0518
(0.2949) (0.2977) (0.0746) (0.0689) (0.4669) (0.4676) (0.0784) (0.0767)
Spillovers other -0.0735 -0.0730 0.0219 0.0781 -1.0318*** -1.0139*** 0.1163 0.1013
(0.2127) (0.2227) (0.0782) (0.0748) (0.3544) (0.3558) (0.0827) (0.0815)
Fixed effects F + Y F + Y BGVR + Y BGVR + Y F + CY F + CY BGVR + CY BGVR + CY
Observations 50115 50115 50115 50115 50070 50070 50070 50070
Firms 3341 3341 3341 3341 3338 3338 3338 3338
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG) in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). In columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), estimation is done by Poisson
regressions where the firm fixed effects are replaced by the pre-sample mean, following Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999, BGVR).
Columns (1) to (4) include year fixed effects and columns (5) to (8) country-year fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables (resp.
spillover variables) include a dummy for no stock (resp. no spillover). Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p <
0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 1.8.32: Other innovation indicators
Auto95
Dependent Variable Biadic (US, JP, EU) Triadic At least one citation Citations weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low-skill wage 2.2776** 2.0079* 3.1886** 2.9795* 2.2198*** 2.1241** 1.7405* 1.6520
(1.0383) (1.0785) (1.4150) (1.5827) (0.8341) (0.8720) (1.0257) (1.1403)
High-skill wage -1.3409 -1.7718* -2.3417* -2.6759* -1.6034** -1.7443** -1.8007* -1.9515**
(0.9663) (1.0724) (1.3640) (1.3768) (0.8099) (0.8577) (0.9814) (0.9717)
GDP gap 0.0397** 0.0390** 0.0178 0.0172 0.0269* 0.0267* 0.0368* 0.0366*
(0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0190) (0.0190)
Labor productivity 0.9807 0.7272 0.3450 0.3518
(1.1988) (1.6987) (0.9171) (1.1755)
Stock automation -0.1683*** -0.1699*** -0.3665*** -0.3677*** -0.1468*** -0.1474*** -0.2220*** -0.2223***
(0.0597) (0.0598) (0.0772) (0.0766) (0.0557) (0.0559) (0.0438) (0.0438)
Stock other 0.6342*** 0.6333*** 0.6500*** 0.6494*** 0.6457*** 0.6456*** 0.6805*** 0.6802***
(0.0662) (0.0663) (0.0875) (0.0875) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0688) (0.0687)
Spillovers automation 0.3839 0.4064 0.7925 0.7981 0.5736* 0.5845* 0.1427 0.1499
(0.4014) (0.4028) (0.5469) (0.5451) (0.3140) (0.3151) (0.2878) (0.2858)
Spillovers other -0.5402** -0.5915** -0.3499 -0.3742 -0.2978 -0.3187 0.1625 0.1429
(0.2587) (0.2715) (0.4685) (0.4599) (0.2404) (0.2468) (0.2595) (0.2600)
Observations 40410 40410 26310 26310 47115 47115 50115 50115
Firms 2694 2694 1754 1754 3141 3141 3341 3341
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional
Poisson regressions fixed-effects (HHG). All regressions include firm fixed effects and year dummies. All regressions include a dummy for no
stock and no spillover. Columns (1)-(2) consider biadic patents applied for in at least two countries among US, JP, EU. Columns (3)-(4)
consider triadic patents (applied for in US, JP and EU). Column (5)-(6) consider biadic patents with at least one citation within 5 years
after publication. Column (7)-(8) consider biadic patents and add to each patent the number of citations within 5 years after publication
normalized by year and technological field. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8.33: Industry-year fixed effects
Dependent variable Auto95
Domestic + Foreign Foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Low-skill wage 2.3157** 2.5169** 3.5773*** 4.1573*** 5.0264*** 4.2013** 4.3562*** 5.0852*** 4.3077**
(0.9890) (1.1159) (1.2188) (1.3041) (1.5426) (1.7227) (1.3302) (1.5430) (1.7067)
High-skill wage -2.9978*** -2.5654** -2.1617** -4.3227*** -3.1470** -4.2974*** -4.5869*** -3.5601** -4.6144***
(0.9457) (1.0210) (1.0263) (1.2915) (1.3761) (1.3321) (1.3283) (1.3944) (1.3495)
GDP gap 0.0709** 0.0707** 0.0731** -0.0059 -0.0083 -0.0059 -0.0066 -0.0093 -0.0065
(0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0470) (0.0469) (0.0470) (0.0471) (0.0470) (0.0471)
Labor productivity -0.9736 -1.9354 -1.6865
(1.7031) (1.4734) (1.4339)
GDP per capita -3.1161* -0.0777 0.0860
(1.7989) (1.8617) (1.7683)
Stock automation -0.1586*** -0.1582*** -0.1601*** -0.1607*** -0.1603*** -0.1607*** -0.1617*** -0.1615*** -0.1617***
(0.0466) (0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0463) (0.0461) (0.0464) (0.0462) (0.0460) (0.0463)
Stock other 0.6549*** 0.6555*** 0.6548*** 0.6492*** 0.6470*** 0.6491*** 0.6497*** 0.6478*** 0.6497***
(0.0552) (0.0552) (0.0549) (0.0550) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0549) (0.0548) (0.0548)
Spillovers automation 1.3924*** 1.3897*** 1.3786*** 1.3568*** 1.3324*** 1.3562*** 1.3558*** 1.3371*** 1.3563***
(0.4759) (0.4766) (0.4761) (0.4658) (0.4651) (0.4675) (0.4653) (0.4651) (0.4665)
Spillovers other -1.0750*** -1.0587*** -1.0900*** -1.0864*** -1.0802*** -1.0873*** -1.0740*** -1.0670*** -1.0730***
(0.3623) (0.3642) (0.3618) (0.3553) (0.3527) (0.3540) (0.3538) (0.3520) (0.3527)
Fixed effects F + CY +IY F + CY +IY F + CY +IY F + CY +IY F + CY +IY F + CY +IY F + CY +IY F + CY +IY F + CY +IY
Observations 49890 49890 49890 49890 49890 49890 49890 49890 49890
Firms 3326 3326 3326 3326 3326 3326 3326 3326 3326
Note: Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses. The independent variables are lagged by two periods. Estimation is by conditional Poisson regressions fixed-effects
(HHG). All regressions include firm, industry-year and country-year fixed effects. All regressions with stock variables (resp. spillover variables) include a dummy for no
stock (resp. no spillover). Domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages are interacted with the share of domestic (resp. foreign) low-skill wages in total low-skill wages computed
at the beginning of the sample, and similarly for high-skill wages, GDP per capita and VA per employee. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
1.8.2 Details on the classification of automation patents
List of keywords
For each technological category, we compute the following share of patents:41
1. Automat* patents. Share of patents which contain the words:
(a) Automation or automatization;
(b) or automat* at least 5 times;
(c) or (automat* or autonomous) in the same sentence as (machine or man-
ufacturing or machining or equipment or apparatus or operator or han-
dling or “vehicle system” or welding or knitting or weaving or convey* or
storage or store or regulat* or manipulat* or arm or sensor or inspect*
or warehouse) at least twice.
2. Labor patents. Share of patents which contain the words: laborious, labouri-
ous, labor or labour.
41x* indicates any word which starts with x, for instance automat* corresponds to the words
automatic, automatically, automate, automates, etc...
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3. Robot patents. Share of patents which contain the word robot* but not (sur-
gical or medical).
4. Numerical control patents. Share of patents which contain the words:
(a) CNC or“numerically controlled”or“numeric control”or“numerical con-
trol” or the same terms but with hyphens;
(b) or NC in the same sentence with (machine or manufacturing or machin-
ing or equipment or apparatus).
5. Computer aided design and manufacturing patents. Share of patents which
contain the words:
(a) “computer aided”, “computer assisted” or “computer supported” or the
same terms with hyphens) in the same patent with (machine or manu-
facturing or machining or equipment or apparatus);
(b) or (CAD or (CAM and not “content addressable memory”)) in the same
sentence with (machine or manufacturing or machining or equipment or
apparatus).
6. Flexible manufacturing. Share of patents which contain the words: “flexible
manufacturing”.
7. PLC patents. Share of patents which contain the words: “programmable logic
controller” or (PLC and not (powerline or “power line”)).
8. 3D printing patents. Share of patents which contain the words: “3D print* ”
or “additive manufacturing” or “additive layer manufacturing”.
9. Automation patents. Share of patents which satisfy any of the previous cri-
teria.
We derived this exact list after experimenting extensively with variations around
those words and looking at the resulting classification of technological codes and
the associated patents. For instance, the thresholds (5 and 2) used in the definition
of the share of automat* patents where chosen so that the distribution of the share
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of automat* patents is comparable to the distribution of the share of numerical
control patents across technological codes. Similarly, requiring that NC be in the
same sentence as words such as machine, ensures that NC is short fort numerical
control instead of North Carolina.
Relative to the original list of technologies given in the SMT, we did not include
keywords related to information network, as these seem less related to the automa-
tion of the production process and the patents containing words such as “local area
network” do not appear related to automation. We also did not directly count all
laser related technologies as not all of these are related to automation—but we
obtain patents related to automation using laser technologies thanks to our other
keywords.

























Table 1.8.34: Summary statistics on the prevalence of keywords across technological codes in machinery
IPC/CPC 6 digit IPC4 + (G05 or G06) IPC 4 pairs
Share all robot automat* CNC all robot automat* CNC all robot automat* CNC
Mean 20.9 4.3 11.2 2.4 53.2 15.4 32.4 11.2 18.5 4.5 8.8 1.8
S. d. 14.4 8.4 9.5 5.8 19.3 17.7 11 16.5 16.3 10 9.9 4.7
p25 10.5 0.8 4.2 0 40 6.7 26.6 0.8 7.7 0.6 2.5 0
p50 18 2 8.7 0.4 54.3 10 31.9 3 13.6 1.8 5.2 0.4
p75 26.6 4.5 15.3 1.8 63.8 16 40.3 15.5 23 4.2 10.7 1.4
p90 38.7 9.1 24.3 6.1 77.9 36.4 43.3 38.2 36.8 8.9 21.7 4.4
p95 47.7 13.7 29.4 12.7 85.6 44.3 45.2 55.3 51.8 14.5 31 7.7
p99 75 35.8 43.8 33.1 90.1 82.9 59.9 56.6 84.5 60 45.3 23.1
Note: This table computes summary statistics on the share of patents with any automation keywords, robot keywords, automat* keywords or CNC keywords for
each type of technological categories (6 digit codes, pairs of 4 digit codes and combinations of ipc4 codes with G05 or G06) within machinery with at least 100
patents.
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Table 1.8.34 gives summary statistics on the shares of patents containing certain
keywords across technological codes in machinery. We look at the share of automa-
tion keywords (“all” in the table) and then focus on the three main subcategories,
namely automat* patents, robot patents and numerical control (CNC) patents (de-
fined above). The 95th and 90th percentile for the share of automation patents in
the distribution of 6 digit codes in machinery define the threshold used to catego-
rize auto95 and auto90 patents. The distributions are quite similar for the C/IPC
6 digit codes and for pairs of IPC 4 digit codes (see also the histograms below).
As expected, the distributions are significantly shifted to the right for combinations
of IPC 4 digit codes with G05 or G06. The distributions of each subcategory are
right-skewed particularly for 6 digit codes and 4 digit pairs, and even more for the
robot and CNC patents. The automat* keywords are also more common as the
mean share for automat* is significantly higher than for the other keywords, how-
ever the difference narrows somewhat in the right tail: the 95th percentile for 6 digit
codes is 29.4% for the share of automat* patents and 13.7% and 12.7% for the share
of robot and CNC patents. In the right tail, the distribution of robot patents and
CNC patents are quite similar.
Figure 1.8.10 gives the histograms of the prevalence of automation keywords for
all pairs of C/IPC 4 digit codes (panel a) and all pairs with at least one member
in the machinery technological field (panel b). The histograms are very similar to
those of C/IPC 6 digit codes in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.8.11 shows the histograms
for all combinations of IPC 4 digit codes with G05 or G06 (panel a), or when
the IPC 4 code is in the relevant technological field (panel b). Both distributions
are considerably shifted to the right, in line with expectations since G05 proxies
for control and G06 for algorithmic, two set of technologies which have been used
heavily in automation. There are, however, much fewer combination of these types
(in part because all histograms only consider groups with at least 100 patents), and
accordingly few patents can be characterized as automation innovations this way.
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(a) For all pairs of C/IPC 4 digit codes (b) For all pairs of C/IPC 4 digit codes
within machinery with 100 patents
Figure 1.8.10: Histogram of the prevalence of automation keywords for C/IPC pairs of
4 digit codes
(a) For all combinations of IPC4 with G05 G06 (b) For combinations of IPC4 in machinery
with G05 G06 and at least 100 patents
Figure 1.8.11: Histogram of the prevalence of automation keywords for combinations of
IPC 4 digit codes with G05 G06
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Table 1.8.35: Identification of automation technological categories
(a) Type of C/IPC codes identifying
auto90 and auto95 patents
Ipc codes / Patents Auto90 Auto95
Matches ipc6 78.2% 78.7%
Matches ipc4 pair 17.3% 24.3%
Matches ipc4 - G05/G06 combination 47.7% 47.8%
Note: Share of innovations classified as automation innova-
tion through ipc6 codes, ipc4 pairs or ipc4 - G05/G06 pairs.
Statistics computed on biadic patents from 1997-2011.
(b) Auto patents and subcate-
gories of automation innova-
tions
Sources / Patents Auto80 Auto90 Auto95
Auto80 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Automat*80 36.2% 53.1% 72.1%
CNC80 5.0% 8.0% 13.2%
Robot80 12.0% 19.2% 33.6%
Auto90 62.4% 100.0% 100.0%
Automat*90 21.6% 34.6% 56.0%
CNC90 2.2% 3.6% 6.3%
Robot90 7.8% 12.5% 21.8%
Auto95 35.8% 57.3% 100.0%
Automat*95 4.4% 7.1% 12.4%
CNC95 1.6% 2.5% 4.4%
Robot95 6.3% 10.2% 17.7%
Note: Share of auto95 (auto90 and auto80,
respectively) innovations which are also classi-
fied as automat*80/90/95, CNC80/90/95, and
robot80/90/95 innovations. Statistics computed on
biadic patents from 1997-2011.
How are auto90 and auto95 patents identified?
Given that our classification procedure is relatively complex, we assess here which
features dominate. To do so, we focus on the set of 15, 212, 134 biadic patent ap-
plications in 1997-2011 (corresponding to the 3, 187, 536 patent families which have
patent applications in at least two countries), since this corresponds to the set on
which we run our main regressions. There are 310, 458 auto95 patent applications
corresponding to 61, 788 patent families (and similarly 541, 693 auto90 patent ap-
plications corresponding to 107, 237 patent families). Table 1.8.35.a gives the share
of biadic patents which are identified through a C/IPC 6 digit code, a pair of 4
digit codes or a combination of 4 digit code with G05/G06 (the shares sum up to
more than 100% since patents may be identified as automation innovations in sev-
eral ways). 6 digit codes appear to be the most relevant since they are enough to
identify close to 80% of auto90 or auto95 patents alone.
Similarly, one may wonder which keywords are the most important in identifying
automation patents. To do that, we define robot95 (respectively CNC95 or autm95)
patents as patents which contain a technological group with a share of “robot”
(respectively CNC or automat*) keywords above the threshold used to define auto95
(namely 0.4766), therefore those patents are a subset of the auto95 patents. We
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Table 1.8.36: Confusion table for different classification periods
Confusion Matrix
Auto95 based on the Auto95 based on the Auto95 based on the
Total
1998-1997 classification 1998-2017 classification 1997-2011 classification
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Auto95 based on Yes 240,194 70,264 280,047 30,411 262,972 47,486 310,458
the 1978-2017 No 53,137 14,848,539 25,186 14,876,490 26,368 14,875,308 14,901,676
classification Total 293,331 14,918,803 305,233 14,906,901 289,340 14,922,794 15,212,134
Notes: The statistics are always computed on patents from 1997-2011.
define robot90, CNC90, autm90, robot80, CNC80 and autm80 similarly. The other
keywords are much less common. Table 1.8.35.b reports the share of auto95, auto90
and auto80 patents which belong to each subcategory. “Automat*” appears to be
the most important keywords since 72% of auto95 patents are also automat*80
patents. “Robot” matters as well with 33.6% of auto95 patents which are robot80.
This is true particularly at the top of the distribution since 17.7% of auto95 patents
are also robot95 (more than autm95). CNC does not matter too much: only 13%
of auto95 patents are CNC80.
Stability of the classification
To assess the stability of our classification, we redo exactly the same exercise but
instead of using EPO patents from 1978 to 2017, we restrict attention to EPO
patents from the first half of the sample (1978-1997), the second half of the sample
(1998-2017) and the period of our main regression analysis (1997-2011). We focus
on the same set of biadic patent applications in 1997-2011. Table 1.8.36 shows
confusion tables on the classification of patents as auto95 according to each of the
classification period. Regardless of the time period used the number of automation
patents stays roughly constant. In particular, 85% of the baseline auto95 patents
are still auto95 if we run the classification over the years 1997-2011. This common
set of patents then represent 91% of all biadic patents classified as auto95 patents
when using the period 1997-2011 instead of the full sample.
1.8.3 Redoing ALM
In this Appendix, we provide details on the analysis conducted in section 1.2.6. We
use granted patents at the USPTO between 1970 and 1998. To assign patents to
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sectors, we first use Lybbert and Zolas (2014) who provide a concordance table be-
tween IPC codes at the 4 digit level and NAICS 1997 6 digits industry codes (mostly
in manufacturing). The concordance table is probabilistic (so that each code is as-
sociated with a sector with a certain probability). In this exercise we are interested
in matching patents with a sector of use and not the inventing sector (which is what
is provided by the Eurostat concordance table for instance). The Lybbert and Zolas
concordance tables are derived by matching patents texts with industry descriptions,
and as such they cannot a priori distinguish between sector of use and industry of
manufacturing. We checked, however, that patents associated with “textile and pa-
per machines” for instance are associated with the textile and paper sectors and
not with the equipment sector (as is the case with the Eurostat concordance table).
We attribute patents to sectors fractionally in function of their IPC codes. To as-
sign patents to the consistent Census industry codes used by ALM, we first use a
Census concordance table (https://www.census.gov/topics/employment/industry-
occupation/guidance/code-lists.html) to go from NAICS 1997 to Census industry
codes 1990, then we use the concordance table of ALM to get to the consistent
Census industry codes of ALM. Finally, for each sector and each time period, we
compute the sums of automation patents and machinery patents and take the ratio
to be our measure of automation intensity. We exclude sectors with less than 50
machinery patents (which is why the number of sectors varies across time periods).
We are left with 66 to 68 sectors, with only 7 of them not in manufacturing.
The other variables are directly taken from ALM. We refer the reader to that
paper for a detailed explanation. The task measures are computed using the 1977
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) which measure the tasks content of occu-
pations. Occupations are then matched to industries using the Census Integrated
Public Micro Samples one percent extracts for 1960, 1970 and 1980 (IPUMS) and the
CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group files for 1980, 1990 and 1998 (MORG). The
task change measure at the industry level reflects changes in occupations holding
the task content of each occupation constant, which ALM refer to as the extensive
margin. Since tasks measures do not have a natural scale, ALM converted them
into percentile values corresponding to their rank in the 1960 distribution of tasks
across sectors, so that the employment-weighted means of all tasks measure across
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sectors in 1960 is 50. Our analysis only uses manufacturing sectors and starts in
1970 but we kept the original ALM measure to facilitate comparison. As in ALM,
the dependent variable in Table 1.4 corresponds to 10 times the annualized change
in industry’s tasks inputs to favor comparison across periods of different lengths.
Computerization ∆Cj is measured as the annual change in the percentage of indus-
try workers using a computer at their jobs between 1984 and 1997 (estimated from
the October Current Population Survey supplements), multiplied by 10 to ensure
that all variables are over the same time length. For all regressions, observations are
weighted by the employment share in each sector. In Table 1.4, the ratio of high-
skill to low-skill workers are measured as the ratio of college graduates (and more
than college) to high-school dropouts and graduates, taken from ALM—knowing
that their data in turn come from IPUMS and MORG.
Table 1.8.38 reproduces Table 1.4 but with the laxer auto90 measure. The results
are very similar—the only difference is that the coefficient on routine manual tasks
is not significant at the usual levels in the 90s.42
Table 1.8.39 reproduces the Table 5 of ALM by carrying the analysis of Table 1.4
for each education groups over the time period 1980-1998 with the auto95 measure
(the results are very similar with auto90). The table shows that automation reduces
the amount of routine tasks undertaken by high-school dropouts and high-school
graduates. Following ALM, Panel F computes the average effect of automation in
tasks changes (from Panel A) and how much of this average effect can be explained
by changes within educational groups (from Panels B to E). We find that changes
within educational categories explain a significant share of the overall reduction in
routine tasks but changes in educational composition also play a role, in line with
Column 6 of Table 1.4. In contrast, ALM found that nearly all of the decline in
routine tasks due to computerization came from within educational group changes.
42To interpret the effect of the automation variable, note that the means are 0.13, 0.15 and
0.14 in the 70s, 80s and 90s, and the standard deviations are 0.10, 0.12 and 0.11 with the auto90
definition.
1.8. APPENDIX 77
ind6090 Title Auto95 ind6090 Title Auto95
0.026 211 0.010
30 Forestry 0.035 212 Misc. plastic products 0.019
31 Fishing, hunting and trapping 0.013 220 Leather tanning and finishing 0.014
40 Metal mining 0.023 221 Footwear, except rubber and plastic 0.086
41 Coal mining 0.037 222 Leather products, except footwear 0.014
42 Crude petroleum and natural gas extraction 0.021 230 Logging 0.030
50 Nonmetallic mining and quarrying, except fuel 0.048 231 Sawmills, planning mills, and millwork 0.038
66 Construction 0.036 236 0.109
100 Meat products 0.107
101 Dairy products 0.402
102 Canned and preserved fuits and vegetables 0.007 241 Misc. wood products 0.075
110 Gain mill products 0.030 242 Furniture and fixtures 0.043
111 Bakery products 0.005 246 0.410
112 Sugar and confectionary products 0.022
120 Beverage industries 0.017 250 Glass products 0.017
121 Misc. food preparations, kindred products 0.019 251 Cement, concrete, gypsum and plaster products 0.074
130 Tobacco manufactures 0.033 252 Structural clay products 0.033
132 Knitting mills 0.007 261 Pottery and related products 0.027
140 0.004 262 Misc. nonmetallic mineral and stone products 0.038
270 0.039
141 Floor coverings, except hard surfaces 0.009
142 Yarn, thread, and fabric mills 0.071 271 Iron and stell foundaries 0.178
146 0.083 281 Cutlery, handtools, and other hardware 0.023
282 Fabricated structural metal products 0.034
150 Misc. textile mill products 0.079 346 0.028
151 Apparel and accessories, except knit 0.060
152 Misc. fabricated textile products 0.172
160 Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills 0.020 351 Transportation equipment 0.207
161 Misc. paper and pulp products 0.015 360 Ship and boat building and repairing 0.058
162 Paperboard containers and boxes 0.003 362 0.166
166 0.086
380 Photographic equipment and supplies 0.043
172 0.017 381 0.174
176 0.125 391 0.032
460 Electric light and power 0.161
181 Drugs 0.040 462 Eletric and gas, and other combinations 0.153
186 0.320 470 Water supply and irrigation 0.126
471 Sanitary services 0.018
190 Paints, varnishes, and related products 0.015 636 0.004
200 Petroleum refining 0.031
201 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.010
206 0.221
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 
except newspapers
Engine and turbines; Construction and material 
handling machines; Metalworking machinery; 
Machinery, except electrical, n.e.c.; Not specified 
machinery
Electronic computing equipment; Office and 
accounting machines
Household appliances; Radio, TV & 
Dyeing and finishing textiles, except wool and knit 
goods
Ag production crops and livestock; Ag services; 
Horticultural services
16 Other rubber products and plastics 
footwear and belting + tires and inner tubes
Railroad locomotives and equipment; Cycles and 
misc transporation equipment; Wood buildings 
and mobile homes
Scientific and controlling instruments; 
Optical and health service supplies
Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and 
finishing mills
Grocery stores; Retail bakeries; Food 
stores, n.e.c.
Primary aluminum & other primary metal 
industries
Plastics, synthetics and resins; Soaps and 
cosmetics; Agricultural chemicals; Industrial and 
miscellaneous chemicals
Guided missiles, space vehicles, ordnance, 
aircraft and parts
Watches, clocks and clockwork operated 
devices
Misc. manufacturing industries and toys, 
amusement and sporting goods
Screw machine products; Metal forgings & 
stampings; Misc. fabricated metal products
Table 1.8.37: List of sectors in the ALM regressions
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Table 1.8.38: Changes in task intensity and skill ratio across sectors and automation
(auto90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 1970 - 80, n=67
Share of automation 0.82 3.57 ***-17.95*** ***-10.60*** -0.89 **0.11**
patents in machinery (3.51) (4.32) (4.22) (3.74) (5.13) (0.05)
D Computer use -7.16 -2.99 ***-18.91*** -3.26 *14.86* 0.08
1984 - 1997 (5.71) (7.03) (6.86) (6.09) (8.36) (0.09)
Intercept 0.92 *2.14* ***4.34*** ***3.39*** -1.70 ***0.04***
(1.00) (1.23) (1.20) (1.07) (1.47) (0.02)
R
2 0.02 0.01 0.31 0.12 0.05 0.08
Weighted mean D -0.05 2.17 -0.90 1.49 0.42 0.07
Panel B: 1980 - 90, n=67
Share of automation *9.01* **13.29** ***-25.37*** ***-13.79*** **9.70** ***0.73***
patents in machinery (5.41) (6.23) (4.96) (4.28) (4.72) (0.19)
D Computer use **24.75** *22.95* -13.41 -1.55 -5.37 0.39
1984 - 1997 (10.34) (11.90) (9.49) (8.18) (9.02) (0.37)
Intercept *-3.15* -1.21 **3.55** 1.69 -2.39 -0.06
(1.77) (2.03) (1.62) (1.40) (1.54) (0.06)
R
2 0.13 0.13 0.32 0.14 0.06 0.21
Weighted mean D 1.86 4.17 -2.22 -0.59 -1.74 0.11
Panel C: 1990 - 98, n=67
Share of automation **9.23** *10.63* ***-13.47*** -6.24 3.95 ***0.42***
patents in machinery (4.57) (6.22) (5.12) (4.19) (4.76) (0.12)
D Computer use ***27.31*** **28.19** ***-25.09*** ***-26.11*** 8.05 ***0.73***
1984 - 1997 (8.27) (11.25) (9.26) (7.58) (8.61) (0.22)
Intercept **-2.93** -1.93 2.23 *2.41* *-2.55* **-0.08**
(1.44) (1.96) (1.61) (1.32) (1.50) (0.04)
R
2 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.03 0.29
Weighted mean D 2.45 3.79 -3.44 -2.36 -0.79 0.09
D H/L
Standard errors are in parentheses. Colums (1) to (5) of Panels A to C each presents a separate OLS regression of ten times the
annual change in industry-level task input between the endpoints of the indicated time interval (measured in centiles of the 1960 task
distribution) on the share of automation patents in machinery (defined with the 90th percentile threshold) and the annual percentage
point change in industry computer use during 1984 - 1997 as well as a constant. In Column (6), the dependent variable is the ratio of
high-skill (college graduates) to low-skill (high-school graduates and dropouts) workers. Estimates are weighted by mean industry share












Table 1.8.39: Changes in task intensity and skill ratio across sectors and automation
(auto95) by skill groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Aggregated within-industry change
Share of automation **9.53** ***17.97*** ***-26.66*** ***-17.09*** ***12.57***
patents in machinery (4.53) (5.39) (4.83) (3.90) (4.30)
D Computer use ***24.91*** ***23.81*** ***-17.75*** **-11.53** 0.47
1984 - 1997 (6.36) (7.56) (6.79) (5.48) (6.03)
Intercept **-2.36** -1.01 *2.05* *1.73* **-2.37**
(1.03) (1.22) (1.10) (0.89) (0.98)
R
2 0.26 0.27 0.39 0.29 0.12
Weighted mean D 2.05 3.88 -2.62 -1.29 -1.34
Panel B: Within industry: High school dropouts
Share of automation 2.41 13.61 ***-26.19*** -5.80 4.56
patents in machinery (7.89) (10.85) (6.94) (6.22) (6.35)
D Computer use 11.70 18.08 15.84 8.68 -9.95
1984 - 1997 (11.08) (15.24) (9.74) (8.73) (8.91)
Intercept **-4.47** ***-8.45*** 0.87 0.55 1.16
(1.79) (2.47) (1.58) (1.41) (1.44)
R
2 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.02 0.02
Weighted mean D -2.56 -4.73 1.20 1.39 0.04
Panel C: Within industry: High school graduates
Share of automation -7.08 6.50 ***-26.09*** ***-13.43*** *9.62*
patents in machinery (5.47) (7.05) (5.64) (4.25) (5.37)
D Computer use 9.30 -0.76 *-14.39* -2.86 6.71
1984 - 1997 (7.69) (9.90) (7.92) (5.96) (7.54)
Intercept **-2.86** 2.19 *2.25* 0.00 -1.43
(1.24) (1.60) (1.28) (0.97) (1.22)
R
2 0.04 0.01 0.30 0.14 0.06
Weighted mean D -2.03 2.57 -1.88 -1.45 0.30
Panel D: Within industry: Some College
Share of automation -11.94 -7.49 -4.92 -5.92 *12.48*
patents in machinery (8.04) (7.31) (6.01) (5.72) (6.56)
D Computer use 7.05 13.85 *-14.68* *-14.11* 9.14
1984 - 1997 (11.29) (10.26) (8.44) (8.03) (9.20)
Intercept -1.10 0.31 0.38 *2.21* *-2.74*
(1.83) (1.66) (1.37) (1.30) (1.49)
R
2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07
Weighted mean D -0.97 1.78 -2.17 -0.33 -0.43
Panel E: Within industry: College graduates
Share of automation -6.54 **-7.28** *-11.58* -7.70 ***17.00***
patents in machinery (4.25) (3.59) (6.48) (7.74) (6.03)
D Computer use **14.44** *9.29* -5.55 -7.69 11.14
1984 - 1997 (6.00) (5.06) (9.14) (10.91) (8.50)
Intercept -0.94 0.17 -1.22 -0.14 ***-5.35***
(0.97) (0.82) (1.48) (1.77) (1.38)
R
2 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.14
Weighted mean D 0.69 0.99 -2.93 -1.86 -2.40
Panel F: Decomposition of automation effects into within and between education group
Explained task D 0.73 1.38 -2.04 -1.31 0.96
Within educ groups (%) -63.96 15.80 72.32 54.61 81.96





n in Panels A-D is 69 and in Panel E it is 68 consitent CIC industries. Standard errors are in parentheses. Each column of
panels A - E presents a separate OLS regression of ten times the annual change in industry-level task input for the
relevant education group (measured in centiles of the 1960 task distribution) during 1980 - 1998 on the the share of
automation patents in machinery (defined with the 95th percentile threshold) and the annual percentage point change in
industry computer use during 1984 - 1997 as well as a constant. Estimates are weighted by mean industry share of total
employment (in FTEs) in 1980 and 1998. The 'explained' component in Panel F is the within-industry change in the task
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1.8.4 Validating our weights approach
In this Appendix, we compare our firm-level weights to bilateral trade flows and
show that they are strongly correlated. The first step is to compute patent-based
weights at the country level. For this exercise (and this exercise only), we define the
domestic country d of a firm based on the location of its headquarters (according to
the country code of its identifier in the Orbis database—for firms which we merged,
we keep the country code of the largest entity by biadic machinery patents in 1997-
2011). We compute the foreign weights for each firm i by excluding the domestic
country. Therefore the foreign weight for country c 6= d for firm i is given by
ωi,c/(1−ωi,d) (recall that these weights are computed based on patenting from 1970
to 1994). We then build the foreign patent-based weight in country c for country
das a weighted average of the foreign weights in country c of the firms from country
d (each firm is weighted according to the number of machinery biadic patents in
1997-2011).
The second step is to build similar weights based on exports. To do that, we
collect sectoral bilateral trade flow from UN Comtrade data between between 1995
and 2009 for 40 countries (Taiwan is not included in the data). To obtain trade
flows in machinery, we use a concordance table between 4 digit IPC codes and 2 or 3
digits NACE Rev 2 codes provided by Eurostat, this concordance table matches IPC
codes to the industry of manufacturing. The concordance table assigns a unique
industry to each IPC code. Then, for each industry and each country, we compute
the share of patents over the period 1995-2009 which are in machinery according to
our definition.43 This gives us a machinery weight for each industry code and each
country. We then multiply sectoral trade flows (after having aggregated the original
data to the NACE Rev 2 codes used in the concordance table) by this weight to
get bilateral trade in machinery. We then compute the export share in machinery
across destinations. We could compute trade based weights for each year but here
we report results based on 1996 only (there are a few missing observations for 1995).
Figure 1.8.12 plots the patent-based weights against the trade-based weights.
43To do that we use a fractional approach: each patent is allocated NACE sectoral weights
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(b) Trade from the 6 largest countries
Figure 1.8.12: Bilateral patent flows and trade flows in machinery. Panel (a) plots log patent
based weights, which are a weighted average of the destination country’s weights in
the (foreign) patent portfolio of firms from the origin country, against export shares
in machinery over the years 1995-2009. The size of each circle represents the product
of the GDP of both countries, which is used as a weight in the regression. Panel (b)
focuses on the weights from the listed countries and observations are weighted by the
GDP of the partner country.
Panel (b) focuses on a few origin countries while Panel (a) plots all countries to-
gether. We find a strong correlation between the two measures with a regression
coefficient of 0.94 (when observations are weighted by the trade flow in 1996).
Another way to summarize how close the two distributions are is to compute
what low-skill wages would be according to either sets of weights. We do this in
Figure 1.8.13. There for each country, we compute “foreign low-skill wages” as a
weighted average of foreign wages where the weights are either the patent-based
weights or the trade-based weights derived above. Foreign wages are deflated with
the local PPI and converted in USD in 1995 as in our main analysis. Panel (a) then
reports foreign log low-skill wages according to both types of weights in 1995-2009,
we find that they are strongly correlated. Panel (b), reports the same foreign log
low-skill wages but taking away country and year fixed effects. We find a regression
coefficient of 0.56, when observations are weighted by the number of machinery
patent in the country over the 1997-2011 time period.
Overall, this exercise shows that there is tight relationship between our patent-
based weights and (future) trade flows, suggesting that we can use these patent-
based weights as proxies for firms’ markets exposure.
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(b) Residualized low-skill wages
Figure 1.8.13: Foreign low-skill wages for each country computed either with patent-
based weights or with trade-based weights. Wages are computed for the years
1995-2009. Panel (a) plots log foreign low-skill wages using either patent-based weights
or trade-based weights. Panel (b) plots the residuals of foreign wages according to both
methods controlling for country and year fixed effects. Observations are weighted by
the number of biadic machinery patents by firms from the the country over the years
1997-2011.
1.8.5 Macroeconomic variables
Our main source of macroeconomic variables is the World Input Output Database
(WIOD) from Timmer, Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer and de Cries (2015) which con-
tains information on hourly wages (low-skill, middle-skill and high-skill) for the
manufacturing sector and the total economy from 1995 to 2009 for 40 countries.
It further contains information on both GDP deflators and producer price indices
both for manufacturing and for the whole economy. Their data on skill is based
on the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) system,
where category 1+2 denote low-skill (no high-school diploma in the US) 3+4 de-
note middle-skill (high-school but not completed college) and 5+6 denotes high-skill
(college and above). Switzerland is not included in the WIOD database and we add
data on skill-dependent wages, productivity growth and price deflators manually
using data obtained directly from Federal Statistical Office of Switzerland.
We supplement this data with data from UNSTAT on exchange rates and GDP
(and add Taiwan separately from the Taiwanese Statistical office). We use this data
to calculate the GDP gap as the deviations of log GDP from HP-filtered log GDP
using a smoothing parameter of 6.25.
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The primary data source for the hourly minimum wage data is OECD Statistics.
Not all countries have government-imposed hourly minimum wages. Spain, for
instance, had a monthly minimum wage of 728 euros in 2009. To convert this into
hourly wage we note that Spain has 14 monthly payments a year (+1 payments
in December and July). Further, workers have 6 weeks off and the standard work
week is 38 hours. Consequently we calculate the hourly minimum wages as monthly
minimum wage×14/ [(52− 6)× 38], which in the case of 2009 is 5.83 euros per hour.
We perform similar calculations, depending on individual work conditions, for other
countries with minimum wages that are not stated per hour: Belgium, Brazil, Israel,
Mexico, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal.
For the US, we use data from FRED for state minimum wages and calculate the
nation-level minimum wage as the weighted average of the state-by-state maximum
of state minimum and federal minimum wages, where the weight is the manufac-
turing employment in a given state.
Further, the UK did not have an official minimum wage until 1999. Corre-
spondingly, we follow Dickens, Machin and Manning (1999) and use the wage levels
agreed upon by local wage councils. These were in effect from 1909 until 1993. For,
1995-1998, the four years in our sample where no official minimum wage existed,
we use the nominal level from 1993. We use the employment-weighted industry
average across manufacturing industries. Finally, Germany did not have a mini-
mum wage during the time period we study. Instead, we follow Dolado, Kramarz,
Machin, Manning, Margolis and Teulings (1996) and use the collectively bargained
minimum wages in manufacturing which effectively constitute law once they have
been implemented. These data come from personal correspondence with the Sabine
Lenz at the Statistical Agency of Germany.

Chapter 2
Automation and the Labor Share:
Evidence from Patents
This chapter is joint work with Vladimir Sulaja.*
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, the labor share of aggregate income has been decreasing steadily
over the majority of countries. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) find that the
corporate labor share has decreased by around five percentage points over the last
35 years. This decrease in the labor share has important implications for inequality.
Most people make a living from their labor, and if capital is concentrated in the
hands of a few, a reduction in the share of income going to labor means that the
majority of people are relatively worse off.
Despite its importance, we are still far away from understanding the causes of the
decline we have witnessed. An explanation that is popular in the public discourse
is the rising adoption of automation technologies. Automation technologies include
industrial robots and artificial intelligence but also a wide range of computer and
software technology which makes manual work redundant.
*Vladimir Sulaja: University of Zurich, Ramistrasse 59, vladimir.sulaja@econ.uzh.ch. Carlo
Zanella: University of Zurich, Ramistrasse 59, carlo.zanella@econ.uzh.ch. We thank David Hé-
mous, Lei Li, Tong Zhang, as well as various participants at the macro seminar at the University
of Zurich for helpful comments and suggestions.
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The idea that automation could have enormous consequences for the labor mar-
ket dates back to at least Keynes (1930), who argued that the advance of technology
would lead to technological unemployment. The logic is simple — as the technology
advances, robots will take over production and many will be left jobless. Of course,
this prediction has not taken into account that many jobs would be created by new
technologies. While the scenario that Keynes (1930) imagined has not realized, the
world has seen a substantial change in the labor markets due to technology.
In this paper, we study the relationship between the fall in the labor share
over the last three decades with the onset of automation technologies. We use
the patent classification developed by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2019) to conduct our
empirical analysis. Our measure of automation innovation is the number of au-
tomation patents in a country in a year. While there has of course been previous
research on the relationship between automation and the labor share, we are the
first to use automation patents as a measure for automation technology. Autor and
Salomons (2018), for instance, use total factor productivity as a measure of automa-
tion, whereas Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017b) focus on robots. Our patent-based
measure has the advantage of being a direct measure of automation. Moreover, it
is more comprehensive than robots.
While the measure of automation is more general than in previous studies, the
patent classification by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2019) has been explicitly developed
for the machinery sector. The definition of automation in this paper therefore does
not include computer technologies outside the use in manufacturing. It would,
for instance, not capture advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI). However, A.I.
innovation only started to take off after 2012 (WIPO, 2019), whereas the decline in
the labor share has been going on since the 1980.
In the main part of the paper, we document a robust negative association be-
tween automation and the labor share. Our main results suggest that an increase
in the number of automation patents by ten percent is associated with a decrease in
labor share by 0.16–0.31 percentage points. For the U.S., for instance, this would
imply that automation accounts for 48 to 91 percent of the decline of the corporate
labor share.
We use the data from World Input Output Database (WIOD) to separate the
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labor share of income in three categories: low-skilled, middle-skilled, and high-
skilled labor. This data also features the possibility of dividing the labor share of
each skill group into hours worked and wages.
We show that the relationship is entirely driven by the middle-skilled labor
share, which is consistent with Autor and Dorn (2013b) and related literature who
document shifts from middle-skilled to low- and high-skilled employment.
There is no significant correlation between low- and the high-skilled labor share
with automation. We find that automation is negatively correlated with overall
employment. Moreover, it is associated with a decrease in the share of hours of low-
skilled labor and an increase in the share of high-skilled workers. Surprisingly, there
is no significant association with the share of hours worked by middle-skilled labor.
This suggests that automation displaces low-skilled workers but is complementary
to high-skilled labor. This view is consistent with the theory put forth by previous
research such as Hémous and Olsen (2018).
Our main focus is on establishing the sign and the size of the statistical relation-
ship between automation and the labor share. We are careful about interpreting
our results as the causal effect of automation on the labor share. It is likely that
automation innovation and production are jointly determined. For instance, Deche-
zleprêtre et al. (2019) show that higher low-skilled wages lead firms to develop more
labor-saving innovation. Zator (2019) studies the effect of automation on worker
substitution by robots using data on German firms and finds that endogeneity leads
to a significant bias in the coefficient on the effect of automation on worker displace-
ment.
For our empirical analysis, we use data on the corporate labor share (CLS)
collected by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). Calculating the labor share in the
entire economy requires splitting business income between labor and capital, which
is not straightforward and requires making additional assumptions. In the corporate
sector this is not an issue, which is why we focus on the corporate labor share.
Our analysis focuses on OECD countries in the time period 1995–2012 because
for periods before 1995 and after 2012 the data on the corporate labor share is
spotty. We show, however, that the negative relationship between automation and
the labor share holds in larger samples and for various measures of the labor share.
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Our work is also related to the recent literature on the job polarization, which
refers to the shrinking share of employment in middle-skilled, routine occupations.
Autor et al. (2003b) argue that the job polarization is a consequence of the progress
of automation. Cortes et al. (2017) use a neoclassical framework to study this prob-
lem and find that the automation accounts for a very small share of job polarization.
We find that while automation is not associated with a decrease in middle-skilled
employment, there is a negative association between middle-skilled labor share and
automation. Graetz and Michaels (2017) study the relationship between modern
technology and jobless recoveries, which Cortes et al. (2017) argue are tightly re-
lated to job polarization. Using country-level data he finds that industries that
used more routine tasks and higher exposure to robotization did not experience
slower employment recoveries. Graetz and Michaels (2018b) study robots adoption
and find that it increases total factor productivity. They show that although in-
creased use of robots does not significantly reduce total employment, it reduces the
low-skilled employment share. Martinez (2019) uses industry-level data and a new
measure of aggregate task inputs in production and finds evidence that automation
was a significant driving force of the US labor share between 1972–2010. Our work
is different as we study automation and labor share on the country level and use
patents as a measure of automation rather than task inputs.
Of course, we are not the first to study the causes of the decline of the labor
share. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) investigate the possibility that the de-
creasing relative price of investment with respect to consumption is responsible for
the decline in the labor share. In their model, firms produce two types of goods
using a continuum of intermediate inputs. Monopolistically competitive firms pro-
duce intermediate inputs using capital and labor. Shifts in technology differences
make the rental rate of capital lower, which forces firms to switch labor for capital
and decrease the share of labor in GDP.
Kehrig and Vincent (2018) use micro-level data from U.S. manufacturing to
investigate the properties of the decline we witnessed. They find that since the
mid-1980s, the labor share in U.S. manufacturing declined around five percentage
points. However, the median establishment has increased its labor share by around
1.4 percentage points per decade. Looking further into the forces at play, they
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find that the hyperproductive plants have over time captured a higher share of the
industry, and that these firms are also the ones that have a lower labor share.
Similarly, Autor et al. (2019) study the fall of labor share in the context of the
rise of superstar firms using industry-level data. They find that superstar firms that
increase their market shares are also the ones that have a lower labor share. This
lead to an overall decline in labor share.
Elsby et al. (2013) argue that the main cause of the decreasing labor share was
offshoring activity. They argue that explanations for the decline in the labor share
that rely on the aggregate perspective are not supported by the data. For example,
the decrease in the relative price of investment could not be the explanation for the
decreasing labor share because in times of large shifts in the labor share, rental rate
of capital does not increase significantly.
Eden and Gaggl (2018) study the effects of information and communication
technologies on payments to factors of production. They document that the income
share of ICT in GDP has increased sevenfold, while the share of other types of
capital has remained stable. Additionally, they find that the reallocation of income
from labor to capital happened in occupations which are highly substitutable by
ICT.
Koh et al. (2018) investigate the role of intellectual property products in the
decline of the labor share. Unlike most studies, they use data on the labor share
spanning 65 years. They show that the decline in the labor share can be explained
entirely by the increasing importance of intellectual property products in national
income. However, their study only includes the data on the US.
Rognlie (2015) focuses on the share of income that accrues to capital, and finds
that the increase in the net capital share since 1948 comes entirely from the housing
sector. He goes on to argue that in order for the capital accumulation to explain
the trends in capital share, we would need much different elasticities of substitution
and correlation between the capital-income ratio and capital share that we do not
observe.
Boehm et al. (2019) use the establishment-level data from multinational firms
in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Multinational establishments accounted for 41
percent of aggregate employment decline. They find that newly multinational es-
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tablishments in the U.S. experienced job losses, while their parent firms increased
imports from their parent firms abroad.
Barkai, Simcha (2016) finds that markups have grown over time and that this
has led to both a decrease in the labor and capital share.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data on labor share,
decomposition of labor share and automation innovation, as well as descriptive
statistics. Section 3 documents the effect of automation innovation on labor share
both overall and by skill groups, and Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Data
In this section, we describe the data that we use for our analysis. We first present
our measure of automation and then describe the sources of our macroeconomic
variables. Finally, we present some summary statistics.
2.2.1 Automation measure
For our measure of automation, we use the patent classification developed by Deche-
zleprêtre et al. (2019), who use text analysis in order to categorize technological
codes assigned to patents, called IPC and CPC codes, as automation.
We briefly summarize the key facts from the classification. The classification of
patents relies on the fact that every patent is associated with technological codes,
called IPC/CPC codes. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2019) employ a full-text keyword
search on the text of EPO patents. For every technological code they compute
the frequency of patents that match a certain set of keywords, such as “robot”,
“automation”, “Computer Numerical Control”, etc. They then classify a patent from
the universe of patents in PATSTAT as automation if it is assigned an IPC/CPC
code with a frequency of matching patents that is higher than a given threshold.
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2019) introduce both a stricter and a laxer classification
of automation patents depending on the threshold. We use both the 90th or the
95th percentile of the IPC/CPC code distribution as the threshold. The resulting
classifications we call auto90 and auto95, respectively. Dechezleprêtre et al. (2019)
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validate the measure of automation by including it in the exercise of Autor et al.
(2003b) and find that in the U.S., sectors where the share of automation patents
filed in machinery was high, are associated with a decrease in routine tasks and an
increase in the skill ratio.
For our analysis, we use the PATSTAT Autumn 2018 database, which contains
information on almost the entire universe of patents. We combine the automation
classification with PATSTAT and consider automation patents which have been reg-
istered with at least two patent authorities. Following Dechezleprêtre et al. (2019),
we call these patents “biadic”.1 Our focus is on biadic patents because previous re-
search including, for instance, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) and, more recently,
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2017), argues that biadic patents reflect more important inno-
vations. However, we will show that our results are robust to alternative innovation
quality indicators.
We combine the automation classification with PATSTAT and define as automa-
tion in a country and year the number of all biadic auto95 and auto90 patents which
have been invented in that year and registered with the country’s patent authority.
We define the year of invention as the earliest application year within its patent
family. EPO patents are assigned to countries upon entry into the national phase.
2.2.2 Macroeconomic data
For our empirical analysis, we use data on the labor share as well as other macroe-
conomic variables such as GDP, employment and labor compensation on a country-
year level.
Data on the corporate labor share (CLS) are taken from Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014). We also use the labor share from the Penn World Tables as an al-
ternative measure. We use real GDP from the World Bank. To control for business
cycle fluctuations, we define the GDP gap as the residuals of applying the HP filter
to real GDP. The World Input-Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015b) contains
data on employment and total labor compensation by skill group. We define low-,
1Note that this definition is in line with DHOZ but slightly than in most of the literature which
defines as biadic patents that were registered at at least two of the following authorities: EPO,
USPTO, JPO.
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middle-, and high-skilled wages as the ratio of the skill group’s total labor compen-
sation and hours worked by that skill group. Similarly, we define labor shares by
skill group as the skill group’s labor compensation divided by gross value added.
For our alternative measures of the labor share, we use data from EU KLEMS
and from Penn World Table.
2.2.3 Sample
Our baseline analysis with the corporate labor share by Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) includes 29 OECD countries and spans the years 1995-2012. We restrict the
sample to OECD countries because most of them have a significant number of
auto95 patents.2 We will show in the appendix, however, that our results also hold
in larger samples.
Table 2.5.1 shows summary statistics of our patent counts and the corporate
labor share.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. We will first present
our panel regression results. Second, we present our long-difference results. Third,
we show the results by different skill groups. The rest of the section demonstrates
the robustness of our results.
2.3.1 Main results
In this section, we present our main empirical results. We focus on the corporate
labor share because in the corporate sector the problem of distinguishing between an
entrepreneur’s capital income and labor income does not arise (Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2014). In our baseline regressions we estimate the following fixed-effects
2For instance Saudi Arabia, which is not in the OECD, has only between 0 to three auto95
patents in 1995–2012 despite having a relatively large GDP.
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panel model:
CLSc,t+1 = β0 + β1 ln auto95c,t +X
′
c,tγ + δt + δc,
where CLSc,t+1 is the corporate labor share (multiplied by 100), ln auto95c,t is the
logarithm of the number of biadic auto95 innovations patented at country c in year
t, Xc,t is a vector of controls, and δt and δc are year and country fixed effects,
respectively.
Table 2.3.1: Baseline results
Corporate Labor Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnauto95 -2.292∗∗∗ -1.646∗∗∗ -3.124∗∗∗ -2.739∗∗∗ -2.702∗∗∗
(0.389) (0.482) (0.758) (0.718) (0.764)
lnother95 1.649∗ 1.303 1.037
(0.902) (0.832) (2.073)




Fixed effects C C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y
Observations 429 429 429 429 429
Countries 29 29 29 29 29
Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-
order serial correlation using Newey-West. The independent variables are
lagged by one year. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Our baseline results are reported in Table 2.3.1. The dependent variable is the
corporate labor share, and all the independent variables are lagged by one year.
We explore different timing assumptions in Section 2.3.4. In Column (1), we run a
simple univariate OLS regression without any controls except country fixed effects.
The estimated coefficient suggests that a 10 percent increase in automation leads
to a decrease in the labor share of 0.229 percentage points. In Column (2), we
add year fixed effects and still find significant effects although the magnitude of
the coefficient is somewhat lower. Next we address the issue that the negative
relationship may be driven by a growth of innovations in the machinery sector
in general rather than labor-displacing technologies. In Column (3), we control
for other machinery innovations except auto95 (other95). Interestingly, we find a
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weakly significant positive influence of non-automation machinery innovation. The
negative relationship between automation and the labor share, on the other hand,
becomes more pronounced. It is well known that both the labor share and patenting
is correlated with the business cycle (Hingley and Park, 2017; Botelho, 2018). To
control for business cycle fluctuations, in Column (4), we add the GDP gap to the
regression model. We find a large positive effect of the GDP gap on the labor
share.3 The coefficient on automation remains significant and remarkably stable.
Finally, Column (5), controls for non-machinery innovation. The results suggest
that non-machinery innovation is not significantly related to the labor share.
Overall, our results imply a significant relationship between automation and the
corporate labor share. In the U.S., for instance, the number of automation patents
registered per year has grown at an annualized rate of 8.5 percent between 1995
and 2011. Our results suggest that a decrease of 0.140–0.266 percentage points per
year of the labor share can be explained by growth in automation innovation. This
would account for 48 to 91 percent of the decline of the U.S. corporate labor share.
Note that we prefer auto95 as a measure of automation because it is stricter
than auto90. The results on auto90 are similar and reported in Table 2.3.6 in the
Appendix.
2.3.2 Long Differences
Both technological change and changes in the labor share reflect long-term processes.
However, so far we identified the coefficient on automation in a yearly panel, which
effectively exploits variation of a high frequency. In this section, we repeat our
baseline analysis using low-frequency variation.
In Table 2.3.2, we regress five-year changes in the labor share on the logarithm
of the number of automation patents. In Column (1), we report the results without
any controls. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant. In Column
(2), we add period fixed effects, and in Column (3) and (4), we add back non-
automation machinery innovation and the GDP gap. In all specifications except (2),
we confirm the significant negative estimates of the previous section. In specification
3The labor share has been considered countercyclical until recently. However, as Botelho (2018)
shows, this has reversed in the last three decades.
2.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 95
(3) and (4), the magnitudes are even larger than in the yearly panel. This suggests
that automation is negatively related to automation over periods spanning at least
several years.
Table 2.3.2: Long Differences
5-year Changes
∆CLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆lnauto95 -1.754∗∗∗ -1.431 -3.655∗∗ -4.026∗∗∗





Fixed effects Y Y Y
Observations 75 75 75 75
Countries 28 28 28 28
Note: The differences are constructed over the following time
spans: 1995–2000,2000-2005, 2005-2011. Our last interval
therefore spans 6 rather than 5 years. We choose 2011 as our
end year because we lose a lot of countries in 2012. Standard er-
rors in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-order
serial correlation using Newey-West. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
2.3.3 Effects by Skill Groups
The routinization hypothesis put forward by Autor et al. (2003b) suggests that
automation technologies displace workers in middle-skilled routine occupations —
occupations which mostly involve tasks that can be done by following well-defined
instructions. At the same time, automation technologies may be complementary
to workers engaged in abstract tasks, which are found mostly in high-skilled oc-
cupations. The evidence on this hypothesis is mixed. For instance, Cortes et al.
(2017) develop a model with endogenous participation and occupation choice and
find that, quantitatively, automation can only explain a modest part of the decline
in routine jobs. In this section, we study how automation is related to the labor
share, employment, and wages of different skill groups.
In order to do that, we use data from the World Input-Output Database to con-
struct the labor share by skill group. In the WIOD, skill is equivalent to educational
96 CHAPTER 2. AUTOMATION AND THE LABOR SHARE
attainment. We then regress these variables on our measure of automation. Our
results are reported in Table 2.3.3. In Column (1), we regress labor share, wage,
and employment, defined as the number of hours worked, on automation. Columns
(2)–(4) report the results for low-, middle-, and high-skilled labor.
Our main result in this section is that the negative relationship of automation
and the labor share is mainly driven by middle-skilled labor, as Panel A of Table
2.3.3 shows. This result is consistent with the routinization hypothesis. Surprisingly,
we do not find a significant association of automation with the wages for any skill
group. In Panel C. we show that automation associated with a decrease in total
hours worked. Moreover, an increase in automation is associated with a decrease
in the share of hours of the low-skilled and an increase in the share of hours of the
high-skilled workers. There appears to be no effect on the relative share of work
hours of the middle-skilled workers.
Table 2.3.3: Effects by Skill Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Low-skilled Middle-skilled High-skilled
A. Labor share
lnauto95 -2.793∗∗ 0.0000251 -2.235∗∗ -0.280
(1.382) (0.364) (1.096) (0.425)
N 454 408 408 408
B. Wage
lnauto95 0.0327 0.0140 0.0116 0.0169
(0.0234) (0.0325) (0.0231) (0.0220)
N 408 408 408 408
C. (Share of) hours worked
lnauto95 -0.0510∗∗∗ -0.0905∗∗ 0.0248 0.0861∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0380) (0.0233) (0.0238)
N 456 408 408 408
Note: The independent variables are lagged by one year, and all regressions
control for other machinery innovation, GDP gap, country and year fixed
effects. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the wage
(deflated by the Producer Price Index). In Panel C, the dependent variable
is logarithm of total hours and log of the ratio of hours by skill group
to total hours, respectively. Outcome variables are constructed using data
from World Input-Output Database. Standard errors in brackets are robust
to heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using Newey-West. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 97
2.3.4 Robustness checks
In this section, we present the results of several robustness checks.
Timing. In our benchmark specifications, we assume that automation innovation
affects the labor share in the next period. In Table 2.3.4, we explore alternative
timing assumptions. The table shows the results of our benchmark specification for
different lags and leads. In Columns (1)–(2), the regressors are lead, in Column
(3) the regressors are current, and in Columns (4)–(6) regressors are lagged. In
all specifications except when lead by one period, the coefficient on automation is
significantly negative. This suggests that our results do not depend on the chosen
lag structure.
Table 2.3.4: Lags and Leads
CLS
Leads Lags
2 1 0 1 2 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnauto95 -1.795∗∗ -1.593 -2.949∗∗∗ -2.739∗∗∗ -1.683∗∗∗ -1.342∗∗
(0.853) (0.974) (0.822) (0.718) (0.635) (0.642)
lnother95 0.0904 0.116 1.127 1.303 0.808 0.181
(0.787) (0.996) (0.852) (0.832) (0.704) (0.755)
GDP gap -14.43 -5.690 10.51 37.84∗∗∗ 41.71∗∗∗ 23.06
(13.99) (12.49) (11.65) (8.676) (11.32) (15.39)
Fixed effects C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y
Observations 458 455 454 429 403 377
Ng 29 29 29 29 29 29
Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-order serial
correlation using Newey-West. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
One explanation for this may be, as hypothesized previously, that the relation-
ship between automation and the labor share are due to long-term processes. In
Table 2.3.5 we explore the timing of the effects in our long-difference panel. Column
(2) is the benchmark long-difference regression. In Column (1) and (3), we regress
the 5-year change in the labor share on the change in the logarithm of automation
innovation of the subsequent and preceding, respectively, 5-year interval. The es-
timated effects of growth in automation on the next and previous change to the
labor share are insignificant. This suggests that for longer periods only changes in
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automation innovation only matters for the current labor share.




∆lnauto95 0.545 -4.026∗∗∗ -0.406
(2.329) (1.508) (1.100)
∆lnother95 -2.667 1.929 0.751
(1.893) (1.320) (0.728)
∆GDP gap -32.48 74.99∗∗ -48.45∗
(39.21) (30.48) (27.44)
Fixed effects Y Y Y
Observations 52 75 50
Countries 28 28 27
Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to
heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correla-
tion using Newey-West. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Alternative automation threshold. How robust are our results to variations in the
definition of automation patents? We address this question using the laxer auto90
measure of automation, of which auto95 patents are a proper subset. In our sample,
there are 73 percent more auto90 patents than auto95 patents. In Table 2.3.6,
we repeat the baseline regressions using the laxer auto90 measure of automation
innovation. The results are very similar to our benchmark regressions. As soon as
non-automation machinery innovation is added as a control, the magnitude of the
coefficient of these measures are equal.
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Table 2.3.6: Baseline results with auto90
Corporate Labor Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnauto90 -2.120∗∗∗ -1.289∗∗∗ -3.390∗∗∗ -3.014∗∗ -2.939∗∗
(0.399) (0.474) (1.260) (1.238) (1.254)
lnother90 2.188 1.798 0.680
(1.349) (1.288) (2.528)




Fixed effects C C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y
Observations 431 431 431 431 431
Countries 29 29 29 29 29
Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-
order serial correlation using Newey-West. The independent variables are
lagged by one year. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Country-level clustering. In our benchmark regressions we use the Newey-West
correction to estimate standard errors that are robust to serial correlation of or-
der one and heteroskedasticity. In Table 2.5.2 we repeat our baseline tables with
standard errors clustered at the country level. While standard errors are somewhat
higher, all our results remain significant at the 5 percent significance level. Sim-
ilarly, in Table 2.5.3, we show that our long-difference regressions results remain
significant when clustering at the country level.
Alternative samples. We limit our sample to OECD countries, for which we think
that automation patents is a good measure of automation. However, our results
remain significant for larger samples. In Table 2.5.4, we run our benchmark spec-
ification on several samples. In Column (1)–(3) we restrict on OECD countries,
whereas in column (4)–(5) we include all countries, for which we have data on the
corporate labor share. In Column (1) and (4) we report the results of the bench-
mark specification. The coefficient of automation is significantly negative but of
lower magnitude for the extended sample than for OECD countries. In Column (2)
and (5) we restrict the sample on observations with at least ten auto95 patents. This
ameliorates the issue of a low signal-to-noise ratio if the number of auto95 patents is
very small. Under this restriction, the results become substantially stronger for the
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OECD countries. Moreover, the coefficients for the extended sample are now highly
significant and of similar magnitude as OECD countries. In Column (3) and (6)
we weight countries by average real GDP in 1995–2011. The results become more
pronounced for OECD countries and less pronounced on the extended sample.
Alternative patent quality restrictions. For our benchmark regressions we con-
struct patent counts using biadic patents. This is to ensure that we only consider
patents of sufficiently high quality. In Table 2.5.5, we report the regression results
of our benchmark specification for several alternative ways to impose quality re-
strictions. In Column (1), we only count patents of innovations which have been
patented in at least two of the following three patent offices: EPO, USPTO, or
JPO. In Column (2), we count triadic innovations, which are inventions that have
been patented at all of the three patent offices above. In Column (3), we count
all patents which have received at least one forward citation. Finally, in Column
(4), we consider all patents but weight them by the number of forward citations
received until at most 5 years after publication. In all our specifications, except
in Column (4), our estimates remain significantly negative and of similar magni-
tude. We are not concerned about the lack of association for the citations weighted
patents. Citations are generally considered correlated with the market value of a
patent. However, for instance, Abrams et al. (2013) have shown that this relation-
ship may be U-shaped. Moreover, it may simply be the case that the market value
of a patent is not strongly related the inventions’ effect on the labor share.
Alternative sources for the labor share. In Table, 2.5.6 we use data from EU
KLEMS and Penn World Table to construct measures of the labor share in the
total economy rather than limited to the corporate sector. The results confirm the
strong and significant negative results obtained for the corporate labor share.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we document a robust negative relationship between automation and
the labor share. The decline is mostly driven by the middle-skilled labor share.
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We have shown that automation innovation is negatively associated with the share
of hours worked of low-skilled labor, not significantly related to the share of hours
worked of middle-skilled labor, and positively related to the share of hours worked
of high-skilled labor.
Our results suggests that automation may play a significant role in the global
decline of the share of value added paid out to labor. We are cautious about a
causal interpretation of our results. Further research is necessary to establish the
causality of the relationship we have documented in this paper.
2.5 Appendix
Table 2.5.1: Summary statistics
N Mean Std. Dev. p5 p50 p95
CLS 472 56.16 8.95 40.12 58.62 67.36
auto90 836 666.13 1223.70 0 145 3174
auto95 836 385.50 747.58 0 77 1937
other95 836 3103.78 4878.07 5 950 14254
Note: This table shows selected statistics on our patent counts and
on the labor share. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.5.2: Baseline regressions with country-level clustering
Corporate Labor Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnauto95 -2.292∗∗∗ -1.646∗∗ -3.124∗∗ -2.739∗∗ -2.702∗∗
(0.573) (0.679) (1.181) (1.114) (1.068)






Fixed effects C C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y
Observations 429 429 429 429 429
Countries 29 29 29 29 29
Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the country-level. The
independent variables are lagged by one year. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table 2.5.3: Long Differences with country-level clustering
5-year Changes
∆CLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆lnauto95 -1.754∗∗ -1.431 -3.655∗∗ -4.026∗∗





Fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Observations 75 75 75 75
Countries 28 28 28 28
Note: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the
country-level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.5.4: Alternative samples
Corporate Labor Share
OECD countries All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnauto95 -2.739∗∗∗ -4.284∗∗∗ -5.627∗∗∗ -1.099∗∗ -4.591∗∗∗ -3.255∗
(0.718) (1.036) (1.509) (0.455) (0.979) (1.704)
lnother95 1.303 0.699 0.232 0.0351 2.072∗ -0.426
(0.832) (1.267) (1.711) (0.528) (1.214) (1.937)
gdpgap 37.84∗∗∗ 24.84∗∗ 17.11 22.29∗∗ 13.12 -5.745
(8.676) (10.38) (16.07) (9.122) (9.582) (21.03)
Fixed effects C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y C+Y
≥ 10 auto95 patents No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
GDP Weighted No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 429 394 394 604 481 481
Countries 29 29 29 47 41 41
Note: This table shows the baseline regressions with alternative sample restrictions. Columns (1)
to (3) restricts the sample to the set of OECD countries. Column (1) is the baseline, column (2)
restricts on observations with at least 10 auto95 patents, and column (3) weights observations by
real GDP. Columns (4) to (6) show the same regression for all available countries. Standard errors
in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using Newey-West. The
independent variables are lagged by one year. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5.5: Alternative innovation quality restrictions
Corporate Labor Share
Biadic (EP,JP,US) Triadic At least one citation Citations weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnauto95 -2.208∗∗∗ -2.286∗∗∗ -2.410∗∗∗ -0.342
(0.652) (0.586) (0.639) (0.284)
lnother95 0.794 0.933 0.966 -0.158
(0.721) (0.642) (0.705) (0.504)
GDP gap 39.39∗∗∗ 42.59∗∗∗ 37.75∗∗∗ 42.03∗∗∗
(9.032) (9.316) (8.992) (9.670)
Fixed effects C C+Y C+Y C+Y
Observations 429 429 429 429
Countries 29 29 29 29
Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using
Newey-West. The independent variables are lagged by one year. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.5.6: Alternative sources for the labor share
Labor Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. EU KLEMS
lnauto95 -0.423∗ -0.607∗∗ -1.766∗∗∗ -1.329∗∗∗





Observations 434 434 434 434
Countries 24 24 24 24
B. Penn World Table
lnauto95 -1.465∗∗∗ -0.519 -1.931∗∗∗ -1.654∗∗∗





Observations 627 627 627 626
Countries 34 34 34 34
Fixed effects C C+Y C+Y C+Y
Note: In both panels, the outcome variable is the total econ-
omy labor share. Standard errors in brackets are robust to
heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using Newey-
West. The independent variables are lagged by one year. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Chapter 3
Opportunity and Inequality Across
Generations
This chapter is joint work with Winfried Koeniger. *
A version of this paper is under review at the Journal of the European Economic
Association.
3.1 Introduction
Inequality across generations is transmitted through parents’ nurture and nature.
A central question is how much the opportunities of each generation depend on
nurture and nature. A tightly related question is whether, and how, optimal policy
should change the observed patterns.
To shed light on these issues, we analyze inequality and opportunity across
generations in an economy with family dynasties calibrated to the U.S. The trans-
mission of inequality across generations in the model is influenced by nurture, in
terms of bequests and schooling investment, and nature, in terms of ability that is
private information, stochastic and persistent across generations. Mobility within a
*Winfried Koeniger: Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, SEW-HSG, Varn-
büelstrasse 14, 9000 St.Gallen, Switzerland, winfried.koeniger@unisg.ch. Carlo Zanella: De-
partment of Economics, University of Zurich, Schönberggasse 1, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland,
carlo.zanella@econ.uzh.ch. We thank Julien Prat for discussions initiating this project and par-
ticipants at various seminars for very helpful comments.
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generation, resulting from the stochastic changes in ability, indicates the extent of
opportunities available to each generation.
Based on the model, we make three contributions. Firstly, we use the calibrated
model to complement the vast empirical literature on inequality and mobility by
illustrating mechanisms through which nurture and nature affect mobility and the
intergenerational transmission of inequality. Secondly, we analyze how mobility
and the transmission of inequality across generations would change if, starting from
the calibrated steady state, a reform implemented the social optimum. Thirdly,
we compare welfare of economies with simple tax and subsidy systems to welfare
in the social optimum, which, in theory, requires complex history-dependent tax
schedules for its implementation as in Farhi and Werning (2010). To the best of
our knowledge, such analysis of simple tax systems has not been provided yet in the
context of intergenerational models with persistence in unobservable ability. We
now elaborate further on each of the three contributions.
Concerning the intergenerational transmission of inequality, we find important
differences in how bequests and schooling affect this transmission in our calibrated
model. Bequests or inheritances decrease the incentive to exert labor effort through
a negative wealth effect and thus induce mean reversion in labor earnings.1 In-
vestment into schooling instead increases the persistence in labor earnings across
generations because more human capital increases labor productivity and thus also
labor effort, as long as the substitution effect of the productivity increase dominates.
Quantitatively, we find that the transmission of inequality is mostly determined by
nature (ability) rather than nurture (bequests or human capital investment), in line
with recent empirical findings of Bingley et al. (2018) who identify the effects of
nature and nurture with a credible “Children of Twins” design.2
1Such a negative wealth effect on life-cycle labor supply, through early retirement or less labor
force participation of some household members, is supported empirically by Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1993) and Brown et al. (2010). See also the evidence for lottery winners by Imbens et al. (2001)
for the U.S., by Cesarini et al. (2017) for Sweden, and the analysis of Kindermann et al. (2018) on
the consequences of this wealth effect for labor income taxation. The wealth effect also implies less
investment into schooling because schooling results in more resources only if combined with labor
effort. Although the negative wealth effect dominates on average, we find that more wealth relaxes
borrowing constraints for some dynasties and thus increases their investment into schooling.
2The empirical importance of nature and nurture for the intergenerational transmission of
inequality is still a matter of debate. Lee and Seshadri (2019) argue, based on a rich structural
model, that the empirical estimates may overstate the importance of nature because they do not
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Our analysis of the intergenerational transmission of inequality and mobility in
the model calibrated to the U.S. complements the empirical evidence provided by
Chetty et al. (2014) for the U.S.3 We highlight economic mechanisms, as discussed
above, that generate the empirically observed patterns and we quantify the trade-off
between intergenerational insurance and mobility. In the analysis of the reform that
implements the social optimum, more income inequality does not make dynasties
worse off ex ante because the reform also increases intergenerational insurance.
The importance of initial conditions for the welfare of generations has been
emphasized by Keane and Wolpin (1997) and more recently by Huggett et al. (2011),
De Nardi and Yang (2016) and Lee and Seshadri (2019). Structurally estimating
career decisions in the U.S., Keane and Wolpin (1997) find that initial conditions
at age 16 explain 90 percent of the total variance in expected lifetime utility. Based
on a model with risky human capital, Huggett et al. (2011) find that differences in
initial conditions at labor market entry account for more than 60% of the variation
in lifetime utility. This percentage increases to more than 70% in Lee and Seshadri
(2019) who model human capital formation early in life. The dominance of initial
conditions for each generation’s welfare motivates our focus on the opportunities
and the transmission of inequality across generations rather than on differences that
arise due to shocks within the labor-market career of a generation.
In their intergenerational model with estate taxation calibrated to the U.S.,
De Nardi and Yang (2016) find that parental background matters most for life-time
utility at the top of the distribution of parental earnings, given that the calibrated
distribution is very unequal at the top. The difference of being born into a family
in the lowest earnings state compared to the second-lowest earnings state is very
small instead. We complement this evidence by showing that family background
in terms of parent’s schooling investment is most effective at the top of the ability
distribution because of the complementarity of ability and schooling. At the bottom
of the ability distribution, bequests are much more effective in welfare terms instead.
We characterize the social optimum as the solution of a dynamic Mirrleesian
problem, in which asymmetric information constrains the insurance that the planner
account for general equilibrium effects.
3Güell et al. (2018) provide evidence for Italy. See also their references for further literature.
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can provide against the ability risk that dynasties face. This makes the quantitative
comparison between the calibrated economy and the social optimum non-trivial.
Inequality and less than full insurance are also a feature of the social optimum,
which provides a useful benchmark to put the observed mobility and transmission
of inequality in perspective.
Our analysis of the social optimum builds on Phelan (2006) and Farhi and
Werning (2007) who have shown that the social optimum in a dynamic Mirrleesian
economy with asymmetric information need not imply immiseration as in Atkeson
and Lucas (1992) if the planner discounts the future but attaches more weight to
future generations than implied by the altruism of a family dynasty. We proceed
as in Farhi and Werning (2007) and assume that dynasties are weighed equally in
the planner’s problem. This implies a wedge between the discount rate that the
planner and the family dynasty apply to the utility of each generation: the planner
cares directly about the welfare of a future generation and also indirectly, given
that family dynasties care about their offspring. The non-degenerate steady-state
distribution in the social optimum, resulting from the wedge in discount rates, allows
for a meaningful analysis of the transition from the steady state of the calibrated
economy to the social optimum. Because the wedge between the discount rates is
an important determinant of the distribution in the social optimum, we explain in
Section 3.5 how it relates to the difference between the real interest rate and the
discount rate of the family dynasty if we focus on the case with a stable consumption
distribution in the long run. We discipline this difference in the calibration by
matching median bequests observed in U.S. data.
In our quantitative analysis of the reform and the subsequent transition to the
social optimum, we find that the importance of nurture (in terms of bequests and
human capital investment) increases relative to nature (in terms of ability) com-
pared with the steady state of the calibrated economy. We show that this implies
more intergenerational insurance against ability risk at the cost of less social mobil-
ity, in the sense that ability is less important for the rank in the welfare distribution
within each generation. We quantify this trade-off between insurance across gen-
erations and social mobility in the transition to the social optimum, in which the
extent of intergenerational insurance and mobility is determined by optimal incen-
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tive provision as pointed out by Phelan (2006).
We find that production is decoupled more from consumption after the reform
on the transition to the social optimum. The pass-through coefficient of an unex-
pected ability shock to consumption decreases by more than half implying more
intergenerational insurance. At the same time, the correlation of ability and labor
effort increases in the social optimum compared to the steady state calibrated to
the U.S., and income mobility across and within generations remains quite stable
after the reform on the transition to the social optimum.
At the time of the reform, we hold constant the present discounted value of
the expected net costs for the allocation of each dynasty and give equal weight
to dynasties in the planner’s objective function. We thus focus on insurance and
refrain from adding motives for redistribution across dynasties by applying different
weights in the objective function. Our reform experiment thus answers the question
how much additional insurance the planner provides ex post by using an optimal
policy without redistributing across dynasties at the time of the reform. This makes
the reform also implementable from a politico-economic point of view.
Our analysis illustrates the general point, made in Lee and Seshadri (2018) for
example, that trade-offs arise depending on whether equality of opportunity is con-
sidered from a dynastic point of view, tilting the balance towards more insurance
across generations at the cost of less social mobility within generations, or from the
point of view of individual families within a generation, tilting the balance towards
more mobility within a generation and thus less intergenerational insurance.4 In-
terpretation of the empirical evidence on mobility patterns and inequality provided
in Chetty et al. (2014) for the U.S., Güell et al. (2018) for Italy or Adermon et al.
(2018) for Sweden, for example, thus requires assumptions about the social welfare
function. The welfare function used in this paper contains a dynastic motive which
is disciplined by calibrating the discount factor of dynasties to match the empirically
observed size of bequests.
Concerning the comparison of economies with simple tax and subsidy systems to
the social optimum, we find that about half of the welfare gains of moving from the
laissez faire to the social optimum can be achieved in economies with linear taxes and
4See Arneson (2018) for a recent discussion of different interpretations of equal opportunity.
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subsidies that condition on current labor income, bequests and schooling. We find
that bequests and schooling are both subsidized but at different rates. This relates
to results in Farhi and Werning (2010) who show that, in an implementation with
history-dependent tax schedules, bequests and human capital should be subsidized.
In our model, subsidies for schooling investment and bequests play a different role in
shaping inequality and opportunity also because we relax the assumptions in Farhi
and Werning (2010) that children make no labor supply decision and that there is
no uncertainty.5 In the tax and subsidy system with optimal linear rates, 18% of
labor income is taxed and bequests and schooling are subsidized at rates of 36%
and 30%, respectively.
Our results show to which extent the endogenous state variables bequests and
human capital together with labor income, which depends on ability draw of the
current generation, can capture the effect of history in our calibrated economy with
persistent ability shocks. Albanesi and Sleet (2006) have shown that history can be
fully summarized by conditioning optimal taxes on the endogenous state variable if
shocks to unobserved ability are i.i.d. and thus not persistent.6 In our model with
persistent shocks to ability, history-independent tax schedules that condition on
bequests, schooling and labor income only allow to implement the social optimum
approximately.7
Our analysis also relates to the large strand of literature on optimal taxation
of human capital or bequests. The special issue on human capital and inequality
edited by Corbae et al. (2017) and the volume on inequality and redistribution
of the Carnegie-Rochester-Conference (2016) provide a good overview over recent
research. Optimal taxation of human capital using a Mirrleesian approach has
been analyzed by Findeisen and Sachs (2016), Kapička (2015), Kapička and Neira
(2019), Stantcheva (2015) and Stantcheva (2017), and Koeniger and Prat (2018).
Heathcote et al. (2017), Krueger and Ludwig (2016), Lee and Seshadri (2019) and
Peterman (2016) are examples for analyses based on a Ramsey approach to optimal
5Farhi and Werning (2010) mention in their discussion of proposition 5 for history-dependent
tax schedules that the symmetry in the taxation of bequests and human capital only holds under
these assumptions.
6Stantcheva (2017) has extended this result in a life-cycle model with assets and human capital.
7Given that shocks to ability are unobservable and persistent, our recursive formulation of the
planner problem relies on results of Kapička (2013) and Pavan et al. (2014).
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taxation. Farhi and Werning (2010) and Phelan and Rustichini (2018) analyze
optimal taxation of bequests or inheritances. The approach in our paper is to
compare the status quo in the U.S., using approximations of existing tax schedules,
with a social optimum that does not imply immiseration in the long run, and to
analyze approximations of the social optimum with simple history-independent tax
schedules. The focus of this paper is thus different from Koeniger and Prat (2018),
who characterize socially optimal taxation of bequests and human capital if the
planner and the dynasties apply the same weight to future generations, implying
immiseration in the long run as in Atkeson and Lucas (1992).
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps. In Section 3.2, we model the de-
cision problem of family dynasties. We then calibrate the model to U.S. data in
Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we provide results for inequality, mobility and the impor-
tance of parental background in this economy. To benchmark these results, we char-
acterize the planner problem in Section 3.5. We compute the constrained-efficient
social optimum and analyze in Section 3.6 how a tax reform changes inequality
and mobility on the transition to the socially optimal steady state. In Section 3.7,
we compare economies with simple history-independent tax schedules to the social
optimum. We discuss the properties of these schedules and conclude in Section
3.8. The appendix contains a robustness analysis for alternative assumptions on
the complementarity of schooling and ability in the production function, on the
persistence of ability, on the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and on the bequest
target in the calibration.
3.2 The model
We build on the dynasty model of Koeniger and Prat (2018) to understand key
mechanisms through which nurture, in terms of schooling and bequests, and nature,
in terms of ability, affect inequality and mobility across generations. We analyze
decisions of family dynasties who are composed of parents and children in each
generation, have an infinite planning horizon and a size normalized to one. Each
generation of a dynasty chooses, conditional on the parents’ ability draw, the labor
supply of the parents, consumption, and the bequests and schooling for the children.
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Our dynasty model is deliberately simpler than the model by Lee and Seshadri
(2019) who analyze the sequence of decisions over the life cycle for each generation
in more detail. The simplicity of our model keeps the problem tractable when we
solve for the social optimum. This allows us make two of our contributions in this
paper: to analyze how the transmission of intergenerational inequality changes on
the transition from the calibrated steady state to the social optimum; and to char-
acterize simple tax schedules which implement the social optimum approximately.
Preferences are time separable across generations and we make the common
assumption that the per-period utility functionU (ct, lt) is separable in consumption
ct and labor effort lt:
U (ct, lt) = u (ct)− v (lt) ,
where u (ct) ∈ C
2 (R+) is increasing in ct and strictly concave, and v (lt) ∈
C2 (R+) is increasing in lt and strictly convex.
Each generation of a family differs in its ability θt. Ability is not observable so
that tax schedules cannot be conditioned on it. Bequests bt and human capital ht,
think of years of schooling and high-school or college degrees, are public knowledge
instead. Output yt is produced with the technology Y (ht, lt, θt) which is increasing
in its arguments and concave. Although output yt is observable, actual labor supply
lt cannot be inferred from it because ability θt is stochastic and hidden.
The expenditure of schooling g(ht+1, ht) depends on the amount of human cap-
ital investment ht+1 into the children and on the family background, which we
summarize by the stock of human capital of parents ht. This cost function follows
from inverting a human-capital production function in the spirit of Ben-Porath
(1967), where human capital of the next generation depends on the expenditure on
schooling and parental background.8
At the beginning of each period, the dynasty learns the ability of the parents
and then makes its choices about labor supply, consumption, bequests and human
8We abstract from modeling a parental time input because such an input is plausibly unobserv-
able which would render the analysis much less tractable. We also abstract from a direct influence
of the childrens’ ability on the cost of human capital investment for parsimony. This would add
another channel through which output would depend on ability but would not add further in-
sights as long as the observation of human capital investments does not provide information about
ability.
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capital investment. Ability is drawn from the bounded interval Θ ≡ [θ, θ] ⊂ R+,
where we assume a continuously differentiable distribution F : Θ → [0, 1] with
conditional density f (θt| θt−1). For the analysis of the planner’s problem we make
the further assumptions that f (θt| θt−1) has full support, that it is of class C
2
with respect to its second argument θt−1, and that it has a bounded derivative
|∂f (θt| θt−1) /∂θt−1| ≤ B for some B ∈ R+. The dependence of the distribution
F (θt| θt−1) on the type of the previous generation allows us to model intergener-
ational transmission of ability, which may occur because of genetic inheritance or
nurture in early childhood. When we quantify the effect of nature in this paper,
the effect should thus be considered an upper bound, given that ability may also
contain some nurture component. In the calibration discussed in Section 3.3, we
discipline the transmission of ability by choosing the correlation between θt and θt−1
such that the intergenerational correlation of earnings based on model simulations
matches the empirical counterpart in U.S. data.
The stationary recursive problem of the family dynasty is
Ŵ (b, h, θ) = max
{b′,h′,l,c}
{
U (c, l) + β
∫
Θ
Ŵ (b′, h′, θ′) dF (θ′|θ)
}
(3.1)
s.t. b′ = (1 + r)b− T b(b)− c− g(h′, h)− T h(h′, h) + y − T y(y),
b′ ≥ max{−φg(h′, h), b′},
y = Y (h, θ, l),
ln(θ′) = ρ ln(θ) + ǫ,
where β is the discount factor of the family measuring the strength of the altruism
towards future generations, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 captures the persistence of shocks to ability,
and “′” denotes values of variables one period in the future. Families can pass
on the fraction φ ∈ (0; 1) of the schooling expenditures to the next generation
but the borrowing constraint limits the overall student debt to b′. The functions
T i (·), for i = b, h, y, denote the non-linear schedules for taxes and subsidies on
bequests, education and labor income, respectively. Since g(h′, h) and T h(h′, h)
enter additively in the budget constraint, we set T h(h′, h) = 0 and interpret g(h′, h)
as the net cost of human capital accumulation.
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3.3 Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model of family dynasties to the U.S. economy. We
will use the calibrated economy to characterize inequality, mobility and the effect
of parental background in Section 3.4. In Section 3.6 we then use the steady state
of the calibrate economy as a starting point to analyze the effect of a tax reform on
inequality and mobility, on the transition to the socially-optimal steady state.
Preferences.—A key parameter in our calibration is the wedge between the rate
at which the planner and the dynasty discount the welfare of future generations.
Although this may seem a minor detail, it has major implications for the stationary
distribution in the social optimum. As we are going to see in Section 3.5, a stationary
distribution in the planner problem requires that the discount rate of the planner
equals the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation, i.e., the real interest rate.
It is well known that in the calibrated economy, in which dynasties face incomplete
markets, stationarity requires that the discount rate of the families is higher than
the real interest rate so that the discount factor β < 1/(1 + r). Thus, we discipline
the wedge in the discount rate between the families and the planner by calibrating β
so that, for a given real interest rate of 3%, the stationary distribution for bequests
in the model implies a median for bequests that matches the median observed in
the data, conditional on receiving a positive bequest.9
Evidence in table 2 of Wolff and Gittleman (2014), based on the Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) in the time period 1989− 2007, shows that the median
wealth transfer among households in the U.S. has been $73, 600, conditional on
receiving a transfer.10 We adjust this figure for household size dividing it by 1.4.11
The rest of our calibration strategy follows Koeniger and Prat (2018) by and
9In the robustness analysis discussed in Section 3.6 we report results if we match the conditional
mean of bequests instead.
10The value is expressed in terms of dollars in 2007. Table 1 in Wolff and Gittleman (2014) shows
that 84% of the wealth transfers are classified as inheritances. Most other transfers are classified
as gifts and most transfers are from family members. Given that the timing of intergenerational
transfers before or after death is difficult to map into our model, we consider all wealth transfers.
11This number is reported in table 8 of Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) who compute household
size for the waves of the SCF in the same time period, based on an equivalence scale that assigns
a weight of 1 to the first person in the household, 0.34 to the second person and approximately 0.3
to each additional member of the household. See also Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2007),
table 1, last column.
3.3. CALIBRATION 115
large and we repeat it here for completeness. We specify the utility function as
U(c, l) = ln(c)− lα/α, which satisfies the assumptions for the utility function made
in Section 3.2. The estimate for the Frisch elasticity of 0.5 documented in Chetty
(2012) implies that α = ε−1 + 1 = 3.
Technology.—The length of a period in the model is 30 years to approximate
the time until labor-market entry of a new-born generation and the length of the
labor-market career. We set the annualized real interest rate to 3% and assume the
production technology
Y (h, l, θ) = A (θ, h) l
with labor productivity









and χ ∈ [0,∞), ξ ∈ (0, 1).
The linearity of the production technology in labor effort and the assumption of
a given interest rate, which is not influenced by accumulation behavior within the
U.S., imply that we can solve the problem of the dynasties separately from each
other. As a benchmark, we assume that the elasticity of substitution χ = 1 so
that labor productivity is a Cobb-Douglas function of ability and human capital:
A(θ, h) = θξh1−ξ. We will check the robustness of our results for a different degree
of complementarity between ability and schooling.
Cobb-Douglas productivity has the advantage that, for competitive labor mar-
kets, wages w(θ, h) are log-linear in human capital and unobserved ability:
lnw(θ, h) = lnA(θ, h) = (1− ξ) lnh+ ξ ln θ, (3.2)
so that it is straightforward to use the variance of residual wages as target to
calibrate the variance of unobserved ability θ.12 We assume that θ is drawn from
a log-normal distribution. The mean and standard deviation specified in Table
12Given (3.2), the variance of residual wages is the variance of wages which remains after re-
gressing log-wages on years of schooling where, in our model, chosen years of schooling S beyond
the compulsory school years correspond to lnh.
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3.3.1 imply a variance of residual wages of 0.2. This corresponds to estimates by
Heathcote et al. (2010) for the U.S. in 2005, for the part of the variance of residual
log-wages that is generated by persistent shocks.13 We use the variance resulting
from persistent shocks as target because a generation’s labor-market career takes
place within a period in our model so that transitory shocks (at least partially)
cancel out and θ, within a period, is fully persistent.
We refer to the large empirical evidence on Mincerian wage regressions to cali-
brate the parameter ξ of the production function. In his survey, Card (1999) shows
that the marginal return to schooling is quite robustly estimated across studies and
close to 10%. Equation (3.2) thus implies 1− ξ = 0.1, given that years of schooling
S correspond to lnh in our model, where compulsory schooling is defined as h = 1
in which case the chosen years of schooling S = ln 1 = 0.
Borrowing opportunities.—We set the parameters of the borrowing constraint in
problem (3.1) to φ = 0.5 and b′ = −$30, 000. This implies that families can finance
up to 50% of their human capital investment into their children, with a maximal
amount of debt of $30, 000. At the time the next generation makes its choices the
accrued interest then implies a maximal total debt of $72, 818 so that the amount
for outstanding student loans broadly matches the amounts reported in Lee et al.
(2014).
Approximation of tax schedules.—We use the parametrization proposed by Heath-
cote et al. (2017) to approximate labor income taxes in the U.S.: T y(y) = y−δy1−ty ,
with ty = 0.181 and δ = 0.9276.
14 We approximate taxes on bequests using the
parametrization for estate taxes proposed by De Nardi and Yang (2016) because
our model does not distinguish estates from bequests. Thus, families pay 20% tax if
the bequest exceeds the exemption of $756, 000. The function g(h′, h) captures net
education costs after subsidies and we now discuss the calibration of its parameters.
Stochastic process for ability and education costs.—The parameters for the per-
13See panel C of Figure 3 in Heathcote et al. (2008).
14T y (y) is negative if y < δ
1
ty ≈ 2/3. A unit in our model corresponds to mean earnings of
high-school dropouts, as explained further below. Thus, in our calibrated model, workers receive




Discount factor (annualized): β = 0.966 Median bequest (conditional on receiving one, equivalized): $52,571 Wolff and Gittleman (2014)
Disutility of labour v (l) = lα/α: α = 3 Frisch elasticity: 1/2 Chetty (2012)
Storage technology
r = 0.03 Annualized real interest rate Standard
Production technology: y/l = θξh1−ξ
ξ = 0.9 Returns to education: 10% Card (1999)
Borrowing opportunities
φ = 0.5, b′ = −$30, 000 Student loans in FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel Lee et al. (2014)
Taxes
T y(y) = y − δy1−ty , ty = 0.181, δ = 0.9276 Parametric approximation of the U.S. labor income tax schedule Heathcote et al. (2017)
T b(b) = max{tb(b− xb), 0}, Parametric approximation of the U.S. estate tax schedule De Nardi and Yang (2016)
tb = 0.2,
xb = $756,000 × model-unit factor
















Variance of residual wages: 0.2 Heathcote et al. (2008)
Education cost: g(h′, h) = κ(h′)ς1hς2
κ = 0.0014 Average years of schooling: 12.86 Barro and Lee (2013)
ς1 = 0.7465 Average net cost for an additional year of education: $13,845 OECD (2011), Stantcheva (2017)
ς2 = −0.0005 Intergenerational correlation of years of schooling: 0.46 Hertz et al. (2008)
Table 3.3.1: Calibrated parameter values
sistence of ability shocks and the education cost function are calibrated jointly
together with the discount factor to match the following target statistics: median
bequests, the average years of schooling, the average net cost of an additional year
of secondary/tertiary education, the correlation between years of schooling across
generations and the intergenerational earnings elasticity.
We have chosen the target moments so that they are tightly related to the pa-
rameters we calibrate. Although jointly calibrated, each target is closely related to
the calibration of one of the parameters. As mentioned above, calibration of the dis-
count factor β helps to match the median bequest. The persistence in the stochastic
process of ability allows us to match the intergenerational earnings elasticity ι (IGE),
resulting from a linear regression of ln y′ on ln y. This is intuitive because ability θ
affects labor earnings through changes in labor productivity A(θ, h). Given that the
exponent of ability ξ in the Cobb-Douglas function for labor productivity is nine
times higher than the exponent of human capital, the IGE is mostly determined
by the persistence of ability that is fed into the model. The endogenous choices of
human capital and labor supply quantitatively matter much less for labor earnings
and thus for the IGE.
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The parameters κ and ς1 of the cost function g(h
′, h) in Table 3.3.1 allow us to
match average years of schooling and average net cost for schooling. The annual
expenditure per student and year in the U.S. is $12, 690 for upper-secondary educa-
tion and $29, 910 for tertiary education, as documented in tables B.1.2 and B.1.6 of
OECD (2011). The average cost for an additional year of schooling is thus $21, 300.
We assume, as in Stantcheva (2017), that 35% of expenses for human capital invest-
ment related to higher education are subsidized so that we get a target of $13, 845
for the cost net of the subsidy for a student at the time of high-school graduation.
We have to convert the monetary costs observed in the data into units of the
model. We make the empirically plausible assumption that the average family
without any non-compulsory education does not receive, or leave, any bequests and
does not spend significant amounts on education. Such a family generation then
approximately consumes all resources in a hand-to-mouth fashion so that income
per model period corresponds to 0.9356 in model units.15 Expressed in dollars, this
amount equals the mean annual earnings of high-school dropouts of $20, 241 in 2010
which have a present value for a 30-year period of $436, 762.16
The calibrated value of ς1 implies sufficient convexity of the cost function so
that the calibrated economy or the planner problem analyzed in Sections 3.5 and
3.6 are concave.17 The calibrated parameter ς2 of the cost function is close to zero.
This implies that the model matches the intergenerational correlation in the years
of schooling although parental background reduces the net cost of education only
very mildly: if parents have four years of non-compulsory schooling, this reduces
the cost of educating their children only by 2 per mille.
Simulation.—We solve the problem by applying the endogenous gridpoint method
15A hand-to-mouth consumer without bequests consumes net income, c = y − T y(y) = δy1−ty
where the last step follows using the tax schedule T y(y) = y−δy1−ty . The optimal labor supply for
a hand-to-mouth consumer without bequests is l∗ (θ, h) ≡ argmax
{
ln(δ [A (θ, h) l]
1−ty )− v (l)
}
.
For v (l) = lα/α, we obtain l∗ (θ, h) = (1− ty)
1/α
. A (1, 1) = 1 then implies that the period income
of the average worker without any non-compulsory education is y∗ (1, 1) = (1− ty)
1/α
= 0.9356,
once we insert the parameter values documented in Table 3.3.1.
16See Table 232 in the Statistical Abstract of the United States 2012 available at
https://www.census.gov .
17In particular, ς1 > 1 − ξ where 1 − ξ is the exponent of human capital in the production
function. Concavity makes our problem tractable because otherwise we could no longer rely on
the first-order approach to characterize the social optimum.
3.4. CALIBRATED ECONOMY 119
Data Model
Variable (1) (2)
Median bequests, conditional on b > 0 $52,571 $52,717
Average years of schooling S 12.86 12.75
Correlation(S ′, S) 0.46 0.48
Intergenerational earnings elasticity 0.45 0.45
Average net cost of an additional year of schooling $13, 845 $13, 674
Table 3.3.2: Target statistics in the data and model predictions
proposed in Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010). The algorithm is described further in
the online Appendix C of Koeniger and Prat (2018). For the simulations, we draw
500, 000 observations, simulate the respective paths based on the model solution for
100 generations to obtain a stationary distribution. Further implementation details
on the numerical solution and calibration are provided in Appendix 3.9.2.
Table 3.3.2 shows that the calibrated model matches the data targets quite
closely. In Appendix 3.9.5 we provide a set of robustness checks. In these alterna-
tive calibrations we target the conditional mean instead of the conditional median
of bequests, we target a lower intergenerational earnings elasticity, we calibrate a
higher Frisch elasticity, and we allow for a higher complementarity between human
capital and ability in the function for productivity.
3.4 Opportunity and inequality in the calibrated econ-
omy
We investigate the transmission of inequality across generations in the calibrated
economy. In doing so, we highlight the mechanisms through which parental back-
ground affects this transmission, both in terms of nurture through bequests and
human capital, and in terms of nature through innate ability.








Years of schooling 0.46
Labor effort 0.34
Within generation
Ability and Welfare 0.90







Table 3.4.1: Mobility and the effect of nurture and nature on earnings
Notes: As discussed in Section 3.3, the empirical literature
on the returns to education implies that the elasticities of
wages (or productivity) with respect to ability and human
capital in our model are 0.9 and 0.1, respectively. This gives
empirical content to the changes in schooling and ability for
the interpretation of the labor earnings elasticities.
The top panel of Table 3.4.1 shows rank-rank correlations across generations for
all variables of interest in the steady state of the calibrated economy. For earnings,
we can compare this with empirical results for the U.S. in Chetty et al. (2014)
who report a rank-rank correlation of 0.34 in their table 1.18 In our model it takes
on average slightly more than five generations until the offspring of a family in
the bottom decile of the income distribution reaches the mean income. This is in
line with results in OECD (2018) for the U.S. that it takes on average four to five
18The estimated transition matrix reported in Table 2 of Chetty et al. (2014) is remarkably
similar to Table 3.9.1 in Appendix 3.9.4, generated by our calibrated model. The matrix in
Chetty et al. (2014) predicts somewhat less persistence at the bottom and top of the income
distribution. As shown in Table 3.9.6 of Appendix 3.9.5, we match this matrix more closely in
the robustness check for a calibration with less persistence that targets the lower end of estimates
for the intergenerational earnings elasticity reported in Table 1 of Chetty et al. (2014). The
model-implied rank-rank correlation of earnings is 0.29 in this case.
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generations for the offspring of a low-income family to reach the average income.
The rank-rank correlations in the top panel of Table 3.4.1 reveal that all vari-
ables, but for labor effort, are at least as persistent across generations as ability,
where the persistence of ability is given by the calibrated stochastic process. The
difference between the rank-rank correlation of labor earnings and the respective
correlations for consumption or welfare in Table 3.4.1 shows that labor earnings
are more mobile (and hence less persistent) across generations than consumption
or welfare. This is because dynasties partially self insure ability shocks and thus
smooth consumption across generations, implying a less than perfect rank-rank
correlation of 0.90 between ability and welfare within generations. The insurance
against ability shocks is achieved by nurture which implies persistence in bequests
and schooling. The relatively lower persistence of labor effort than ability is the
result of different effects: more bequests result in a negative wealth effect on labor
effort but more schooling or ability make labor effort more productive so that the
substitution effect would increase labor effort, ceteris paribus. These effects also
explain the different sign of the average steady-state elasticities of labor earnings
with respect to changes in bequests, schooling and ability, respectively, reported in
the bottom panel of Table 3.4.1.
Quintiles
Ability / Welfare 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.86 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01
(-6.03,4.4) (37.64,4.8) (93.7,4.8) (161.32,4.8) (283.21,4.8)
2 0.14 0.66 0.11 0.06 0.03
(-8.1,4.4) (-5.0,4.6) (45.71,4.9) (116.35,4.9) (245.21,4.9)
3 0.0 0.26 0.53 0.14 0.07
(.) (-8.4,4.5) (0.01,4.7) (72.03,5.0) (205.73,5.0)
4 0.0 0.0 0.33 0.5 0.17
(.) (.) (-7.88,4.6) (13.55,4.8) (157.32,5.0)
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.28 0.72
(.) (.) (.) (-4.6,4.7) (76.71,5.0)
Table 3.4.2: Social mobility matrix in the calibrated economy
Notes: Each cell contains the probability of a family in an ability quintile to be in a
specific quintile of the families’ welfare distribution. In brackets for each cell, we report
the average values of the state variables other than ability. Bequests are in units of $1,000
and school years are non-compulsory. The probabilities across columns in each row may
not add up to 1 because of rounding.
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To investigate the extent of social mobility in the calibrated economy further, we
show in Table 3.4.2 how shocks to ability translate into differences in welfare. The
matrix in Table 3.4.2 displays the probability that a family in a quintile of the ability
distribution is in a specific quintile of the welfare distribution. The welfare measure
is dynastic and includes the discounted welfare of future generations. We define
perfect social mobility within a generation as the case in which nature, in terms of
ability θ, fully determines the position in the welfare distribution. In other words,
nurture, in terms of received bequests b and obtained human-capital investment h,
is then irrelevant for the position in the welfare distribution. In this case, the matrix
would be an identity matrix. The more weight is on the off-diagonal elements, the
more nurture dampens the effect of nature on the position in the welfare distribution
and thus insures generations from an intergenerational perspective.19
For example, the cell in the first row and fifth column of the matrix shows that
a family in the first quintile of the ability distribution has a one percent probability
of being in the top quintile of the welfare distribution. These families have received
$283, 210 as bequests and have obtained 4.8 years of non-compulsory schooling
on average. This shows that nurture can compensate for bad draws of nature.
Bequests are more effective in compensating for low ability than human capital
investments because ability and schooling are complements in making labor effort
more productive. Thus, the differences in average bequests across columns are
relatively larger than the differences in average additional school years, in particular
for low-ability quintiles.
The matrix shows that there is much less than full insurance against ability risk
in the calibrated economy. For example, the cell in the first row and first column
of the matrix shows that 86% of families currently in the lowest ability quintile are
also in the lowest quintile of the welfare distribution. As shown in Table 3.4.1, the
rank-rank correlation between ability and welfare within a generation is 0.90. More
insurance across generations and less social mobility within a generation are two
sides of the same coin.
We investigate further the mechanisms through which nurture affects the trans-
19We find that labor supply is approximately uncorrelated with ability in our calibrated model
so that changes in welfare result mostly from changes in consumption.
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mission of inequality. As mentioned above, bequests reduce labor effort through
a wealth effect. This introduces an endogenous mean reversion in labor earnings
because parents with higher labor earnings leave more bequests, thus inducing less
labor effort and earnings of their children. We compute the average steady-state
elasticity of labor earnings with respect to bequests to gauge how much the endoge-
nous mean reversion reduces the persistence in labor earnings across generations.
The bottom panel of Table 3.4.1 shows that the average elasticity of earnings with
respect to bequests is indeed negative at −0.033. Interestingly the order of mag-
nitude of this elasticity is in line with the evidence on lottery winners by Imbens
et al. (2001) for the U.S. and by Cesarini et al. (2017) for Sweden. They estimate
remarkably similar marginal propensities to earn out of changes in unearned income.
Cesarini et al. (2017) report that (pre-tax) earnings decrease by 1.1 percent of the
change in wealth, and this effect is very persistent. The average earnings response
in our calibrated model is very similar at 1.5 percent.
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Figure 3.4.1: Human capital investment and bequests as a function of received bequests.
Notes: We condition on parents with 12 years of schooling and me-
dian ability. Bequests are in units of $1, 000.
Another channel through which bequests affect mobility, is that bequests relax
financial constraints for human capital investment. The relatively modest value of
median bequests, resulting from a highly concentrated empirical distribution, im-
plies that in the calibrated economy the spending of nearly half of the families is
financially constrained.20 To illustrate the consequences for human capital invest-
20The incidence of the financial constraint does not imply that the intergenerational earnings
elasticity deviates much from the intergenerational correlation of ability. This is similar to Lee
and Seshadri (2019) but for a different reason. As explained in Section 3.3, the empirical estimates
on the returns to schooling imply that the effect of ability on labor productivity is much stronger
than the effect of schooling on productivity in the calibrated model. In Appendix 3.9.5 we check
robustness of our results if we target the mean of bequests, conditionally on receiving one. In this
calibration 6.5% of families are financially constrained. As discussed at the end of Section 3.6, this
increases the amount of insurance in the calibrated steady state relative to the benchmark cali-
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ment, Figure 3.4.1 plots human capital investment and bequests for children as a
function of bequests that parents received, for a representative family with median
ability and high-school education. The figure shows that human capital investment
is a very non-monotonic function of bequests because there are various effects at
work. At a low level of bequests, human capital investment increases in bequests
because the borrowing constraint is binding, illustrated by the flat portion of the
policy function for the bequests left to children. More financial resources thus allow
more human capital investment. Once the financial constraint is slack, the negative
wealth effect on labor effort of the next generation implies that it is less attrac-
tive for parents to invest into their children’s human capital: more schooling for
the children only increases children’s welfare in our economy if they work so that
this investment generates income. Figure 3.4.1 further shows that once bequests
start to be taxed, it becomes more attractive again to invest additional resources
into schooling rather than to leave further bequests. This changes the slope of the
plotted functions because relatively more human capital accumulation then ensures
that the endogenous (risk-adjusted) return to human capital equals the after-tax
return on bequests.
Compared to bequests, human capital affects the transmission of earnings in-
equality very differently in our calibrated economy. It makes labor earnings more
persistent, less mobile and more unequal across generations. Given that parents
with higher labor earnings invest more into the human capital of their children,
high earnings are transmitted to their children as long as the substitution effect
dominates so that an increase in labor productivity increases labor effort. The bot-
tom panel of Table 3.4.1 shows that this is the case in the calibrated economy. The
average elasticity of earnings with respect to schooling investment is 0.50, and we
find that the elasticity has the highest value of 0.55 at the top of the earnings distri-
bution where families have an ability above average. The elasticity of labor earnings
with respect to nature (ability) is even higher at 0.93 because of the stronger effect
of ability on labor productivity implied by the empirical estimates on the returns
to schooling in the calibration.
bration. Qualitatively as in the benchmark case, social mobility decreases and insurance increases
further on the transition path to the social optimum.
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Given these transmission channels of nurture and nature, one may ask what
size of changes in nurture and nature generates the same welfare effect. This is of
interest from an intergenerational insurance perspective. To answer this question,
we report results of the following experiment in Table 3.4.3. Consider a family
characterized by the initial conditions (b, h, θ). Then compute the welfare increase if
that family receives additional $10, 000, for example as bequest. Table 3.4.3 displays
the increase in years of schooling or the increase in ability, in units of its standard
deviation, which would generate the same welfare increase. In the different rows of
the table, we show the average results of this experiment for families in different
quintiles of the earnings distribution. We have chosen the earnings distribution
because earnings are observable but the results are very similar for quintiles of the
welfare distribution, as shown in Table 3.9.2 in Appendix 3.9.4.21
Earnings Increase in Cost of Increase in
quintile years of schooling additional schooling ability (in units of standard deviation)
1 0.97 19,393 0.08
2 0.70 13,772 0.09
3 0.57 11,429 0.09
4 0.47 9,489 0.10
5 0.34 7,106 0.11
Table 3.4.3: Average increase in schooling and ability that is welfare equivalent to receiv-
ing an additional $10,000 as bequests, by earnings quintile
The results in Table 3.4.3 illustrate the effectiveness of nurture (b, h) relative
to nature θ in generating the same amount of welfare. In terms of efficiency, the
increase in schooling, reported in the first column of the table, implies direct costs for
the current generation that are reported in the second column.22 The direct costs of
the additional years of schooling, that are welfare-equivalent to obtaining additional
$10, 000 as bequest, are larger than $10, 000 for families in the lower three quintiles
of the earnings distribution. These families have relatively less ability, given the
21The correlation between earnings and welfare is very high at 0.81 so that the values in the
last column of Tables 3.4.3 and 3.9.2 do not differ up until the second decimal place.
22For simplicity, we do not consider in these calculations that more human capital reduces
the cost of investing into the human capital of the next generation. The reported costs can
thus be considered an upper bound. Note that the cost of an additional year of schooling are
approximately $20, 000 and thus higher than the cost of an additional school year at high-school
graduation targeted in the calibration. The reason is that many families invest into schooling
beyond high-school graduation and that the cost of schooling is convex.
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nearly perfect correlation between ability and earnings of 0.99. Thus, schooling is
less effective for these families in generating welfare than bequests. For families in
the top of the earnings distribution instead, schooling is more efficient than bequests
for generating additional welfare, given the complementarity of ability and human
capital in generating labor productivity. For these families, the welfare-equivalent
direct costs of the additional schooling are smaller than $10, 000. Finally, the last
column of Table 3.4.3 shows that the required changes of ability, which are equivalent
in welfare terms to additional bequests of $10, 000, are larger for higher quintiles of
the earnings distribution. This indicates the decreasing returns in ability and shows
the extent to which a given shock to ability has a stronger welfare impact at the
bottom of the earnings distribution.
After illustrating the mechanisms through which nurture and nature affect the
transmission of inequality in the calibrated model, we compute the quantitiative
effects of nature and nurture on labor earnings y and the intergenerational trans-
mission of earnings. We find that the effect of nurture on earnings through school-
ing and bequests is modest in the calibrated model. The variation in bequests
and schooling given to a generation explains 0.9− 1.2 percent of the cross-sectional
variance of that generation’s earnings, depending on whether the covariance is split
proportionately or equally across the determinants. The bequests and schooling
received by parents explain at most 4.8 percent of the part of the variation of chil-
dren’s earnings that can be attributed to parents’ nature and nurture. These results
are consistent with the important role of nature in the transmission of earnings em-
phasized in recent empirical research by Bingley et al. (2018) based on a credible
“Children of Twins” design using unique Danish data. They find that two thirds
of the intergenerational earnings elasticity can be attributed to nature. Our model
attributes an even larger role to ability but this has to be interpreted as an upper
bound when assessing the effect of nature, given that ability at labor market entry
in our model may also contain some nurture component.
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3.5 Social optimum
To put inequality and mobility in the calibrated economy into perspective, we will
compare them to their respective counterparts in the social optimum. We assume
that asymmetric information constrains the insurance or redistribution provided by
a utilitarian planner who discounts the future and weighs family dynasties equally.
This implies non-degenerate inequality and mobility in the social optimum so that
comparison between the calibrated economy and the social optimum is non-trivial.23
We focus on the planner problem with full commitment which provides an upper
bound for the amount of insurance the planner can provide given the constraints.
In such an environment, Farhi and Werning (2007) have analyzed allocations cho-
sen by a utilitarian planner who discounts the future less than family dynasties
and weighs dynasties equally. Denoting the planner’s discount factor with ψ, they
considered the case in which ψ > β. They showed that this assumption breaks
the immiseration result of Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and implies a non-degenerate
stationary distribution of consumption and welfare in the planner problem.
We refer to Appendix 3.9.1 for details about the planner problem and its solution.
We emphasize two key equations, derived in the appendix, which show how the
parameters ψ and β shape the solution of the planner problem. Let E denote the
expectation operator, u′(·) the marginal utility of consumption, and let ct(θ
t) denote
consumption at time t as function of the sequence of abilities θt until time t, which is















Stationarity of consumption thus requires ψ = 1/(1 + r), i.e., the planner’s
discount rate has to equal the real interest rate. Furthermore, we obtain an equation



















23In the first best with full insurance all inequality in consumption among ex-ante identical
households would be eliminated.
3.6. TRANSITION TO THE SOCIAL OPTIMUM 129
where η is the multiplier attached to the constraint that captures the differences
in the promises made by the planner compared to the promises which the planner
would make if the same discounting as the family were applied to the welfare of
future generations. See the recursive problem and its constraints in Appendix 3.9.1.
Since β/ψ < 1 and the multiplier η > 0, equation (3.4) shows that 1/u′(c(θt))
is mean-reverting. Because the planner cares more about providing equal oppor-
tunities for new generations in the future, shocks to ability are not fully passed
on to future generations. The mean reversion implies a form of insurance against
ability risk in the social optimum which contrasts the increase of inequality required
for incentive provision. For β = ψ instead, 1/u′(c(θt)) would follow a martingale,
implying immiseration as in Atkeson and Lucas (1992).
As Farhi and Werning (2007), pp. 375-376, we focus on the case ψ = 1/(1 + r)
in which the social optimum implies a stationary distribution for consumption. Our
calibration of β(1 + r) < 1 then disciplines the extent to which the planner cares
more about providing opportunities for future generations than a dynasty itself. A
stationary distribution in the social optimum also makes it sensible, in our view,
to analyze a tax reform which implements a transition towards the socially-optimal
steady state, starting from the status quo characterized by the economy that we
calibrated to the U.S.
3.6 Transition to the social optimum
We analyze the transition to the social optimum, starting from the steady state of
the calibrated economy. We implement this hypothetical reform by ensuring that
the allocation for each dynasty has the same present discounted value of the ex-
pected net costs in the planner problem as in the calibrated economy. Although
there is no redistribution across dynasties at the time of reform, the planner may
redistribute towards future generations within a dynasty, given that the planner
cares relatively more about welfare of future generations (ψ > β). The design of
the reform ensures that the effects on insurance and mobility are not confounded by
wealth effects. Appendices 3.9.2, 3.9.3 together with equation (3.25) and the sub-
sequent discussion in Appendix 3.9.1, provide further details on how we implement
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the numerical solution and the reform.
We focus on results on the transition path rather than in the steady state of the
social optimum because our interest is on the changes of mobility and inequality in
the first decades after the reform. We also report key results for the new steady
state after the reform as further benchmark. The steady state is approximated by
the period 100 generations after the reform. This is conservative because we have
found that in our experiments convergence happens much faster.
The evolution of key variables of interest after the reform is intuitive. Average
consumption increases by 1.2% after the reform illustrating the efficiency gains of
the social optimum compared to the calibrated economy. Expenditures for human
capital and average labor earnings increase although average labor effort decreases.
The distributions in Figure 3.9.1, Appendix 3.9.4, show that the averages hide
substantial heterogeneity. The figure plots distributions up to two generations after
the reform and reveals that labor supply and human capital become much more
dispersed after the reform as the planner decouples production of families from
their consumption. Figures 3.9.2 and 3.9.3 show the evolution of the distributions
for families, conditioning on the top and bottom quartile of the ability distribution
in each generation. The different changes of the distribution of labor supply across
ability types in generation 0, when the reform is implemented and assets and human
capital are still given by pre-reform decisions, shows that social optimality requires
an increase of labor supply of high ability types and more investment into the human
capital of their children (visible in the distribution of non-compulsory school years
plotted for generation 1). Labor supply of low ability types is reduced instead so
that low-ability families obtain more of their welfare through enjoying more leisure.
Moreover, some dynasties with currently high ability previously had low ability
and vice versa, which affects the resources implied by promised utility (which we
continue to call bequests after the reform in the figures). Thus, labor supply and
human capital expenditures become more dispersed within the top quartile of the
ability distribution, and the dispersion of labor supply increases also within the
bottom quartile. We now provide further evidence on the larger dispersion within
ability types on the transition path to the social optimum by analyzing the effects
of the reform on mobility.
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Beyond the effects on inequality, we find that income mobility (or persistence
of labor earnings) remains quite stable on the transition to the social optimum.
Two generations after the reform (corresponding to 30 − 60 years), for example,
the rank-rank correlation of earnings is 0.39 compared to 0.43 in the calibrated
economy and the rank-rank correlation of consumption is 0.77 compared to 0.64.
The similar persistence of earnings across generations, accompanied by the increase
of the persistence of consumption, suggests that more intergenerational insurance
against ability shocks is provided after the reform, reducing social mobility within
generations.
Quintiles
Ability / Welfare 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.38 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.07
(-264.19,5.0) (-256.43,5.2) (-222.59,5.4) (-122.23,5.5) (111.82,5.5)
2 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.13
(-272.46,5.1) (-265.87,5.3) (-240.52,5.5) (-158.71,5.6) (64.26,5.7)
3 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.18
(-276.69,5.1) (-270.64,5.3) (-247.81,5.5) (-174.55,5.6) (43.01,5.7)
4 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.24
(-278.87,5.1) (-274.97,5.3) (-254.32,5.5) (-187.46,5.6) (31.15,5.8)
5 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.37
(-285.55,5.1) (-281.24,5.3) (-262.42,5.5) (-201.38,5.7) (28.66,5.9)
Table 3.6.1: Social mobility matrix on the transition to the social optimum (in t=1, i.e., the second
generation after the reform)
Notes: See Table 3.4.2.
This suggestive evidence is confirmed comparing the social mobility matrix two
generations after the reform, presented in Table 3.6.1, with the mobility matrix of
the calibrated economy in Table 3.4.2. The mobility matrix after the reform has less
weight on the diagonal, implying more insurance and less mobility. The correlation
between the rank in the ability distribution and the rank in the welfare distribution
is indeed much smaller at 0.38, compared with 0.90 in the calibrated economy.24
More intergenerational insurance on the transition towards the social optimum is
achieved with a larger dispersion of wealth and human capital across families with
different abilities,25 and the correlation between wealth (or promises) and human
24Given that we simulate the economy for a sample of 500, 000 families, this difference is statis-
tically significant.
25In the social optimum, families do not face borrowing constraints as in calibrated economy so
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capital falls after the reform: in the second generation after the reform (t = 1),
cor(b, log(h)) = 0.12 compared with 0.44 in the calibrated economy.
To further compare the role of parental background in the calibrated economy
and on the transition path to the social optimum, we regress the rank in the welfare
distribution on the ranks in the distributions for bequests, human capital, and abil-
ity. Table 3.6.2 displays the results for the calibrated economy in column (1) and
for the economy two generations after the reform in column (2). The linear speci-
fication explains most of the variation in welfare ranks, e.g., 92% in the calibrated
economy according to the R2 statistic. The regression coefficients in Table 3.6.2
show how moving up one decile in the distribution of bequests, human capital, or
ability, respectively, changes the rank in the welfare distribution. For example, the
coefficient of 0.77 for θ in column (1) implies that if ability were one decile higher in
the ability distribution, then the family would move up 0.77 deciles in the welfare
distribution.
Rank in Welfare rank
distribution (1) (2) (3)
of... Calibrated economy 2nd generation after reform steady state after reform
b 0.29 0.55 0.99
S 0.14 0.68 0.36
θ 0.77 0.02 0.01
N 500,000 500,000 500,000
R2 0.92 0.89 0.97
Table 3.6.2: Welfare rank regressions
Notes:The estimation results are obtained with an OLS-regression of welfare ranks on an
intercept and the ranks in the distributions of bequests (b), schooling (S), and ability (θ).
Column (1) uses simulated data of the calibrated economy. Columns (2) and (3) use
simulated data of the socially optimal economy in the second generation after the reform
and in the steady state, respectively.
Table 3.6.2 indicates that, in the calibrated economy, nature θ plays a more
important role for a family’s place in the welfare distribution than nurture b or S.
The results in column (1) show that the rank in the ability distribution is approxi-
mately 2.5 to 5.5 times as important as bequests or schooling, respectively. In the
that wealth (or promises) can take more negative values.
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second generation after the reform (t = 1), more intergenerational insurance against
ability shocks increases the importance of nurture relative to nature dramatically:
as shown in column (2), nurture is two orders of magnitude more important than
nature for the position in the welfare distribution. The results in column (3) show
that the same is true in the new steady state after the reform where, among the two
variables capturing the effect of nurture, bequests (or promises in the terminology
of the planner problem) become more important than schooling for the position in
the welfare distribution.
Table 3.6.3 summarizes the analysis by showing how insurance and mobility
evolve after the reform, starting from the steady state of the calibrated economy.
The pass-through of an unexpected change in productivity to consumption falls
after the reform, illustrating the increase of consumption insurance. Column 1 in
Table 3.6.3 shows that the pass-through coefficient, obtained from a linear regression
of log consumption on log productivity (which equals the log wage under perfect
competition), decreases from 0.35 in the calibrated economy to 0.28 in the second
generation after the reform and 0.31 in the steady state. That is, in the steady state
after the reform 69 percent of ability shocks are insured compared to 65 percent
in the calibrated economy.26 Similarly, the rank-rank correlation between ability
and welfare within generations decreases. Instead, mobility of income across and
within generations changes very little. In particular, the high rank-rank correlation
between ability and labor earnings within generations, that remains close to one
after the reform, shows that the additional insurance after the reform can be decou-
pled from efficiently higher production of more able families. At the same time, the
transition after the reform is associated with an increase in inequality of earnings,
labor effort, consumption and bequests, as measured by the respective standard
deviation reported in Table 3.9.3 in Appendix 3.9.4.
26Although the size of the pass-through coefficient in the calibrated intergenerational economy
is not comparable directly to estimates obtained in a life-cycle context, a common finding in the
literature is that US households are insured against a substantial part of persistent shocks. See,
e.g., Heathcote et al. (2014) for an analysis of partial insurance in a model with consumption and
endogenous labor supply.
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Rank-rank Rank-rank
correlation correlation
Pass-through of ability of ability and IGE
coefficient and welfare labor earnings
Calibrated economy 0.35 0.90 0.99 0.45
Social optimum
2nd generation after reform 0.28 0.38 0.99 0.42
Steady state after reform 0.31 0.24 0.96 0.44
Table 3.6.3: Insurance and Mobility
Notes: The pass-through coefficient captures the effect of unexpected changes in
productivity on consumption, obtained from a linear regression of log consumption
on log productivity. IGE denotes the intergenerational earnings elasticity.
Table 3.9.4 in Appendix 3.9.5 shows that the results on insurance and mobility
reported in Table 3.6.3 are quantitatively robust if we target a lower intergener-
ational earnings elasticity of 0.3 instead of 0.45, if we calibrate the model for a
higher Frisch elasticity of 0.86 instead of 0.5, and if we recalibrate the economy
with a higher complementarity between ability and schooling than in the bench-
mark. We do not report the results on income mobility because it does not change
much after the reform for all cases but for the case in which we target the mean
instead of the median of bequests in the calibration. In this case, the larger amount
of bequests in the calibrated economy implies that there is an extended time period
after the reform in which these bequests are run down at the same time as human
capital increases. This has a positive effect on labor supply and is associated with an
increase of the persistence of labor earnings from 0.45 to 0.62. As shown in column
2 of Table 3.9.4 in Appendix 3.9.5, a higher target level of bequests reduces social
mobility, in terms of the correlation between ability and welfare, and increases in-
surance in the calibrated economy compared to the benchmark case. Qualitatively
as in the benchmark case, social mobility decreases and insurance increases on the
transition path to the steady state in the social optimum.
Given that we have constructed the reform without redistribution of resources
across dynasties from an ex-ante perspective, our results on insurance and mobility
show to which extent, at the time of the reform, dynasties are willing to trade less
mobility within a generation for more intergenerational insurance. As is common
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in settings with risk sharing and insurance, generations with high ability may be
better off ex post with less insurance but are bound by the commitment in our
model environment. Without such commitment less insurance could be achieved
if generations with high ability would have to be made indifferent to an outside
option, which they would obtain if they reneged on the risk sharing arrangement.27
It is worth noting that compared to the transition to a social optimum with
immiseration, there is more social mobility and a smaller increase in inequality to
maintain incentives. As discussed, for example in Kocherlakota (2010), pp. 158-159,
the inequality-increasing incentive effect is kept in check by the motive to provide
opportunities for later generations if, as in our model, the planner discounts the
future less than families and not at the same rate as in models that imply a social
optimum with immiseration.
3.7 Simple tax and subsidy systems and the social op-
timum
Wedges, as defined in Appendix 3.9.6, capture the differences between the laissez
faire and the socially optimal allocation based on comparison of the respective first-
order conditions. Non-zero wedges imply that choices in the laissez faire need to
be modified by taxes or subsidies to implement the social optimum. We provide
simple history-independent approximations of these taxes and subsidies and discuss
to which extent they allow to achieve the welfare gains of the reform.
We compare economies with simple tax and subsidy systems to the social opti-
mum using two complementary approaches. We solve for the optimal linear taxes
and subsidies that do not vary across generations after the reform, based on the
problem (3.32) specified in Appendix 3.9.6 and modified to include linear, constant
rates for taxes and subsidies. As an alternative, we approximate linear schedules
27Lack of the commitment of the government to stick to the implemented tax schedules also
would impose a further constraint to achieve ex-ante credibility of the implemented tax schedule,
in the sense that deviations have to be made sufficiently unattractive ex post. Farhi et al. (2012)
show that such a constraint induces progressivity of the marginal tax on capital and can make
the level of the capital tax positive. As shown by Findeisen and Sachs (2018) this result may not
extend to human capital.
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that may vary across generations analogous to the approximation of Farhi and
Werning (2013) or Stantcheva (2017) in a life-cycle context. We thus set the tax or
subsidy rates for income, bequests and schooling in each generation to their cross-
sectional weighted averages in the second best, as further explained in Appendix
3.9.6.28
Bequest Schooling Labor Income
Optimal linear taxes / subsidies, -0.36 -0.30 0.18
constant across generations
Approximated linear taxes / subsidies,
varying across generations:
2nd generation after reform -0.21 -0.45 0.31
Steady state after reform -0.23 -0.50 0.41
Table 3.7.1: Simple linear taxes and subsidies
Notes: The taxes and subsidies varying across generations are cross-sectional
averages derived in Appendix 3.9.6. A positive value implies a tax, a negative
value implies a subsidy.
Table 3.7.1 displays the resulting linear taxes or subsidies. Bequests and school-
ing are subsidized while labor income is taxed. The qualitative features of this tax
and subsidy system are intuitive. The planner has a lower discount rate than the
dynasties and thus wants to provide further incentives so that dynasties shift re-
sources to the future. The Pigouvian subsidy of bequests thus aligns the dynasties’
incentives with the social optimum. Human capital accumulation is subsidized as
well. As shown in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and illustrated in Appendix 3.9.6,
this is done also to offset the distortion of the schooling decision resulting from the
taxation of labor income. The size of the subsidy further depends on the riskiness
of human capital and possible distortions of the accumulation motive or incentives
as emphasized by Stantcheva (2017) and Koeniger and Prat (2018).
28Solving for the optimal taxes and subsidies is numerically feasible if we restrict the tax sched-
ules to be linear and constant in the post-reform period. We then perform a global search for the
three optimal tax or subsidy rates and locally apply the Nelder-Meade optimization algorithm.
A higher dimensionality of the space of parameters characterizing the tax and subsidy system
quickly makes this procedure prohibitively costly in terms of computing time, e.g. if one attempts
to solve for an optimal non-linear tax and subsidy system or if one allows for different taxes and
subsidies across generations on the transition to the social optimum.
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Table 3.7.1 shows that bequests and schooling are subsidized more compared to
the calibrated economy, in which bequests are taxed only above the large exemption
of $756, 000 and schooling subsidies are included in the net cost for education. Thus,
the level of the subsidy rates reported in Table 3.7.1 corresponds to the quantitative
difference of the rates to the calibrated economy. The first row of Table 3.7.1 further
shows that the optimal subsidy rate for schooling is six percentage points smaller
than for bequests.
Concerning labor income taxation, the optimal linear tax rate reported in the
first row of Table 3.7.1 is eleven percentage points smaller than the average marginal
income tax in the calibrated economy. The bottom part of Table 3.7.1 shows that,
for the approximated tax and subsidy rates which vary across generations but are
not optimized, the absolute size of the taxes or subsidies increases slightly on the
transition to the new steady state to provide insurance through nurture in terms of
bequests and human capital at the same time as the inequality in labor earnings
increases. Comparing the results in the bottom part with those in the top part
of Table 3.7.1 reveals that the level of the approximated rates differs substantially
from the optimal but constant rates. We now show that the latter imply a better
approximation of the social optimum in our application.
We assess to which extent the linear tax and subsidies achieve the welfare gains
of the second-best allocation relative to the laissez-faire allocation.29 We compute
the welfare gains at the time of the reform. By the design of the reform, we keep the
present value of the expected net cost of the allocation per dynasty unchanged at the
time of reform to focus on insurance and mobility by abstracting from redistribution
across dynasties.
The first row of Table 3.7.2 shows the welfare gains for the social optimum, in
which the planner is more patient than the dynasties (ψ > β). We report the welfare
gains in percentage changes of consumption equivalents from the perspective of the
planner, applying the discount factor ψ.30 The welfare gains of 4.8% are larger than
29We compare the welfare gains relative to the laissez faire without distortionary taxes, starting
from the steady state of the calibrated economy. In the laissez-faire economy we add a lump-sum
tax so that each dynasty of type (b,h,θ) contributes the same present value of net taxes as in the
calibrated economy and thus, by design, also as in the second best. This prevents a wealth effect
from biasing the welfare comparison. Appendix 3.9.3 contains further details.
30If we evaluate the welfare gains from the perspective of the family, applying the discount factor
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the gains between 1% and 3% reported in the life-cycle models of Farhi and Werning
(2013) and Stantcheva (2017). By replicating their gains, we have verified that the
difference comes from the larger initial cross-sectional heterogeneity in our setting,
given that we start from the calibrated steady-state distribution, and from the
intergenerational rather than life-cycle model implying different parameter values
for the variance and the persistence of the shocks. The wedge between the discount
factor of the planner and the dynasties instead cannot explain the difference, as we
discuss further below. If compared to the calibrated economy, the welfare gains of
the reform are a bit higher at 5.7% because of the borrowing constraints that are
present in the calibrated but not in the laissez-faire economy.
Welfare gain in percent
of consumption equivalents
Second best 4.8
Optimal linear taxes / subsidies, 2.2
constant across generations
Approximated linear taxes / subsidies, 1.5
varying across generations
Table 3.7.2: Welfare gains
Notes: Welfare gains compared to the laissez faire, holding constant
the present value of expected net costs for each dynasty at the time
of the reform. The consumption equivalents are computed holding
labor supply constant and applying the discount factor ψ.
The second and third row of Table 3.7.2 show the welfare gains achieved in
the economies with the simple linear tax and subsidy systems. The economy with
the approximated, varying tax and subsidy rates, in the third row of Table 3.7.2,
achieves 31% of the welfare gains obtained by moving from the laissez faire to the
second best after the reform. The economy with optimized but constant linear taxes
and subsidies, in the second row of Table 3.7.2, achieves 46% of the welfare gains
instead. This is a sizable part but less than in the calibrated life-cycle models of
β in the objective function, the welfare gains are smaller by a factor 0.31 as gains accruing in the
future then receive less weight.
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Farhi and Werning (2013) and Stantcheva (2017) who find that simple linear taxes
deliver more than 90% of the welfare gains.31
In order to gauge the importance of ψ > β for these results, i.e., the difference
of the discount factor of the dynasties β and the discount factor of the planner ψ,
we also compute the welfare gains for the case ψ = β, keeping the interest rate
r unchanged.32 As mentioned before, ψ = β implies immiseration in the social
optimum. In this case, the welfare gains of the socially optimal allocation after
the reform compared to the laissez faire are 6.7%. Approximated linear taxes and
subsidies, which vary across generations, imply welfare gains of 1.2%, thus achieving
18% of the welfare gains from the laissez faire to the second best after the reform.
These results are similar in terms of orders of magnitude to those reported in Table
3.7.2 and illustrate that our conclusions for the benchmark case do not depend on
the wedge between the discount factor of the planner and the dynasties in a critical
way.
Although a substantial part of the welfare gains can be generated with the simple
taxes and subsidies, one may expect that the history dependence of optimal taxes
and subsidies is not fully captured by the endogenous state variables bequests b
and human capital h in our model because the unobserved shocks to ability θ are
persistent in our model and not i.i.d. as in Albanesi and Sleet (2006). Allowing for
further history dependence of the taxes and subsidies, while maintaining tractability,
seems viable within a life cycle of a generation, as shown in Kapička (2017), but
less so across generations where this would require information on past generations
for determining taxes and subsidies of the current generation.
31We have found that an approximated quadratic tax schedule, which captures the progressive
phasing out of bequest subsidies emphasized by Farhi and Werning (2010), does not achieve higher
welfare gains. This may be a consequence of approximation error and, unfortunately, computing
the optimal quadratic tax schedule is prohibitively costly. Appendix 3.9.6 provides further details
on the non-linear approximation.
32For a stationary distribution in the calibrated economy, we need to maintain the assumption
that β < 1/(1 + r).
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3.8 Conclusion
We have analyzed inequality and mobility in a dynasty model that we calibrated to
match empirical evidence for the U.S. We have compared mobility and the intergen-
erational transmission of inequality in the steady state of the calibrated economy
and on the transition to the social optimum, based on a social welfare function in
which dynasties are weighed equally and, as a result, future generations receive a
larger weight than in the welfare function of dynasties. The wedge between the
weight of future generations in the dynasties’ problem and the planner’s problem
has been disciplined by observable data on bequests in our calibration.
We have found that, compared with the calibrated U.S. economy, social optimal-
ity implies less opportunity within a generation, measured in terms of less mobility
of agents with different ability across the welfare distribution, and more intergener-
ational insurance against ability risk. This is achieved with a stronger influence of
nurture, in terms of schooling and bequests, on the family’s position in the welfare
distribution. We find that income mobility across and within generations remains
quite stable, indicating that consumption can be decoupled from labor earnings in
the social optimum.
We show that simple linear schedules for taxes and subsidies achieve about half
of the welfare gains of the socially optimal tax system compared to the laissez faire.
On average, bequests and schooling are subsidized in the social optimum to provide
insurance of future generations against ability risk. The optimal linear rates of
the simple tax and subsidy system are 18% for the labor income tax, 36% for the
bequest subsidy and 30% for the schooling subsidy.
Our analysis of the transition to the social optimum shows that less social mo-
bility and more inequality of labor earnings ex post do not imply necessarily lower
welfare ex ante because they may be the flip side of more intergenerational insur-
ance. This illustrates that interpretation of descriptive evidence on the evolution
of inequality and mobility require the usual assumptions about preferences and
technology, and about the social welfare function. For one plausible set of these
assumptions, we have shown how intergenerational insurance and mobility may be
shaped by the tax and subsidy system.
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3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Planner problem: recursive formulation and results
In this appendix we present the problem of a utilitarian planner who maximizes
the welfare of generations under incentive compatibility constraints. The socially-
optimal solution of this problem requires that families truthfully reveal their hidden
ability. We first present both the primal and the dual problem of the planner. We
then provide the recursive formulation of the relaxed dual problem, based on the
first-order approach.33 We use the first-order conditions of the relaxed problem to
derive the key equations (3.3) and (3.4) discussed in Section 3.5 of the main text.
Stating the problem of the planner requires that we discuss incentive compatibility.
Incentive compatibility.—We focus on a direct revelation mechanism which en-
sures that families truthfully report their type in each generation. We denote the
history of types within a given family as θt ≡ {θ0, θ1, ..., θt} and history dependent
allocations as xt (θ
t) ≡ {ct (θ
t) , ht+1 (θ
t) , yt (θ
t)} . The feasible set X contains all
sequences x ≡ {xt (θ
t)}Tt=1 of measurable functions xt : Θ
t → R3+. Using the pro-
duction function to substitute lt in the utility function and writing U (ct, yt, ht, θt)
instead of U(ct, lt), preferences of a family dynasty for an allocation x are






















where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time
0 and β is the discount factor of the family.
Family dynasties can choose any reporting strategy r ≡ {rt (θ
t)}Tt=1 from the
set R containing all sequences of measurable functions rt : Θ
t → Θ. The types are
private information so that an allocation must be incentive compatible to ensure
truthful reporting, i.e.,
(IC) : U (x) ≥ U (x ◦ r) , for all r ∈R, (3.5)
33This approach replaces the incentive-compatibility constraints with an envelope condition that
needs to be satisfied on the equilibrium path on which families truthfully reveal their type.
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where (x ◦ r) (θt) ≡ {xt (r
t (θt))}∞t=1 is the allocation x resulting from the reporting
strategy r and history θt.
Primal problem.—We assume a utilitarian planner who weighs the welfare of
each family dynasty equally and discounts the future less than a dynasty, i.e. ψ > β.
See Kocherlakota (2010), chapter 5, p. 146, for a textbook treatment. The planner
can fully diversify the idiosyncratic ability risk that family dynasties face. Since
there are no general equilibrium feedbacks that link the problems of the dynasties,
the planner can maximize aggregate welfare by maximizing welfare of each dynasty.
For a utilitarian planner, the problem of insuring family dynasties under the veil of
ignorance (from the perspective of period 0) is equivalent to the problem of optimal
redistribution across family dynasties with different initial conditions. The primal
















where zt is the per-period net cost (i.e., zt ≡ ct+g(ht+1, ht)−yt), Γ0 is a given level of
average discounted costs, V is a (promised) utility level and q ≡ 1/(1+r). Without
loss of generality, we can assume an initial (distribution of) promised utility.
We consider the constant discount factor ψ in the planner’s objective. In the
derivation of the planner’s objective in Kocherlakota (2010), p. 147, the discount
factor is time varying and converges to ψ if ψ > β and t→ ∞. See also Kocherlakota
(2010), p. 157. We abstract from possible time variation in the planner’s discount
factor assuming that the planning objective has converged. This has the advantage
that our transition analysis after the tax reform in Section 3.6 is not confounded by
changes in the discount factor over time on the transition path.
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Incentive constraints for the recursive formulation and the first-order approach.—
We replace the ex-ante incentive constraint (3.5) with an ex-post requirement to
write the planner’s dual problem in recursive form.34 For this purpose, we define




























dF (θt+1| θt) , (3.9)
for all t = 1, ...,∞. Families compare the continuation value ω (θt) of truthful


































dF (θt+1| θt) .









, for all θt and all r ∈R. (3.10)
We use xIC to denote the set of all allocations x satisfying (3.10).35
Problem (3.8) requires to keep track of all the out-of-equilibrium payoffs to check
the incentive constraint (3.10). Applying the first-order approach, we reduce the
34In this part we draw heavily on material in Koeniger and Prat (2018) which we present here
for completeness.
35Note that allocations in xIC are incentive compatible for all θt ∈ Θt. This requires truth
telling to be optimal after any history of shocks, whereas the incentive constraint (3.5) only
requires truth telling to be ex-ante optimal. The two notions can only differ on a set of measure
zero histories. In other words, allocations that are ex-ante incentive compatible are also ex-post
incentive compatible almost everywhere.
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complexity of the problem by replacing the incentive constraint with an envelope
condition which only depends on the marginal utility of truthtellers. As in Koeniger





t) , yt (θ













Intuitively, if one considers a one-shot perturbation of the type θt in equation (3.9),
the sum of all the derivatives of terms with respect to the report of the type is zero,
once the derivatives are evaluated on the equilibrium path where truthful reporting
is optimal. Equation (3.11) reduces to the condition prevailing in Mirrlees’ static
setting if types are i.i.d. In this case, the second term on the right-hand side of (3.11)
vanishes. The second term on the right-hand side is relevant instead if types are
persistent because unobserved ability then generates additional private information.
For example, parents who underreport their type become more optimistic than the
planner about the ability of their children if types are positively correlated.
Replacing the incentive constraint by (3.11) greatly simplifies the optimization
problem because it only depends on the continuation utility of truthtellers and
not on the continuation utility of all possible types. Defining xFOA as the set of
allocations so that condition (3.11) holds for all θt, we note that xIC ⊆ xFOA.
Replacing the incentive constraint in problem (3.8) by x ∈ xFOA thus relaxes this
problem.
Recursive relaxed problem.—We write the relaxed problem in recursive form so
that we can solve it as sequence of standard optimal control problems. Denoting
with “′” values of variables one period in the future and with “−” values of variables
with a one-period lag, the stationary recursive problem is:





[c(θ) + g(h′(θ), h)− y(θ) + qΓ (V ′(θ),W ′(θ),Φ′(θ), h′(θ), θ)] dF (θ|θ−)},
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s.t. ω(θ) = U(c(θ), y(θ), h, θ) + βV ′(θ), (3.12)



















∂U (c, y, h, θ)
∂θ
+ βΦ′(θ). (3.17)
Equations (3.12) and (3.13) define the continuation values using the discount
factor of the family and planner, respectively. Equations (3.14) and (3.15) are
the respective promise keeping constraints. Because of the persistence of ability,
the planner keeps track how reports of ability in the last period change promised
utility so that the problem also has a threat-keeping constraint (3.16). The envelope
condition (3.17) is the incentive compatibility constraint as explained above.
The recursive problem is standard but for the additional constraints (3.13) and
(3.15) which enter the problem because the planner discounts the future at a differ-
ent rate than the family dynasties. Substituting (3.13) into (3.15), and substituting
U(·) using (3.12) and (3.14), we obtain




ψW ′(θ)− βV ′(θ)
)
dF (θ|θ−). (3.18)
The problem has therefore one more state variable W and equation (3.18) as addi-
tional constraint, which replaces (3.13) and (3.15). The additional state variable and
constraint (3.18) would be redundant if the planner and the dynasties discounted
the future at the same rate because W = V and
∫
Θ
ψW ′(θ)− βV ′(θ)dF (θ|θ−) = 0
in this case.
Optimality conditions.—We use the separability of utility in consumption and
labor effort to solve constraint (3.12) for consumption. We then substitute the
resulting consumption c(ω(θ) − βV ′(θ), y(θ), h, θ) into the objective function. The
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Hamiltonian reads
H =[c(ω(θ)− βV ′(θ), y(θ), h, θ) + g(h′(θ), h)− y(θ) (3.19)
+ qΓ(V ′(θ),W ′(θ),Φ′(θ), h′(θ), θ)]f(θ, θ−)








W − V −
(











The first-order conditions for h′, y and Φ′ remain qualitatively unchanged com-
pared with those reported in Appendix A of Koeniger and Prat (2018). We thus
focus on the first-order necessary conditions which generate new insights. The first-
order condition for V ′ is
β
∂u(c(θ))/∂c(θ)
− βη = q
∂Γ(V ′(θ),W ′(θ),Φ′(θ), h′(θ), θ)
∂V ′(θ)
(3.20)
and the first-order condition for W ′ is
ηψ = q
∂Γ(V ′(θ),W ′(θ),Φ′(θ), h′(θ), θ)
∂W ′(θ)
. (3.21)
We now use these two equations to derive a modified reciprocal Euler equation
and the key equations (3.3) and (3.4) discussed in Section 3.5 of the main text. As
a first step, we substitute the envelope condition ∂Γ/∂W = η into equation (3.21)
which implies
ηψ = qη′(θ). (3.22)
The shadow price of the new constraint (3.18) thus evolves deterministically which
simplifies the numerical solution.
Next, we substitute the envelope condition ∂Γ/∂V = λ − η into first-order
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η′(θ) + η. (3.23)













This is the modified reciprocal Euler equation because λ′(θ) = E[(∂u(c′(θ′))/∂c′(θ′))−1|θ̂],
as can be shown following the same steps as in the proof of Remark 1 in Koeniger
and Prat (2018), for example. Note that the expectation conditions on the history
of abilities until the current period which we denote by θ̂.





















For the implementation of the reform, as discussed in further detail in Section
3.9.3, we set η = λ at the time of the reform. We now show that this choice implies
that average consumption changes at the time of the reform and remains constant
afterwards at its steady state level if ψ = q, i.e., if the planner’s discount rate equals
the real interest rate r. Equation (3.25) implies that for η = λ and ψ = q,
E[(∂u(c′(θ′))/∂c′(θ′))−1] = E[λ′] = η. (3.26)
Iterating forward, using (3.25) with a one-period lead, η = E[λ′] and ψ = q, it
follows that average consumption remains constant after an initial adjustment at
the time of the reform.
Long-run properties.— If we take unconditional expectations on both sides of
(3.24) and rearrange using that E[η] = E[λ], we obtain key equation (3.3) in Section
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Clearly, stationarity of consumption requires ψ = q. Substituting this into the
modified reciprocal Euler equation (3.24), we obtain key equation (3.4) in Section



















For β/ψ < 1, 1/u′(c(θt)) follows a mean-reverting process. This recovers, for our
model setting, results in Farhi and Werning (2007), p. 380, or Kocherlakota (2010),
p. 158.
Note that we get the standard reciprocal Euler equation if η = 0, in which
case the constraint for providing a certain amount of welfare W is slack, or if
ψ = β so that the immiseration result applies. As we have just seen, stationarity of
consumption in the planner problem requires ψ = q; and a stationary distribution
in the decentralized calibrated economy with incomplete markets requires q > β.
Thus, ψ > β seems a rather natural assumption.
The steady state consumption level is determined by the resources of the planner,
as mentioned in Farhi and Werning (2007), p. 385, and η0 = ∂Γ0/∂W0 measures
the marginal cost for the planner of providing social welfare W0 in period 0. We
can index the planner problem by η0 since the entire sequence of multipliers ηt is
deterministic. This property not only simplifies the numerical solution but also the
implementation of the reform, as we explain further in Appendix 3.9.3.
3.9.2 Numerical solution
We solve problem of dynasties applying the endogenous gridpoint method, as ex-
plained in the online Appendix C of Koeniger and Prat (2018). The planner problem
is solved building on the programs of Farhi and Werning (2013).
For the dynastic problem we use a grid of 75 points for bequests, 100 points for
human capital, and 12 points for ability θ. Consistent with our interpretations of
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log(h) as non-compulsary schooling years in the Mincer wage regression, the lowest
grid point of human capital is exp(0) = 1. Note that the cost function thus implies
a very small minimum expenditure for education over a 30-year period of $600 for
the calibrated parameter values.










xmi is the i-th moment generated by the model and x
d
i is the corresponding target
moment in the data. We compute a moment xmi in the stationary distribution
by simulating the model for 500,000 dynasties. To calibrate the model, we start
by performing a global search on a parameter grid to minimize this expression.
From the best parameters thus obtained we then use the Nelder-Meade optimization
algorithm to further improve on the fit of the model. With this strategy we are able
to reduce D close to zero, i.e. to fit the data precisely.
For the numerical solution of the planner problem, we follow Farhi and Werning
(2013), pp. 614-615, and replace the state variables (V,Φ) with the multipliers
(λ, γ). This has computational advantages because the domain of the multipliers is
bounded below. Furthermore, conditioning the problem on λ allows us to solve the
first-order conditions to determine the allocation and then obtain V by integrating
once over the utility of that allocation. Similarly, conditional on γ, we can obtain
Φ by integrating once. This speeds up the numerical solution because otherwise
we would have to ensure, for example, that the chosen allocation integrates to V
and computationally expensive integration potentially would have to be performed
many times.
We choose a grid of 17 points for λ, 12 points for γ, 18 points for h, 25 points
for θ−, and 26 points for ǫ. All programs are implemented in julia. On a standard
processor of the current vintage, solving the calibrated economy takes 2 minutes
and solving the planner problem takes 30 hours.
3.9.3 Implementation of the reform to attain the social optimum
In this section we describe how we construct the reform to attain the social optimum
starting from the steady state of the calibrated economy. We first simulate the
calibrated economy for M = 500, 000 households. We approximate the stationary
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distribution by simulating the economy for 100 generations. We label the steady-
state of the calibrated economy as t = −1. The planner proposes the reform at
t = 0. Note that the reform is proposed after consumption and human capital
investment decisions by the parents have been made but before their childrens’
types are realized and therefore before the children make their decisions.
To focus on the implications of the reform for insurance, we abstract from re-
distribution between dynasties by holding constant the present discounted value
of net costs of each dynasty’s allocation. The reported welfare gains are thus not
confounded by wealth effects. We now describe in more detail how we implement
the reform.
Resource constraint.— In the calibrated economy, households pay a positive
amount of net taxes to the government. These taxes can be thought of being used
to finance an exogenous stream of government expenditures which in the calibrated
economy amount to 27 percent of average labor earnings. Since we do not model the
expenditure side of the government, we assume that the planner has to continue to
raise the amount of resources required for these government expenditures. In other
words, the net government surplus in the reformed economy equals the surplus in
the calibrated economy so that the planner does not have more resources available
due to some arbitrary assumption about a change in the size of that surplus in
the reform. Each dynasty in state s = (b, h, θ) at the time of the reform has to
contribute the same amount of net-taxes t(s) as in the calibrated economy. Then
the planner’s allocation satisfies for each state
Γ̂η(λ(s), 0, h(s), θ) = (1 + r)b(s) + t(s), (3.27)
where Γ̂η(·) is the expected cost for the planner of providing the allocations for the
dynasties conditional on the state variables of the relaxed planner problem derived
in Appendix 3.9.1. Note that Γ̂η(·) is the cost function for any value of η once
the state variables (V,Φ) have been replaced by their multipliers (λ, γ), analogous
to Farhi and Werning (2013). The multiplier γ(s) = 0 for all dynasties in state s
because, apart from the utility promise and the parents’ ability, there is no further
restriction from history so that the threat-keeping constraint is not binding in the
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reform period.
The remaining degree of freedom in equation (3.27) is η0 at the time of the reform
which depends on the resources available to the planner. We set η0(s) = λ0(s) which,
by the envelope condition ∂Γ/∂V = λ− η obtained in Appendix 3.9.1, implies that
a marginal variation of the promised utility V leaves the planner’s cost for the
allocation of a dynasty in state s unchanged.
Assets.— Given that the socially optimal allocation does not determine dynas-
ties’ assets or bequests, we briefly mention how we compute them after the reform.
If one interprets assets as the difference between the net present value of expendi-
tures and the net present value of earnings, as frequently done in the literature, the
counterpart of assets in the planner’s problem is the expected present value of net
costs Γ̃(s) for providing an allocation.
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3.9.4 Further results
Quintiles
yt / yt+1 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.42 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.05
2 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.11
3 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.18
4 0.11 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.27
5 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.40
Table 3.9.1: Earnings quintile transition matrix in
the steady state of the calibrated econ-
omy
Notes: The probabilities across columns
in each row may not add up to 1 because
of rounding.
Welfare Increase in Cost of Increase in
quintile years of schooling additional schooling ability (in standard deviations)
1 0.94 17,465 0.08
2 0.68 12,977 0.09
3 0.57 11,317 0.09
4 0.48 10,251 0.10
5 0.40 9,177 0.11
Table 3.9.2: Average increase in schooling and ability that is welfare equivalent to receiv-
ing an additional $10,000 as bequests, by welfare quintile
Standard deviations of logarithms
Bequests Schooling Labor effort Earnings Consumption
Calibrated economy 0.16 0.08 0.06 0.46 0.41
Social optimum
2nd generation after reform 0.39 0.06 0.10 0.51 0.36
Steady state of reform 1.04 0.07 0.16 0.53 0.55
Table 3.9.3: Standard deviations in the calibrated and reformed economy
Notes: For bequests we report the standard deviation of the level and not the logarithm because the
variable bequests can take negative values. Bequests after the reform correspond to the present value












Figure 3.9.1: Transition to the social optimum: evolution of distributions. Notes: The reform is implemented before generation 0
makes its choices. Units of monetary variables are in 10, 000 US-$ and labor supply is normalized by the average













































Figure 3.9.3: Transition to the social optimum: evolution of distributions for bottom quartile of ability distribution in each generation.
Notes: See Figure 3.9.1.
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3.9.5 Robustness analysis
This subsection presents the results of the robustness analysis. Table 3.9.4 shows
that the results on the evolution of insurance and mobility for our benchmark cali-
bration, presented in Table 3.6.3 in the main text, are robust across most alternative
calibrations. For convenience, we repeat the results of the benchmark case in the
first column of Table 3.9.4. Worth noting is that social mobility, in terms of the
correlation between ability and welfare, decreases and insurance increases in the
calibrated economy if we target the conditional mean of bequests in column (2).
This calibration implies more bequests than in the benchmark calibration and thus
less dependance of welfare on current ability.
Table 3.9.5 provides the corresponding details on the results of the calibration
for each of the considered robustness checks, in terms of the recalibrated parameter
values and the implied target statistics. We now provide further information for
each of the robustness checks.
Mean bequests as target.— We target the mean bequests of households that
received a bequest. As before, we convert the mean bequest of $408, 400 for house-
holds, reported in table 2 of Wolff and Gittleman (2014), into adult equivalents
dividing by 1.4 so that our target is $291, 714. As shown in the second column of
Table 3.9.5, the calibration matches this target quite closely.
Lower intergenerational elasticity of earnings as target.— We recalibrate the
model if we target a lower intergenerational earnings elasticity ι = 0.3, which is
at the low end of estimates reported in Chetty et al. (2014), table 1. The third
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Higher
Benchmark Mean bequests Lower IGE Higher Frisch complementarity
as target as target elasticity between θ and h
Pass-through coefficient
Calibrated economy 0.35 0.19 0.34 0.37 0.27
Social optimum
2nd generation after reform 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.32 0.21
Steady state after reform 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.22
Rank-rank corr(ability,welfare)
Calibrated economy 0.90 0.49 0.87 0.92 0.95
Social optimum
2nd generation after reform 0.38 0.19 0.26 0.42 0.38
Steady state after reform 0.24 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.27
Table 3.9.4: Robustness of results for insurance and social mobility
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Higher
Benchmark Mean bequests Lower IGE Higher Frisch complementarity
as target as target elasticity between θ and h
Recalibrated parameters
Discount factor (annualized) β 0.966 0.970 0.965 0.965 0.963
Persistence ρ 0.45 0.44 0.33 0.49 0.44
Education cost parameter κ 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017
Education cost parameter ς1 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.68 0.70
Education cost parameter ς2 -0.0005 -0.0489 -0.0514 0.0443 0.0177
Predictions for target statistics
Bequests 52,772 298,458 52,681 51,678 52,711
Average years of schooling S 12.75 12.73 12.77 12.71 12.88
Correlation(S ′, S) 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.46
Intergenerational earnings elasticity 0.45 0.43 0.30 0.48 0.44
Average net cost of an additional year of schooling 13,954 13,691 13,696 13,821 13,725
Table 3.9.5: Calibration results for robustness checks
column of Table 3.9.5 shows that the recalibrated model continues to match the
target statistics closely. Furthermore, the model-implied mobility matrix, displayed
in Table 3.9.6, matches more closely the estimated transition matrix reported in
Table 2 of Chetty et al. (2014). The match of the rank-rank correlation of income
also improves, as mentioned in footnote 18.
Higher Frisch elasticity.— We recalibrate the model for a larger Frisch elasticity
of 0.86 for aggregate hours, reported in Chetty et al. (2013), table 2. This elasticity
is based on micro-estimates from quasi-experimental studies and contains responses
of hours at the intensive and extensive margin. We thus set α = 2.16. The fourth
column of Table 3.9.5 shows that in the recalibrated model persistence of the ability
shock slightly increases to match the intergenerational earnings elasticity. This
quantitative result obtains because labor supply is not only a function of ability but
also of bequests and human capital. If labor supply instead were a power function
of ability, then one can show that a higher Frisch elasticity would only affect the
variance of log income but not the persistence of log income across generations.
Further note that ς2 is calibrated to be positive, implying that families with lower
human capital have a cost advantage for educating their children (which can be
motivated, for example, because of lower opportunity costs).
Higher complementarity between human capital and ability.— We recalibrate
our model to match the complementarity between years of schooling and ability, as
suggested by findings in the second row of table 3 in Cunha et al. (2006). Using test
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results of the AFQT as a measure of ability, they find that the return to one year
of college in percent at the 95-th percentile of the ability distribution is 1.6 times
higher than the return at the 5-th percentile of the ability distribution (and not
constant across the ability distribution as implied by the Cobb-Douglas assumption
for productivity). We use this target to calibrate the elasticity of substitution χ
between ability θ and human capital h in the function for productivity. Because
wages are no longer log-separable in ability and years of schooling if productivity
is not Cobb-Douglas, we also calibrate the variance of the innovation of the ability
process and the parameter ξ using the variance of residual wages of 0.2, obtained
from a Mincer wage regression on the years of schooling, and the return to schooling
of 0.1 as target statistics.36 The calibration of these parameters is done jointly with
the other parameters reported in Table 3.9.5. Our recalibration results in χ = 0.786,
σ2ǫ = 0.295 and ξ = 0.73 compared with χ = 1, σ
2
ǫ = 0.217 and ξ = 0.9 in the
benchmark calibration. The additional targets are matched well by the recalibrated
model: the return to the first year of college at the 95-th percentile of the ability
distribution is 1.6 times higher than the return at the 5-th percentile of the ability
distribution, the variance of residual wages is 0.2 (both statistics equal the respective
target up to three digits of precision), and the return to schooling is 0.09. The fifth
column of Table 3.9.5 shows that the recalibrated model also continues to match
the other targets reasonably well where ς2 is calibrated to be positive, as in the
robustness check with the higher Frisch elasticity.
36Given that we observe ability in our simulated data based on the model, we obtain the model
counterpart for the unbiased empirical estimate of the return to schooling by controlling for ability
in the regression. In the empirical literature, identification of the return to schooling is based on




yt / yt+1 1 2 3 4 5
1 0.35 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.08
2 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.14
3 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.20
4 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.25
5 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.32
Table 3.9.6: Earnings quintile transition matrix, in
the steady state of the calibrated econ-
omy, targeting an intergenerational
elasticity of earnings of 0.3
Notes: The probabilities across columns
in each row may not add up to 1 because
of rounding.
3.9.6 Details on the wedges and the approximate implementation
In the laissez faire each dynasty solves the maximization problem37









s.t. b′(θ) = (1 + r)b− c(θ)− g(h′(θ), h) + y(θ),
y(θ) = Y (h, θ, l(θ)),
ln(θ) = ρ ln(θ−) + ǫ,
where the family chooses functions b′, h′, l, c : Θ → R. Note that, as in the planner
problem but differently to the calibrated economy presented in Section 3.2, we
make the common assumption that the dynasty faces no borrowing constraint in
the laissez faire. Thus, below we obtain the standard definitions of the wedges based
on the first-order conditions of the laissez faire problem.
37The first-order conditions of this problem are equivalent for the problem WL (b(θ), h(θ), θ) =
max{b′(θ),h′(θ),l(θ),c(θ)}
{[
U (c(θ), l(θ)) + β
∫
Θ




, s.t. the constraints.
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The first-order conditions for bequests, human capital and labor supply are:
∂U (c, l)
∂c































Based on these first-order conditions and given the separability of the utility
function, the history-dependent wedges at time t for bequests τb,t, human capital


















































t) , ht (θ
t−1) , θt)/∂yt
∂u (ct (θt)) /∂ct
, (3.31)
where the function v(·) denotes the disutility of labor once we have substituted
labor using the production function.
The social optimum can be decentralized with a general, history-dependent tax
schedule as shown, for example, in Stantcheva (2017). We will approximate the
implementation of the social optimum with a history-independent and linear tax
schedule. With this goal in mind, we now specify an auxiliary, decentralized problem
for each dynasty that helps us to explain how we approximate the linear history-



































yt = Y (ht, θt, lt),
ln(θ) = ρ ln(θ−) + ǫ,
where the tax shifter T (θt) becomes a transfer if negative, and the conditioning
of that shifter and the taxes tj,t (·), j = b, h, y, on the history imply general, possibly
non-linear tax schedules across dynasties with different histories. These general
tax schedules allow to implement the social optimum and this can be achieved
also by conditioning taxes on the history of observable variables such as output
and education expenditures. As discussed in Stantcheva (2017), for example, this
requires that the history of these observable variables allows to identify θt.
Note that tb,t (θ
t−1) is the tax rate applied at the time parents choose bequest bt
and th,t (θ
t) increases the cost of a year of schooling, g(ht+1, ht), so that th,t (θ
t) < 0
has the interpretation of a subsidy for human capital investment ht+1. For realism,
we implement the conditioning of taxes or transfers on human capital by linking
the tax or subsidy for human capital to education expenditures.
We proceed by linking the taxes tj,t (·), j = b, h, y to the respective wedges and
then use these relationships to approximate linear, history-independent taxes.
Labor income tax.—The first-order condition for labor supply or income y and
the definition of the labor wedge (3.31) imply that the marginal income tax of a
dynasty with a certain history θt equals the labor wedge, i.e. ty,t (θ
t) = τl,t (θ
t). In
Section 3.7 we are interested in how well the social optimum can be approximated
with simpler linear taxes that do not depend on history. Given the non-tractability
of solving for the optimal linear taxes, as mentioned in the main text, we proceed as
Farhi and Werning (2013) or Stantcheva (2017) and approximate the linear income
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so that every dynasty faces the same labor income tax.
Bequest tax.— The first-order condition with respect to bt+1 implies that
∂u (ct)
∂ct












Thus, comparison with equation (3.28) implies that bequests of a dynasty with
a certain history θt should be taxed at rate τb,t(θ
t).38 We approximate the bequest








































































The equation shows that a positive wedge for human capital does not necessarily
38As discussed in Kocherlakota (2010), taxation of assets generally has to be implemented ex
post, after realization of θt+1, thus ensuring that the Euler equation of families is satisfied for each
consumption level at the reported ability. We approximate this ex-post heterogeneity in the tax
rate when we consider non-linear taxes below.
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imply a positive current marginal tax on human capital accumulation. The second
term inside the expectation operator on the right-hand side shows that the sign
and size of the tax also depends on how human capital changes labor income and
thus labor-income taxes in the next period, how human capital changes the cost
for education in the next period, and how these changes are correlated with the
marginal utility of consumption. In particular, the planner has to undo the dis-
tortion on human-capital accumulation implied by labor-income taxation, as shown
in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), and the distortion implied by the tax/subsidy on
human capital next period. Note that through the stochastic discount factor, any
distortion of the bequest decision also influences the tax/subsidy on human capital.
Furthermore, effects of human capital accumulation on incentives are captured as
well through the wedge τh,t. Such effects occur if productivity is not Cobb-Douglas
as emphasized, for example, by Stantcheva (2017).
As for the other taxes, we approximate the linear tax or subsidy for human








Given the recursive nature of equation (3.39), we use the approximated taxes
in t + 1 when approximating taxes in t. This ensures consistent use of the linear
tax approximations in the dynasties’ problem to compare the decentralized problem
with the approximated linear tax schedule to the social optimum. We thus solve
problem (3.32) replacing the general tax schedules with the approximated linear
taxes tj,t, j = b, h, y, and compare the welfare gains of this economy with simple
linear taxes to the welfare gains of the social optimum with implicit non-linear and
history-dependent taxes.
For the welfare comparisons of the decentralized economy with a simple non-
linear approximation of the tax schedules, mentioned in footnote 31, we assume
ty,t (yt, θ
t), tb,t+1 (bt+1, θ
t) and th,t (ht+1, θ
t) in the auxiliary problem (3.32). I.e., we
capture explicitly some of the non-linearities of the tax schedules by letting the
income tax depend on the current income, by letting the bequest tax depend on the
bequest level and by letting the subsidies for human capital expenditures depend on
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the size of these expenditures. This allows, for example, to capture explicitly the
progressivity emphasized by Farhi and Werning (2010) in the context of bequest
taxation. The tax schedules still condition on the history given that the ability
shocks are persistent and not i.i.d. so that the history is not fully encoded in
the endogenous state variables. The first-order conditions of the auxiliary problem






















































































is the elasticity of education expenditures
with respect to human capital. Note the right-hand side of (3.42) differs from
the right-hand side of (3.28) because we approximate the non-linear tax schedule
for bequests based on the implementation discussed in Kocherlakota (2010), which
conditions on the current realization of the shock. See also Farhi and Werning
(2010), p. 664, for this type of implementation in an intergenerational model.
Approximating the non-linearity of each tax with a quadratic function, the re-
spective tax rate is linear, i.e., t(x) = α̃+β̃x. The left-hand side of equations (3.41),
(3.42) and (3.43) then becomes
α̃y,t + 2β̃y,tyt, (3.44)
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where (3.46) follows from the parametric assumption for the cost function g(h′, h) =
κ(h′)ς1hς2 and from the change of variable S = ln(h) to express the tax rate as a





Analogously to the approximation of the linear taxes (and constant tax rates),
we can then approximate the simple non-linear tax schedules by regressing the right-
hand side of equations (3.41), (3.42), (3.43) for each generation t on a constant and
x = yt, bt+1, St+1, respectively.
40 Given the recursive nature of equation (3.43), we
use the approximated taxes in t+ 1 when approximating taxes in t, as before.
The estimated regression coefficients α̂x,t and β̂x,t, for each generation t, then
allow us to identify the parameters of interest α̃x,t and β̃x,t, x = y, b, S with the
following system of equations:
α̂y,t = α̃y,t, (3.47)
α̂b,t = α̃b,t, (3.48)




β̂y,t = 2β̃y,t, (3.50)
β̂b,t = 2β̃b,t, (3.51)
39See Section 3.3 for an explanation why S = ln(h) in our model.
40The approximation of the linear tax with the cross-sectional average obtains if we only regress
the right-hand sides on a constant.
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β̂S,t = β̃S,t. (3.52)
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